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Body and Material Substance 
in the Periphyseon of John Scottus Eriugena 
An Abstract 
It has been argued (by Richard Sorabji among others) that in the Periphyseon John 
Scottus Eriugena (? 800 - ? 877) presents an immaterialist theory of corporeal 
substance. I argue that as it stands this claim requires qualification. At Points in the 
Periphyseon Eriugena's theory of body presupposes a material substrate. In Part One 
of this study I aim to show - by an analysis of Eriugena's definitions of form, 
substance, and matter - that the immaterialist and substrate theories, although prima 
facie inconsistent with one another, combine to form a single unified theory of body 
understood `dialectically. ' 
In Part Two I argue that, by mapping the philosophical notions of processio 
and reditus onto the Christian doctrines of Fall and Resurrection, Eriugena develops a 
theory of body according to which diversity is illusory (punishment for sin), and the 
`created' reality (man's pre-lapsarian state) is radical simplicity. The Fall is a fall into 
diversity, into effect; the Resurrection is a return to simplicity, to the Cause. 
Eriugena has primarily been thought of, both by his contemporaries and 
modern commentators, as a metaphysician, a liberal arts master, a Neoplatonist. 
Without denying that he is all or any of these, it is the aim of this study to show that 
his masterpiece - and in particular his theory of body - serves a practical purpose: to 
bring fallen human nature back into alignment with God. 
Through a radical de-historicizing of the doctrir:. es of Fall and Resurrection, 
and a dialectical understanding of the relation that obtains between Creator and 
creation, Eriugena presents a theory of body and material substance that is at once 
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i) Aims and Objectives: 
In its final analysis, the Periphyseon' of John Scottus Eriugena is an extended 
meditation upon the relation between God and creation. It is the aim of this study to 
offer a detailed examination of the role of body and material substance within that 
relationship. 
In Part One we shall attempt to demonstrate that Eriugena's various accounts 
of body and material substance can be taken to express a single coherent thesis. In 
Chapters One and Two we shall look at form and matter respectively. By the end of 
Part One it is hoped that we shall have a resilient model of Eriugenian body. Part Two 
shall then be taken up with an attempt to illustrate the role played by the body in the 
unfolding of Eriugena's broader metaphysics and theology. Chapter Three studies the 
role of body in the Fall; and Chapter Four ponders the death of the body, its 
resurrection and the return of human nature to God. 
The problems under discussion in Part One are, in a sense, internal to 
Eriugena's metaphysical schema. The problems that shall form the focus of Part Two 
are, as it were, external to the theory itself: is it now possible to show that the account 
of body developed in Part One is consistent with the incontrovertible teaching of Holy 
Scripture? 
In this sense the present study mirrors the form of the Periphyseon itself, being 
roughly divisible into two parts - the metaphysical groundwork occupies the lion's 
' For the title of the Periphyseon, see Sheldon-Williams, I. P., "The Title of Eriugena's Periphyseon, " 
Studia Patristica, 3 (Berlin, 1961) pp. 297-302 
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share of the opening sections; the later work consists in showing how the theory of 
body reached in Part One finds endorsement through scriptural exegesis. 
ii) The Problem: 
Influenced by his freshly absorbed Greek sources, the relationship between God and 
creation is conceived by Eriugena in terms of a Procession from God and a Return to 
God. 2 So, for example, in the Preface to his translation of Maximus the Confessor's 
Ambigua, Eriugena claims that Maximus reveals 
what sort of thing Procession is, namely a multiplication of the divine 
goodness through all the things that are, descending from the highest to the 
lowest, firstly from the general essence of all things, then through the most 
general genera, next through the more general genera, then the more specific 
species to the most specific species through differences and properties. And 
likewise, what sort of thing Reversion of the divine goodness is, namely a 
congregation, through the same stages from the infinite and multiplex variety 
of those things that are to the simplest unity of all things, which is in God and 
is God; so that God might be all things, and all things might be God. 3 
Even at this early stage in our investigation it is worth noting that the `movement 
language' of procession and return, is translatable, according to Eriugena, into 
language that does not imply movement: multiplication and congregation. This 
`static' rendering of classical Neoplatonic metaphysics will prove crucial to our 
analysis in Part Two of the Fall and Return as `alignments' of the will and the 
intellectual, perceptive faculties rather than as historical processes. 
2 See Jeauneau, E, "The Neoplatonic Themes of Processio and Reditus in Eriugena, " Dionysius 15 
(1991). For a clear and unequivocal expression of the view that the Periphyseon is an attempt to frame 
a new metaphysical structure for understanding the relation between God and man, see Moran, The 
Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1989) p. 68 
and p. 282: "Eriugena's philosophy is a daring attempt to express in dialectical terms the meaning of 
the relations between human and divine nature. " 
3 Versio Ambiguorum Sancti Maximi (PL 122 1195BC) my translation: qualis sit processio, id est, 
multiplicatio divinae bonitatis per omnia, quae sunt, a summo usque deorsum, per generalem omnium 
essentiam primo, deinceps per genera generalissima, deinde per genera generaliora, inde per species 
specialores usque ad species specialissimas per differentias proprietatesque descendens. Et iterum, 
eiusdem, divinae videlicet, bonitatis qualis sit reversio id est, congregatio per eosdem gradus ab 
infinita eorum, quae sunt, variaque multiplicatione usque ad simplicissimam omnium unitatem, quae in 
Deo est et Deus est; ita ut et Deus omnia sit, et omnia Deus sint. 
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Essential to an understanding of Eriugena's notion of the relationship between 
Creator and Creation is his theory of corporeal substance. After all, the material body, 
mutable, temporally bounded, either male or female, stands at the furthest reach from 
the changeless, eternal and perfectly simple Creator; it is therefore also the beginning 
of the ascent to God. 
The division of substances, which took its beginning from God, and, 
descending by degrees, reached its end in the division of man into male and 
female, and again the reunification of the same substances ought to begin from 
man and ascend through the same degrees to God Himself, in whom... there is 
no division because in Him all things are one; so the unification of natures will 
begin from man, through the grace of the Saviour, in Whom, as the Apostle 
says, there is neither male nor female when human nature shall be restored to 
its pristine state. 4 
Descending a ladder it is the rung closest to the ground you reach last, but it is also 
the first step in the ascent. The ladder is Dialectic, the "mother of all the arts. "5 There 
is a body of evidence to suggest that, in his own lifetime, Eriugena was thought of 
primarily as a liberal arts master. 6 And several modern commentators have adopted 
this view, arguing that the Periphyseon itself is, at least in its original conception, a 
treatise on dialectic or a guide to the use of dialectics in theological enquiry. 7 Over the 
4 II 532AB (all references to the Periphyseon 1,11, III, IV and V are according to the PL column 
classification. Except where stated, translations from the Periphyseon 1, II, III are by I. P. Sheldon- 
Williams. Translations from Periphyseon IV and V are by J. J. 0' Meara. ) 
5V 870B 
6 So for example Prudentius complains to Eriugena of tui quadruvii innodationibus ac depravationibus 
in his De Praedestinatione contra Johannem Scotum (PL 115 1020D). Florus Diaconus refers to 
Eriugena as homo quasi scolasticus et eruditus in his Adv. Johannis Scottis Definitiones and accuses 
him of humanis et... philosophicis argumentationibus disputans, nulla ratione reddita, nulla 
Scripturarum sive sanctorum patrum auctoritate praelata, velut tenenda et sequenda sola sua 
praesumptione definire ausus est. (PL 119 102B - 103 A). Note that both these sources - Prudentius 
and Florus - are hostile to Eriugena in the predestination controversy. 7 For examples of the view that the Periphyseon is primarily concerned with dialectic see, Ueberweg, A 
History of Philosophy, Vol. 1 (London, 1875) p. 360 where Ueberweg claims that Eriugena 
hypostasizes the tabula logica. The same point is made by Sheldon-Williams, see Sheldon-Williams, 
"The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena, " The 
Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967) p. 521. 
Sheldon-Williams claims that the original purpose of the Periphyseon was to show that the 
dialecticians' table of contraries and contradictories had a metaphysical counterpart. See also Sheldon- 
Williams's introduction to I p. 5. See also, Roques, "Remarques sur la Signification de Jean Scot 
Erigene" Divinitas XI (1967) p. 253; Huber, Johannes Scotus Erigena: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
Philosophie und Theologie im Mittelalter (repr. Hildesheim, 1960) pp. 160,163. 
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course of the following analysis it should become clear that, although the Periphyseon 
contains a dialectical account of God's relationship with creation, this does not mean 
that dialectics is the subject of the enquiry. Rather, it is by means of dialectics that 
Eriugena attempts to resolve the divisions he finds in universal nature, a resolution 
that ultimately aims to unify God and creation. Indeed, for Eriugena, the practice of 
philosophy (particularly dialectics) is itself an ascent to God. 8 
The nature of matter and corporeal substance within this dialectical 
relationship will prove of utmost importance for the working out of God's plan as 
conceived by Eriugena: 
What should be more important, after God, for the reason to consider than 
unformed matter I do not see, when the questions it raises are: what is matter? 
What is form? What is made from matter and form? Whence (comes) matter? 
Is it to be included among the primordial causes which were created by God 
first of all, or even from the secondary causes which proceed from the 
primordials? Is it to be reckoned among If; he things which are subject to the 
sense or among those which are to be allotted to the intellect? And can it be 
defined when it is still infinite or is it definable even when it is finite? - which 
seems to conflict with reason, since it has been clearly established by the holy 
fathers that there are two, and two only, that cannot be defined, God and 
matter. For God is without limit and without form since He is formed by none, 
being the Form of all things (forma omnium). Similarly matter is without form 
and without limit, for it needs to be formed and limited from elsewhere, while 
in itself it is not form but something that. can receive form. And this similarity 
between the Cause of all things, from which and in which and through which 
and for which all things exist, and this unformed cause -I mean matter - 
which was created to the end that those things which in themselves cannot be 
8 In this respect Eriugena is closer to the late Neoplatonic commentators for whom the telos of 
philsophical enquiry is likeness to God, than to the Scholastics. See Sorabji, The Philosophy of the 
Commentators 200 - 600AD Vol. 1 Psychology (Duckworth, 2004) pp. 319-328. 
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grasped by the sense might by some means have a sensible appearance in it, is 
understood in contrary sense. 9 
Now that we have placed matter and corporeal substance squarely at the heart of 
Eriugena's metaphysical and theological scheme we need to expose the first core 
problem of this enquiry. 
There are in the Periphyseon several definitions of corporeal substance or 
body; we might think of them as `formulae', lists of ingredients that go to make up 
complex bodies. The commonest definition of body to be found in the Periphyseon is 
that expressed by 
The Form + Matter Theory: 
Every corporeal and sensible creature is composed of matter and form. ' 0 
And, 
Qualitative form... combining with matter produces body. ' 1 
And, 
That form which is a species of quality, when it is joined to matter, produces a 
body. 12 
As well as the Form + Matter Theory we also find body defined in terms of its 
constituent elements: 
9I 499C-500A; Calcidius calls God, matter and the ideas, the summa genera and calls them primae 
substantiae (in Tim., 330). Eriugena cites Calcidius' commentary on the Timaeus in his glosses to 
Martianus. See Lutz, C. (ed. ) Annotationes ad Marcianum (Cambridge Massachussetts, 1939) p. 10 [7, 
10] and p. 22 [13,23]. For the debate over the attribution of the Martianus glosses to Eriugena see 
Michael Herren, "The Commentary on Martianus Attributed to John Scottus: Its Hiberno-Latin 
Background" in Allard, G. -H. (ed. ) Jean Scot Ecrivain (Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales, 1986) 
pp. 269,271-272,274,285. Schrimpf, "Zur Frage der Authentizitat unserer Texte von Johannes 
Scottus' Annotationes in Martianum, " in J. J. O'Meara and Ludwig Bieler (eds. ) The Mind of Eriugena, 
(Dublin, 1973) pp. 125-39; Marenbon, John, From the Cicrle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre 
(Cambridge, 1981) pp. 117-119; John J. O'Meara, Eriugena (Oxford, 1988) pp. 25-26. For the 
availability of Calcidius in the ninth century see Edouard Jeauneau, "L'Heritage de la Philosophie 
Antique" in his Etudes Erigeniennnes (Etudes Augustiniennes Paris, 1987) pp. 39-40; Cappuyns, M., 
Jean Scot Erigene, Sa Vie, Son Oeuvre, Sa Pensee, (Louvain-Paris, 1933) p. 392 n. 4; E. Mensching, 
"Zur Calcidius-ueberlieferung" in Vigiliae Christianae 19 1965 pp. 42-56. 
10 11 54813: omnis siquidem corporalis sensibilisque creatura ex materia et forma constitutur. 
11 11170 1 D: Qualitativa forma... adiuncta materiae corpus effecit. 
12 I 495BC: eam formam quae species qualitatis est materiae superadditam corpus cui oloza 
subsistitperficere. See also I 494A; IV 786C: corpore (hoc est ex formata materia sensibili). 
10 
The Elemental Theory: 
All bodies... are composed from the coming together of the four simple 
elements, extending from the greatest to the smallest. 13 
And, 
Body is a compound welded together of the qualities of the four elements 
under a single species. 14 
Throughout the Periphyseon we also find body defined as an agglomeration of 
immaterial properties or qualities. This definition we shall refer to as 
The Immaterialist Theory: 
Body, when the accidents are withdrawn, can by no means subsist by itself 
since it is not supported by any substance of its own. For if you withdraw 
quantity from body it will not be a body... similarly if you take quality away 
from it, what is left is shapeless and nothing. The same view must be taken of 
the other accidents by which the body is seen to be held together. So that 
which cannot subsist by itself without accidents must be understood to be 
nothing else but the concourse of those same accidents. 15 
That the three formulae are in tension with one another (if not actually logically 
inconsistent) should be clear from the outset. The most obvious divergence between 
the three is the space each formula makes for matter. In the first formula matter is 
clearly a crucial constituent in the composition of body; it seems to act as a substrate 
for the inhering of the forms. In the Elemental Theory we can still assume a role for 
matter, after all the elements themselves are presumably material in some 
13 11170 1 A: omnium corporum ex quattuor simplicium elimentorum coitu compositorum ex maximis 
usque ad minima. For the elements in the Periphyseon see, 1479AB; 1492B; II 605C - 606A; III 
663B; III 664A; III 695BC; 11170 1 A; 111 711 D-71313; IV 775B; IV 783AB; IV 801 D; IV 858A; V 
874A; V 896CD; V 902AB; V 958CD. 
14 I 474B: corpus est compositio quaedam quattuor elementorum qualitatibus sub una quadam specie 
conglobata. The stress on qualities in this definition points towards the Immaterialist Theory. See also I 
479A: corpora quae ex coitu quattuor mundi elementorum conficiuntur. For a clear and helpful account 
of the elements' relation to matter and body in Eriugena, see Dermot Moran, "Time, Space and Matter 
in the Periphyseon. An Examination of Eriugena's Understanding of the Physical World, " 0' Rourke 
(ed. ) At the Heart of the Real. Philosophical Essays in Honour of the Most Reverend Desmond Connell 
Archbishop of Dublin (Irish Academic Press, 1992) pp. 67-96, esp. pp. 78-82. 
15 150313: Corpus autem subtractis addidentitubs nullo modo per se subsistere potest quoniam nulla sui 
substantia fulcitur. Nam si quantitatem a corpore subtraxeris corpus non erit ... 
Similiter si qualitatem 
ab eo dempseris deforme remanebit et nihil. Eadem ratio in caeteris accidentibus quibus corpus 
contineri videtur contemplanda est. Quod igitur sine accidentibus per se non potest subsistere nihil 
aliud intelligendum est praeter eorundum accidentium concursum esse. 
fundamental way. But in the last formula there is no mention of matter at all either 
directly, or indirectly as in the case of the Elemental Theory. Indeed matter would 
appear prima facie to be excluded by the Immaterialist Theory: body, according to 
this theory, is no more than a concourse of accidents that in themselves appear to be 
immaterial Aristotelian categories: Quantity, Quality and so on. 
In view of these apparently conflicting theories, the majority of interpreters of 
Eriugena have concluded that he is confused on the subject of material substance. It is 
our aim over the course of the following two chapters to show that what we have 
presented here as essentially a textual problem, a problem of consistency across the 
Periphyseon as a whole, is not so much a confusion on Eriugena's part, as a deliberate 
attempt to express a fundamental tenet of his metaphysical theology: the dialectical 
nature of the relation between God and creation. 
12 
Chapter One : Form 
Introduction: 
Aside from passing references throughout the whole of the Periphyseon, Eriugena 
gives detailed accounts of form and its relation to body in two places, firstly in Book 
One as part of his general discussion of the application of the categories to God (I 
462D - 524B), and secondly, in Book Three as part of his hexaemeral investigation. 
According to Eriugena the division of light from darkness on the First Day of creation 
is provisionally offered as a reference to the division of form and matter: 
The name of light is taken for the perfection of form, but that of darkness for 
the confusion of formlessness. ' 
It is these two sections of the Periphyseon to which we shall largely be referring over 
the following pages. It shall be found that there are a number of textual and 
terminological anomalies within the Periphyseon that appear to point to metaphysical 
confusions concerning form and its relation to material substance. Our primary 
objective in this chapter will be to show that, once we have taken into account 
variations in terminology and usage, it is possible to show that Eriugena actually 
presents a single, unified theory of form and its relation to body. 2 
To this end we shall first uncover some of the central difficulties that are 
raised by a close reading of Eriugena's account of form and its relation to material 
substance and then show how the difficulties are, in effect, superficial once placed 
within the dialectical structure of the Periphyseon conceived as a 'system'. 
III 691 CD; the interpretation is Augustinian, as Eriugena himself acknowledges, classing himself as 
amongst those Augustinum sequentes. See De Civ. Dei xi. 23; De Gen. ad litt. I. 17.34; iv. 22.39. 
2 Stephen Gersh suggests that Eriugena's variations in terminology, "the polysemy of etymology and 
metaphor, exhibit not intellectual weaknesses but intellectual strengths. " Gersh, Stephen, "John Scottus 
Eriugena and Anselm of Canterbury" in Marenbon (ed. ) Medieval Philosophy (Routledge, 2003) p. 
125. 
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I: Two Forms 
To complicate matters from the start, Eriugena distinguishes two `types' of form, 3 two 
species, each of a different genus, namely, forms of quality (forma qualitiva)4 and 
forms of substance (substantialis forma)5 or ousia. The former are ineluctably bound 
to the material flux - Qualitative Form (QF), the latter is form acting as the immutable 
ground of the body - Substantial Form (SF). Both QF and SF, Eriugena argues, are 
necessary constituents of a sensible body. 
A) Qualitative Form: 
QF is, according to Eriugena, immaterial in itself, 6 but is "joined to matter so as to 
constitute body. "7 It is "always varying and changeable, "8 and it is, "dispersed among 
diverse differences by accident. "9 It is signified in the Biblical text by the waters 
which are under heaven and which are in turmoil (exaestuant) and which cover over 
that inward substance (intima substantia). These waters wash around the SF and 
render it almost imperceptible as to what it is. When the Bible tells us that `Heaven 
and Earth shall pass away' (Marc. 13: 3 1) the reference is to matter and QF, not the SF. 
That QF is a necessary component of body has been discussed earlier by 
Eriugena in Book I where he has the Alumnus state that QF is, "a species of quality 
that, when it is joined to matter, produces a body, of which the substance is oix 'ux. "lo 
And again that when whatever form from quality is superadded to the material 
3 1496B: duas species diversi generis, ousiae videlicet atque qualitatis. 
4III701D 
5 III 702A 
6 14961): quantitates qualitatesque quantum in se ipsis cogitantur incorporeal esse. Note the quantum 
(insofar as) qualification. The dependence of QFs on point of view will prove vital later in making a 
case for the appearance of material substance depending on the alignment of the will and the epistemic 
faculty. 
7111703B 
8 III 703B 
9 III 703B: secundum accidens. 
10 1 495B 
14 
substrate then the complete body is made. 11 In essence the QF is a necessary suchness, 
without which a body is either a) cognitively unavailable, or b) is not a body. 
Disentangling a) and b) shall occupy the second half of Chapter Two when we come 
to discuss visibility and its relation to material substance. 
Leaving aside for now the question as to how it is that QFs make their sensible 
appearance in matter, we can at least assert that for Eriugena QF is an attribute of 
body and is to be found always in association with bodies. ' 2 In other words QFs are 
not to be found except in relation to bodies. To what extent, therefore, are QFs 
simply bodily components of the perfected body? On what basis is Eriugena able to 
maintain the view that QFs are immaterial, incorporeal in themselves and are 
superadded to a material substrate? 
i) Are QFs `Bodily'? 
As well as the passages in which Eriugena expresses the view that QFs are 
superimposed on matter in order for bodies to come to be, there are points at which he 
seems to suggest that QFs are themselves quasi-corporeal: 
Everything that exists is either a body, or bodiless, or something between the 
two which is called "corporal. " 13 
To which of these three modes of corporeality and incorporeality do QFs belong? A 
body is, according to Eriugena, "that which is extended in length, breadth and 
depth; " 14 it may be a physical object or a geometrical figure. Of course it is perfectly 
possible for a component of body to be itself a body. Nor on the face of it is it 
impossible for the body to comprise non-bodily elements. So it cannot be ruled out a 
11I 495D: materiam corporumfieri, cui adiecta qualicunque ex qualitateforma perfecta corpus 
efficitur. 
12 V 882C: semper corporibus adhaerent. 
13 V 882C: omne enim, quod est, auf corpus est, auf incorpoream, auf medium, quod corporate dicitur. 
14 V 882C 
15 
priori that QF is not itself bodily. If the accidents that compose body (QFs) are 
material then we can dismiss the possibility of Eriugena expressing an Immaterialist 
Theory of body. An example of that which is bodiless is life when isolated from 
matter. The corporal, Eriugena suggests, are such things as colour, shape and so on. 
And it is precisely these qualities that Eriugena has argued are, when considered in 
relation to bodies, QFs: 
The order and position of their [sc. natural bodies'] natural parts or members 
are assigned to quality and are properly called form. 15 
And he continues in an expansion: 
... Hence those are called deformed who do not possess a suitable harmony of 
their members or are deprived of the beauty of colour, which is produced in 
bodies from the fiery quality which is calor. 
But problems arise when QFs are taken to be `corporal. ' Compare the above account 
of QF with the passage from Book V in which colour and shape are described as 
corporal. In Books I and III bodies are decked (superfusae) 16 with colours which as 
forms are wholly distinct from bodies. So Eriugena quotes Gregory of Nyssa with 
approval: 
For softness, and two-cubit length, and the other things that have been 
mentioned [viz colour, weight, feel to the touch] are not, from the point of 
view of reason, confused with one another or with body. ' 7 
Colour, Gregory goes on to assert, is solely intelligible. And Eriugena, in his own 
words, emphatically endorses this view: 
Quantities and qualities, in so far as they are contemplated in themselves, are 
incorporeal. 18 
15 I 494CD 
16 III 710B 
"I 502C quoting Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio 24 (PG44 213A) 
18 I 496D (quoted in n. 6 above); Cf. IV 775B: quantitates similiter et qualitates intelligibilis naturae 
esse nulli sapienti dubium videtur. 
16 
So are the QFs inhering body corporal or incorporeal? Prima facie the QFs 
appear to be straightforward universals. Surely it cannot be the case that these 
universals are also somehow bodily, or corporal? 
An answer to this question can be formulated by observing that in the 
discussion of QF in Book III Eriugena suggests that, "matter and the form attached to 
it (QF) can be combined under a single meaning (unus intellectus est) since they 
produce a single body. " 19 And in the passage quoted above the QFs are described as 
not confused with one another or with body, "from the point of view of reason. , 20 It 
seems, on the basis of these two statements, that whether or not we wish afford QF 
`corporality' or incorporeality will depend on whether or not we wish to discuss the 
form abstracted from the body of which it is a constituent (from the point of view of 
reason), or in relation to that body. In relation to body, combined under a single 
meaning, it is corporal; abstracted from the body by reason it is incorporeal. 
Even at this early stage in our survey it is possible to see how - by means of 
this emphasis on point-of-view - the metaphysics of material substance will be made 
to depend on epistemology and the alignment of the will: what body is will depend 
ultimately on what value we believe it has. 
B) Substance and Substantial Form: 
Eriugena's notion of substance and substantial form (SF) is familiar inasmuch as a 
good deal of his thinking derives from Aristotle via Porphyry and Boethius and 
19 III 702B 
20 1 502C 
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Martianus Capella. 21 There are, in Eriugena, however, a number of unprecedented 
twists. These twists and ambiguities have led some scholars to suppose that 
Eriugena's theory of substance and SF is hopelessly confused. 22 It is the aim of what 
follows to show that, in fact, the twists and ambiguities do not represent a failure on 
Eriugena's part to assimilate his sources properly, as has been suggested, rather the 
apparent oddities concerning SF are deliberate and productive, illustrating Eriugena's 
dialectical understanding of the relation between Creator and creation. Ultimately our 
dialectical reflection on substance and SF is the means whereby the Return of all 
things to God is to be effected. 
The first thing to ensure is that the language we use to analyse Eriugena's 
theory is itself free from ambiguity. Eriugena tends to use the same words to refer to 
genus and species. As shall become apparent, this is not entirely, or not just, a stylistic 
device, or the result of an inconsistent terminology; there are underlying metaphysical 
reasons for the identical terminology. We on the other hand need to be clear as to 
exactly what Eriugena means us to understand by ousia, substance, essence and so on 
in each instance. 
To this end it is necessary to identify three stages, three differing uses of the 
term ousia or substance. Firstly, there is that substance that corresponds to the first of 
2! For Eriuegna's inheritance of the categorial tradition, see Marenbon, "John Scottus and the 
`Categoriae Decem"' reprinted in Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic, Platonism, and the Context of Early 
Medieval Philsophy in the West (Variorum, 2000) V pp. 117-134. For Eriugena's sources in general 
see, Sheldon-Williams, I. P., "Eriugena's Greek Sources" in 0' Meara, J. J. and Bieler, 
L. (eds. ) The 
Mind ofEriugena (Dublin, 1973) pp. 1-15; Madec, G., "Jean Scot et ses auteurs, " 
Allard, G. -H (ed. ) 
Jean Scot ecrivain (Montreal: Institut d' Etudes Medievales, 1986) pp. 143-86; Jeauneau, 
E., "Pseudo- 
Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Maximus the Confessor in the Works of John Scottus Eriugena, " 
Blumenthal (ed. ) Carolingian Essays (Washington, 1983) pp. 175-187. 
22 For example, Marenbon, op. cit., p. V 124: "Is this many-sidedness of meaning the product of a 
sophisticated philosophical system, which sets out - among other things - to solve the 
difficulties 
surrounding the concept of ousia? Or is it merely the result of John's 
failure fully to assimilate the 
diverse arguments of his sources? " Marenbon's answer falls squarely to the 
latter view; elsewhere 
Marenbon concludes that Eriugena's various uses of ousia, "do not themselves 
link to form a coherent 
logical picture. " Marenbon, From the Circle ofAlcuin to the School of 
Auxerre (Cambridge, 1981) 
p. 87. 
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the categories, understood not in the Aristotelian sense as that which can neither said 
of a subject, nor in a subject, but as the genus in which all substantial species 
participate. Let us call this, generic substance. Then there are the substantial species 
of generic substance; these are classes of things such as Man or Horse. Let us call 
these specific substances, and deriving from them are individual substances such as 
Cicero and Bucephalus and so on. These individual substances are the subjects of the 
QFs that invest them. To recapitulate, the species of generic substance, are not 
substantial bodies, but specific substances: Man, Horse and so on. The individual 
substance belongs within the Aristotelian tradition that defines ousia as that which is 
neither said of a subject nor in a subject; in other words it is the individual man, the 
individual horse. 23 
So far so Porphyrian. The Eriugenian twist comes, however, with the claim 
that there is no difference (or no substantial difference) between an individual 
substance and a specific substance; Cicero just is Man, Bucephalus just is Horse. This 
claim, far from being extraordinary or absurd, is actually trivial, even tautological, 
when understood in the context of Eriugena's metaphysics of substance. 
The substantial form (SF) is, for Eriugena, a unifying principle. It is that in 
virtue of which Cicero and Socrates qua individual substances are identical with the 
specific substance in which they both participate, Man. And to this extent the SF is 
identical to the specific substance from which they derive. `Man' is an example of a 
SF, and yet it, as a SF, is not greater in the infinite multiplication of human nature into 
its indivisible species than it is in the single first man, nor is it less in him than it is in 
23 Aristotle, Cat. 2a 11-14; cf. Categoriae Decem, Minio-Paluello (ed. ), Aristoteles Latinus 1,57 p. 146: 
est igitur usiaproprie etprincipaliter dicta quae neque in subiecto est neque de subiecto significatur, 
ut est hic homo vel hic equus. 
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the whole of human nature; it admits of no variation or dissimilarity. But Eriugena 
wants to say that both Cicero and Socrates despite being substantially identical still 
have individual SFs. 
There will always remain without change, like a centre, the natural essence 
which is proper to each individual, which can neither move nor increase nor diminish. 24 
SF, therefore, is ambiguous between individual substance and specific substance 
because individual substance and specific substance are identical. This is not strictly 
an ambiguity at all, but a reflection of the true substantial nature of things. The 
apparent ambiguity is deliberate on Eriugena's part; it is a function of his view that 
the genus... is whole in each of its forms, just as also the several forms are one 
in their genus. 25 
Eriugena's notion of SF is, therefore, a crucial element in his overall metaphysical 
theology. SF will be identified, over the course of the Periphyseon, with human nature 
in its pristine pre-lapsarian state, with Paradise, with the interior body, and with the 
resurrection body. It acts as the compass by means of which the individual can 
negotiate its alignment with the Creator. The SF of a body is its relation (an identity 
relation) with its cause (specific substance, and ultimately generic substance). To talk 
of an individual's SF is to refer to its substantial relation to its cause. 
Let us settle on this productively ambiguous definition of SF; it can be 
finessed in the light of the ensuing discussion. But the ambiguity, being essential to 
the notion of SF, cannot be eradicated. It must always be born in mind that the 
reference of 'SF' can range over individual substance, specific substance and 




Since it is the aim of this chapter to develop a model of how form relates to 
body and material substance, let us now turn to an examination of SF and its relation 
to body. 
i) SF and the Body: 
Eriugena has argued that a body is definable in terms of its matter and QF. The SF is 
superfluous in any such definition. 
Nutritor: Do you think that it is the essential form (SF) which, in 
combination with matter, produces natural body? 
Alumnus: Certainly not. Rather I see that it is what you do not mean. 26 
So again, what role for the SF? Eriugena is explicit in his claim that there can be no 
body without SF. The argument runs as follows: 
1) No matter without form (QF) produces a body. 
2) No form (QF) subsists without an individual substance as its subject. 
3) No individual substance lacks a SF. 
4) No form (SF) subsists without (expers) its Cause, 27 therefore, 
5) A body, in order to be a body, requires matter, QF, SF and Cause. 
The above argument makes clear the necessity of the presence of a SF in any given 
body, but it provides no substantial detail as to the precise role substance plays in 
constituting body. What Eriugena means by the cause of a SF also requires 
investigation. This investigation shall be saved for a later section of this chapter; the 
present concern is the SF itself, as opposed to its cause. 
In Book One of the Periphyseon the Nutritor lists three things we ought to 
know distinctly: what we are, what is ours, and what is about us. 28 We are our 
26 I 495B 
27 III 728B 
28 1 497C 
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substance which is endowed with life and intellect. Ours is the body. And about us are 
the sensibles, composed of the four elements. This triad reflects a distinction Eriugena 
detects in the Categories, a distinction according to which we can take Ousia to be the 
subject of which the other nine categories are accidents, 29 and that these accidents in 
turn can be divided into `internal' and `external'. 
Some of the Categories are predicated around oißia, which are said to be a 
kind of ic¬ptoxai, that is `circumstances', because they are seen to be about 
it, while some, which are called by the Greeks avµßöc µa'toc,, that is 
`accidents', are within it. 30 
If we are justified in indexing this categorial distinction to the what-is-it, what-does- 
it-have, and what-is-about-it questions then body seems to correspond to the inherent 
accidents: quality, relation, condition, action and passion; it is something a substance 
has. Substance is distinct from body. And indeed Eriugena is able to deploy several 
arguments, "against those who say that their mortal transient bodies are nothing else 
than their o1x ta, and that their o'bßia is nothing else but their body, which is 
material and composed of different parts, namely, of form and matter. 01 So once 
again, why discuss SF in relation to body at all? While an analysis of body will 
require only a list of the relevant QFs, there remains the question as to whether or not 
this particular body exists. In order for a body to exist it must have a SF. Eriugena 
makes this clear by comparing a sensible body with a geometrical figure. A 
29 See for e. g. II 593A: aliud est substantia aliud accidens substantiae. Cf. Categoriae Decem, Minio- 
Paluello (ed. ), Aristoteles Latinus I, 51, p. 144: Hae sunt categoriae decem, quarum prima usia est - 
scilicet quae novem ceteras sustinet - reliquae vero novem cvU, 
88,8 x'oza (id est accidentia) sunt. 
At I 497A Eriugena defines quality and quantity as prima accidentia maximaque of ousia. 
30 147 1 C. Further to our analysis of QFs, it appears reasonable on the basis of this passage to equate or 
identify these muµtpdµa'ca understood in substance, with the `corporal' qualities that fall between 
body and the bodiless but which are always and only associated with bodies, namely colour and shape 
and so on. At V 933D Eriugena lists those things that are described as being, in subiecto quodam 
intelliguntur. These turn out to be, naturalia accidentia: qualitates et quantitates, ceteraque, quae 
augeri ac minui possunt. 
31 I 490CD. 
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geometrical body or figure, he states, "consists only of the quantity of its dimensions 
and lines and quality of its form. , 32 Geometrical bodies are contemplated by the mind 
alone since they do not subsist in ousia. 33 In other words it lacks substance. Natural 
(or sensible) bodies on the other hand, 
are natural for the very reason that they subsist in their natural obatat, that is, 
their essences, and cannot exist without them. 34 
These sensible bodies receive the cause of their establishment 35 from no other source 
than its substance, or SF. It is the necessary cause of a sensible (as opposed to 
geometrical) body inasmuch as the sensible body cannot be without it. 
When we come to analyse Eriugena's position further, however, we find that 
substance or ousia cannot be the cause of bodies. In fact Eriugena is careful to argue 
that bodies are not caused by their ousiai, rather their ousia is a necessary 
precondition of their establishment in reality. In other words, `substance' is here 
being used as 'being'. 
Note that Eriugena did not say that ousia is the cause of the body's 
constitution, rather he claimed that the body received the cause of its establishment 
from ousia. The direct cause of the body is the running together (concursus) of the 
accidents in ousia which, by coming together create something sensible and extended 
in space; furthermore, the accidental forms (QFs) cannot be caused by substance 
since, 
although the quality is contained within the substance - for no quality subsists 
through itself -, yet I would not say that the substance is the cause of the 
quality because every species follows its own genus since it is born of its 
genus and is immutably preserved within it; and therefore every substance 
flows down from general being (ex generali essentia), but every quality from 
general quality. 36 
32 1495C 
33 I 493D: in nullaque oIolasubsistunt. 
34 1493D 
35 I 497A: constitutionis suae causam. 
36 11 605AB 
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In this passage Eriugena refers to every substance flowing down ex generali essentia. 
In terms of the three stage model of substance we developed earlier, this generali 
essentia we labelled generic substance; and `every substance' presumably refers both 
to specific substances (e. g. Man, Horse etc) and to individual substances (e. g. Cicero 
and Bucephalus). The SF of Cicero and Socrates is that which identifies them not as 
men qua individuals but as Man, their specific substance, that substance which they 
both share and which is wholly, immutably, eternally instantiated in them. 
It is also the case that the SF of a body is the cause of a body inasmuch as 
without it the body cannot be said really to be. (To this extent a geometrical or 
imaginary body is not real, or is only real in an attenuated sense since it lacks 
substance. ) 
As we stated in the Introduction to this chapter both QF and SF are offered by 
Eriugena as necessary conditions of material body, and together, we may assume, 
they constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions of body firstly, to be, and 
secondly, to be the sort of thing it is. The above analysis of both QF and SF has 
shown both forms playing very different roles in Eriugena's overall conception of the 
corporeal; QF, we might say, is a necessary condition of body instantiating certain 
universal qualities; SF is a necessary condition of body qua existent. In other words 
SF accounts for a thing's being, QF for a thing's being a such and such. 
ii) Body: Two Descriptions: 
With the above definitions of QF and SF in place let us recapitulate 
by submitting two 
descriptions of body (in both cases, human bodies) to close scrutiny. 
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In the following passages we should be able to detect both QF and SF being 
used to explain how it is that individual bodies exist, and also to explain the 
differences by means of which they are individuated. 
For the dissimilarity of men one from another in feature, size, and quality of 
their several bodies, and the variety of custom and conduct result not from 
human nature, which is one and same in all in whom it exists, and is always 
most like itself and admits no variety, but from the things which are 
understood about it, namely from places and times, from generation, from the 
quantity and quality of their diets, their habitats, the conditions under which 
each is born, and, to speak generally, from all things which are understood 
about the substance and not the substance itself (circa substantiam 
intelliguntur et non ipsa substantia sunt). 37 
The first point that requires our attention in this passage must be Eriugena's 
identification of `nature' with substance, for I take it that "human nature" in the third 
line of the quote is an example of a "substance" mentioned in the last line. This must 
be specific substance. To talk of "human nature" is to specify a substance or SF; to 
talk of Substance in itself is to talk generally: generic substance. Why does he not say, 
therefore, `human substance'? In Book V Eriugena explains that, "the Greeks very 
frequently put fr(xnS for otx to and oiißia, for #oiS. "38 And he goes on to define 
the proper use of these words. Ousia, he claims, should be translated `essentia' and 
should be understood to mean that "which in every creature, visible and invisible, can 
neither be corrupted nor increased nor diminished. "39 The definition of ousia as that 
which in every creature cannot be corrupted, increased or diminished correlates with 
"human nature" defined in the passage from Book III as being one and same in all in 
whom it exists, and always most like itself and admitting of no variety. 40 Nature and 
essence are, according to Eriugena, synonymous in both Greek and Latin. 41 
37 III 703BC 
38 V 867A 
39 V 867A 
40 III 703BC 
41 V 867B: essentia pro natura et natura pro essentia indifferenter constituitur, salva tam en 
singularum significationum proprietate. 
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In passage 1, "human nature" is the specific substance of all men; it is "one 
and the same in all in whom it exists" just as the genus is whole in each of its 
species. 42 And this nature has as its origin that Substance, or the Substance itself (ipsa 
substantia): generic substance. 
Substance or nature is the origin of all the SFs, 43 while those differences, 
namely differences according to place, time, quantity, quality, habitat and so on, 
account for dissimilarities between individual men, and are understood about specific 
substance (circa substantiam. ) These differences are clearly categorial differences, 
differences deriving from the Aristotelian categories. And the categories, Eriugena 
claims, are accidents of Ousia, or generic substance. 44 And these categories Eriugena 
has divided into external and internal, or circumstances and accidents proper. In the 
passage under discussion Eriugena is discussing those factors that are understood 
about a subject which account for the dissimilarity to be perceived amongst 
individuals, and which allow for individuation. 45 
Let us take the above analysis of Eriugenian form in relation to body as an 
accurate rendering of Eriugena's intentions. Now it is possible to turn to a second 
description of body. 
2. Since God in that first and one man whom he made in his image established 
all men at the same time, yet did not bring them all at the same time into this 
visible world, but brings the nature (naturam) which he considers all at one 
time into visible essence at certain times and places according to a certain 
sequence which he himself knows: those who already <are becoming, or> 
have become visibly manifest in the world are said to be, while those which 
are as yet hidden, though destined to be, are said not to be. 46 
42 494B 
43 497B: o1x iau quae est formarum substantialium origo. 
as I 497A 
as For individuation in Eriugena see Chapter Two, Section IV, i) below. 
46 1445A 
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Though form is not mentioned explicitly in this early programmatic passage, 
certain phrases and concepts can be taken as referring to distinctions that later in the 
Periphyseon will be assigned `formal' definitions. Thus that nature of the first and 
one man, "in whom all men are established" and which God contemplates all at one 
time, is identical to that human nature which is not less in that "unique and first man" 
out of whom all men are multiplied. 47 And this nature we have labelled specific 
substance. Thus the first man is here being discussed in terms of specific substance. 
And that visible essence into which the nature or specific substance is brought by God 
according to a pre-known sequence is the individual substance of an individual 
creature in which the QFs break forth in order to render manifest the natural body. But 
are individual substances visible? In themselves they are not, but since Eriugena is 
here talking of individual men coming into being, it cannot be the case that they qua 
corporeal men, come into being without being visible. 
48 
In conclusion, it appears that, despite variations in language and context, 
Eriugena seems to deploy a single, coherent - though complex - notion of form in 
relation to body. 
The aim of this chapter was to render consistent two formulae for body: firstly, 
that body is composed of matter and form (both QF and SF), and secondly, that it is 
composed of substance and accidents. How, if at all, can these positions 
be 
reconciled consistently? An answer to this question will clearly have to address the 
nature of the relationship between SF and Substance on the one hand and 
between QF 
and the categories on the other. 
47 III 703A 
48 1 479A: corpora vero si sensibus non percipantur corpora non sunt. 
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II : Substance and Accident 
In Book V of the Periphyseon, Eriugena defines Substance or Ousia as, 
that which in every creature, visible and invisible, can neither be corrupted nor 
increased nor diminished. 49 
That which suffers no corruption, increase or diminishing must be immutable and 
eternal. And a few lines later Eriugena goes on to claim that, "every creature that 
subsists in its "reasons" is an o&aia. "50 But Ousia is also, "that by participation in 
which every indivisible species is formed. )551 Is this not a simple mistake on 
Eriugena's part, a confusion? Has he not assigned to the term `substance' two 
metaphysically distinct meanings? On the contrary, over the next few pages I shall 
argue that the relation between Substance and SF is a relation of participation, and 
that far from being confused, this is another example of the productive ambiguity 
lying at the heart of Eriugena's notion of substance and SF. 
An individual substance is distinct from specific and generic substance 
inasmuch as it proceeds from specific and generic substance, but it is unified with 
specific and generic substance inasmuch as it continues to subsist within them, its 
causes direct and indirect. It is not the case, therefore, that Eriugena assigns to 
substance two meanings. Rather, one and the same thing is being referred to; in 
talking of substance we are talking either generally, or specifically or picking out an 
individual's essence. 
Oixta is in no way defined as to what it is... but only that it is; and this 
could aptly be said of all o1x3ta universally, the most general, the most 
special, and the intermediate kinds. 52 
49 V 867A: quod nec corrumpi, nec augeri, nec minui in omni creatura sive visibili sive intelligibili 
potest. 
so V 867AB; V 887A 
51 III 703A 
52 1487B 
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Bodies subsist in their ousiai and cannot exist without them. Nor indeed can 
these individual ousiai exist without body. 53 But Eriugena also thinks of the 
categories themselves as accidents inhering Substance, or Ousia. 
For they cannot subsist by themselves. Essence appears to be in all, for 
"s4 without it they are not able to be. 
And Eriugena is not here talking about bodies, but the categories by means of 
which bodies are defined or sorted. Not only is it the case, therefore, that sensible 
bodies require a SF in order for them to come into being, so also the `accidental' 
categories require the first category, Substance or Ousia in order for them to subsist, 
since they cannot subsist except in Substance. 
Eriugena expresses the relation that obtains between substance and accident in 
an exegetical passage from Book III: 
When the waters recede and are collected from all sides into their beds the 
shores begin to appear far and wide, bare and dry and solid, so when the 
inconstancy of perishable things is separated by the mind's observation 
(mentis contuitu) from the imperishable natures in uninterrupted 
contemplation, soon the immutable and most beautiful firmness of the 
[substantial] forms and species will become manifest in their genera to the 
mind's gaze (animi obtutibus). 55 
The first thing to note here is the evaluative implication of the metaphysics. The 
correct objects of intellection are the most beautiful and constant substantial forms. 
The differently weighted values are assigned to accidental qualities on the one hand 
(negative), and the substances on the other (positive). Through the notion of SF and 
its relation to specific substance and thereby to generic substance itself, Eriugena 
illustrates the correct alignment of the will. This alignment is expressed in 
53 I 487A: olxi(xvper se ipsam diffinire et dicere quid sit nemo potest; ex his autem quae 
inseparabiliter ei adhaerent et sine quibus esse non potest. 
sa 1467D 
ss III 702C; square brackets in Sheldon-William's text indicate additions to the MS, R (Reims 875) 
taken by some to be in Eriugena's own hand. See Sheldon-Williams's introduction to I pp. 7-8. 
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contemplatio of the substances of things. Contemplation and its role in aligning the 
human will is discussed in Part Two. 
But also of interest in this passage is the opening up of an apparent gap 
between the positions of the Alumnus and the Nutritor. In the passage the Nutritor 
claims that SFs are the imperishable natures that subsist as the ground of each and 
every creature and to which the inconstant and perishable QFs adhere. In Book I, 
however, the Alumnus states that, "That form which is a species of quality, when it is 
joined to matter, produces a body, of which the substance is o%6i. a. "56 This substance 
must be the specific substance, that in virtue of which Cicero is a man, and 
Bucephalus is a horse and so on. But this seems to conflict both with Nutritor's claim 
that it is not generic or specific substance but the form of generic or specific substance 
that is, "an immovable foundation [that] supports and contains the formed matter. "57 
For the Alumnus, therefore, it is substance rather than its form (SF) that is given as 
the substantial ground around which the forms of the qualities (QFs) unite so as to 
constitute a natural body. Does this represent a genuine disagreement between the 
Nutritor and the Alumnus? The Nutritor defines the relationship between SF and 
ousia in the following passage: 
Of the forms, some are understood in of oia, others in quality; but those 
which are in obam are the substantial species of the genus. For of them 
genus is predicated because it subsists in them. For the genus, as we have 
often said, is whole in each of its forms, just as also the several forms are one 
in their genus; and all these, that is genera and forms, flow from the single 
source of o'bßia and by a natural circulation return to it again. 
58 
The forms that are understood in Ousia are specific substances - Man, Horse and so 
on. We are justified, according to Eriugena, in predicating genus of them since it, that 
is the genus or Ousia, subsists in them. I take this to mean that we are justified in 
56 1495B 
57 III 701A 
58 1 494AB; II 526A. 
30 
predicating Ousia of them since Ousia subsists in them as their causal ground. And it 
is axiomatic for Eriugena that, "every caused thing always subsists in its cause. "59 On 
this basis Eriugena argues that 
one and the same thing is made known by the investigations of the 
contemplation in one way in its causes, in another way in its effects. 60 
And further to this, Holy Scripture, Eriugena claims, often uses words that 
signify corporeal things or material effects to refer to invisible and spiritual things, 
immaterial causes. 61 So the division of Ousia into its specific substances is effected 
by the reason alone (sola ratione)62 while in reality it 
remains indivisible by virtue of its nature and cannot be separated by any 
visible act or operation. For it subsists in its subdivisions eternally and 
immutably as a whole that is always together, and all its subdivisions are 
always together as an inseparable unity in it. 63 
It is possible now to see how it might be that the Alumnus is not actually 
contradicting his master in asserting that Ousia is the substantial ground of all things, 
rather than SF. The Alumnus is simply referring to the same thing, contemplated in its 
cause or genus, rather than in its effects or species. 
This is a radical claim in that it aims to unify both the Aristotelian and 
Platonic traditions to which Eriugena is heir. 64 It is also radical in that this notion of 
one and the same thing being available to the understanding both as simple genus and 
59 III 639C; see also II 547A; II 552A; II 605AB 
60 III 704B 
61 III 706A; IV 859C; V 888A; and cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology (PG3 1033AB). 
62 I 492C 
63 1492C; IV 860C 
6' The harmony of Plato and Aristotle is an underlying theme in the Neoplatonist tradition from 
Porphyry onwards. See Porphyry in Cat. 57,7-8; 58,5-7; 91,19 for a Platonist's defence (against his 
own master, Plotinus) of the use of Aristotelian categories. Porphyry claims that the Categories apply 
only to words insofar as they signify things, not things in themselves. And words signify only things 
in 
the sensible (as opposed to intelligible) world (in Cat. 91,19-27). Porphyry is credited with a work 
entitled On the School of Plato and Aristotle Being One. See Sorabji, R., "The Ancient 
Commentators 
on Aristotle" in Sorabji, R., (ed. ), Aristotle Transformed. - The Ancient Commentators and 
Their 
Influence (Duckworth, 1990) pp. 1-30. See also Lloyd, A. C., "The Later Neoplatonists, " in Armstrong, 
A. H., (ed. ) The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967) 
p. 275: "It was normally accepted that the disagreement between Aristotle and Plato was unreal or only 
verbal. " 
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as diverse species, as cause and effect, lies at the root of Eriugena's thinking. The 
central concern of the Periphyseon - the relation between Creator and creation - is 
articulated by means of the intellect, the contemplating mind, the faculty that is able, 
when corrrectly deployed, to distinguish the SF. In distinguishing the SF from QFs, 
the intellect successfully aligns itself with God. 
By means of the contemplating intellect the diverse species are analysable into 
a simple genus, the effects are gatherable into their cause: 
The inconstancy of perishable things is separated by the mind's observation 
from the imperishable natures in uninterrupted contemplation. 65 
When the contemplating mind addresses itself to, "that science which the 
philosophers call dc, vaXit'Li f , "66 it gathers together individuals into their species, the 
species into the genera, the genera into ousia, "until it arrives at that One (illud unum) 
which remains inseparably in itself and from which that division took its origin. , 67 
Returning to the exegetical passage from Book III it is now possible to see 
how Eriugena intends the relationship between Substance and SF to be understood. 
The inconstancy of perishable things is separated by the mind's observation 
(mentis contuitu) from the imperishable natures in uninterrupted 
contemplation, soon the immutable and most beautiful firmness of the 
[substantial] forms and species will become manifest in their genera to the 
mind's gaze (animi obtutibus). 68 
65 III 702C 
66 II 526A 
67 II 526AB; I 472B; I 463AB; see also Johannis Scotti Eriugenae Expositiones in lerarchiam 
Coelestem CCCM 31 (Turnholti 1975) VII, 583 p. 106: Due quippepartes sunt dialectice discipline, 
quarum una LIIAPBTIKH, altera ANAA YTIKH nuncupatur. Et 
AIAPETIKH quidem divisionis 
vim possidet; dividit namque maximorum generum unitatem a summo usque 
deorsum, donec ad 
individuas species perveniat, inque eis divisionis terminum ponat; ANAA 
YTIKH vero ex adverso 
sibi posite partis divisiones ab individuis sursum versus incipiens, perque eosdem gradus quibus 
ilia 
descendit, ascendens convoluit et colligit, easdemque in unitatem maximorum generum reducit, 
ideoque reductiva dicitur sive reditiva In the De Praedestinatione Eriugena 
divides dialectic into four 
species - dialectic, horistic, apodictic and analytic 
(De Prae 358A). On Eriugena's use of dialectic see 
J. Trouillard, "La Notion d'analyse chez Erigene, " in R. Roques (ed. ), Jean Scot Erigene et 1 'histoire 
de laphilosophie (Paris: CNRS, 1977) pp. 349-356 and Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus 
Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 
139-153. 
68 111 702C 
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The SFs become manifest to the mind's eye in their genera. Genus is predicable of 
SFs on account of their eternally subsisting in their genus: Ousia or specific 
substance. And this substance in turn subsists wholly and eternally and immutably in 
them. Thus Eriugena argues that 
`Man' is no greater in the infinite multiplication of human nature into its 
indivisible species than in that unique and first man who became the first to 
partake of it, nor was it less in him than in all whose bodies are multiplied out 
of him, but in all it is one and the same and in all it is equally [whole], and in 
none does it admit any variation or dissimilarity. The case is the same with all 
substantial forms (substantialis form is); in horse, in ox, in lion and in the other 
animals, in trees also and in crops a like rule is established. 69 
And on the basis that a species is no greater throughout all its instances, nor is it less 
in a single instance than in all, Eriugena feels justified in arguing against the opinion 
of the `dialecticians' who claim that all that there is is either a subject or what is 
predicated of a subject or what is in a subject. 70 Instead, he states, "if right reason is 
consulted... `subject' and `what is predicated of a subject' are one, and differ in no 
respect. , 71 And the example he gives to illustrate his point is the subject and first 
substance Cicero, and the predicate and second substance (secunda substantia), 
6 man. ' The dialecticians would predicate `man' of Cicero, so that `man' is said of 
Cicero. But since the species / second substance / SF `man' is total and one and 
indivisible in all its individual instances, and since all the individual instances - 
Cicero, Socrates, and so on - are one and indivisible in the species, then, Eriugena 
asks, what possible difference can there be between a subject and what is predicated 
of a subject? Now if, as we are claiming, this identification of individual and species, 
69 III 703AB; see also 147 1 A; 1472C: Nil aliud esse video in quo naturalfiter finesse olx'ia possit nisi 
in generibus et speciebus a summo usque deorsum descendentibus, hoc est a generalissimis usque ad 
specialissima, ides individua, seu reciprocatim sursumuersus ab individuis ad generalissima; in 
his 
enim veluti naturalibus partibus universalis subsistit. 
70 Cf. Categoriae Decem, Minio-Paluello (ed. ) Aristoteles Latinus I, 57, p. 146: usian neque in subiecto 
est neque de subiecto significatur. 
71 1470D -471A 
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of first and second substance, is exactly analogous to the relation that obtains between 
genus and species, it follows that: species and what is predicated of species (i. e. 
genus) are one. Let us stick with Cicero. In order to be, Cicero must be in receipt of a 
SF. This SF is, as Eriugena has argued, `Man. ' But a SF is itself a species of the genus 
Substance. But, according to the analogy, if Cicero and `Man' are one and the same, 
then SF and Substance are also one and the same. 
Thus it is that the universal Substance around which or in which the other 
`accidental' categories fall is identical to that substance or SF without which a 
sensible body cannot be said to exist. In the first case we are contemplating the cause, 
in the second the effect. 
For the cause, if it be truly cause, most perfectly pre-encompasses (praeambit) 
in itself all things of which it is the cause, and perfects in itself its effects 
before they become manifest in anything, and when they break forth through 
generation into genera and visible species they do not abandon their perfection 
in it but fully and immutably abide (in it), and need no other perfection than it 
<alone> in which they subsist all at once and eternally. 72 
In summary, an individual SF is required for an individual body to exist, but 
these SFs flow from the single source of Ousia; 73 every substance flows down from 
general Being. 74 That is, every individual substance flows down from Substance. But, 
"one and the same thing is made known by the investigations of the contemplation in 
one way in its causes, in another way in its effects. "75 Therefore, the individual 
substance or SF, without which a particular sensible body cannot be said to exist is 
identical to that universal Substance in which the other nine categories subsist, and 
without which they can in no way subsist. 
72 II 547A 
73 I 494B 
74 II 605B 
75 III 704B 
34 
Or, to put it another way, since a genus subsists wholly and eternally and 
immutably in each of its species and individuals, and since SFs are in Ousia as their 
genus, 76 it follows that SF is the same thing as Substance or Ousia, just as the 
individual term `Cicero' has the same referent as `Man. ' And therefore, again, the 
individual's SF is identical to the general or universal Substance. 
III : Substance and the Contemplating Mind 
Having delineated in some detail the relations between substance and accident, and 
bewteen SF and substance or Ousia we can now consider substance or SF as an object 
of the contemplating mind. 
Eriugena denies that the SF falls within the range of a human's intellectual 
grasp. No substance or essence of any creature, whether visible or invisible, can be 
comprehended by the intellect or by the reason as to what it is. 77 That it is becomes 
apparent to the senses as we come to contemplate it in the genera proceeding from 
their cause, in the species proceeding from the genus. 
Essences cannot be understood to be unless through the attachment of 
attributes, categories and sensible species. 78 
Therefore we are not required to have intellectual access to Ousia in itself in order to 
refer to it as the substantial ground of all bodies. Instead we can rely for justification 
on a causal theory that allows us to assert that every effect subsists in its cause, and 
that the causes subsist wholly, eternally and immutably in each of their effects. 
79 
76 1494A 
77 1443 B; 147 1 B: oi)07cxv omnino in omnibus quae sunt per se ipsam incomprehensibilem non solum 
sensui sed etiam intellectui esse. 
78 IV 779B; I 487AB: OIciCX itaque nullo modo diffinitur quid est sed diffinitur quia est. Ex loco 
nanque, ut diximus, et tempore accidentibusque aliis quae sive in ipsa seu extra intelliguntur esse 
tantummodo datur non quid sit sed quia est. 
79 V 867AB 
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As part of his exegesis of the text, "Let the waters which are under the 
firmament be gathered together into one place and let the dry land appear, " (Gen. 1: 9) 
Eriugena claims that 
the contemplating mind first assembles the fluctuating inconstancy of matter 
and the form attached to it, like turbulent waves, into one place in the 
intelligence - for matter and the form attached to it can be combined under a 
single meaning since they produce a single body - that substantial form which 
is always stable by reason of the natural firmness of its nature will not become 
apparent to the mind's eye. 80 
For Eriugena the sub-celestial waters represent the unstable flux of matter and the 
forms (QFs) that attach to it. The dry land is that substantial Form (SF) that is not 
subject to change, and which is here placed firmly outside of our epistemic grasp. A 
few lines later he seems to contradict his negative assessment of the human intellect in 
its attempt to grasp the substantial forms: 
As when the waters recede and are collected from all sides into their beds the 
shores begin to appear far and wide, bare and dry and solid, so when the 
inconstancy of perishable things is separated by the mind's observation from 
the imperishable natures in uninterrupted contemplation, soon the immutable 
and most beautiful firmness of the [substantial] forms and species will become 
manifest in their genera to the mind's gaze. 81 
So, according to Eriugena, the gathering together of the sub-celestial waters in one 
place is to be interpreted as an, "operation of reason"82 by which process the intellect 
is finally able to gaze upon the substantial forms, or dry land. 
As was found in the previous section, SF is to be understood in two ways. In 
the first passage, in which substance "will not become apparent to the mind's eye, " 
the specific substance is still subsisting in its cause, Ousia or generic substance. In the 
second passage, in which substance "will become manifest to the mind's gaze, " 
generic substance has proceeded into its species, specific substances. Hence, 
80 III 702B 
81 III 702C 
82 111 703C: actu rationis. 
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contemplated as to its cause, which is Ousia, the specific substance or SF continues to 
be wholly beyond the grasp of the intellect, contemplated as to its effects on the other 
hand, it is accessible to the mind's eye. It follows that substance is both available and 
unavailable to the contemplating mind. Since access to the contemplating mind is, for 
Eriugena, that which determines a thing's existence, 83 this dual predication of 
`available' and `unavailable' has profound metaphysical implications. 
The placing of substance within reach of the intellectual faculty leads 
Eriugena to make the claim that, "the understanding of things is what things really 
are. "84 The steps in his argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
1) Eriugena accords to the form or species of an object in the perceiving mind a 
superior ontological status to that form which is embodied in the subject 
perceived: 
To understand something is to have a species of it in the mind. And this 
species in the mind of the knower is of a higher nature than the species found 
in bodies since those species in the mind are incorporeal. 85 
2) That which perceives is, according to Eriugena, necessarily greater than that 
which is perceived, just as that which understands is greater than that which is 
understood. 86 
3) A cause is necessarily greater than its effects. 87 
For Eriugena the species in the mind of the perceiver must be the cause of that species 
which is perceived (not the other way around), since the form in the mind of the 
perceiver is greater than that form in the perceived body. It follows that the sensible 
species (QFs) of bodies are somehow brought into being by the presence of 
83 I 443AB 
84 II 535CD: intellectus enim rerum veraciter ipsae res sunt.; Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, EH D. 
85 IV 766AB; cf. Augustine, De Trin. IX. 11.16. 
86 I 485B; IV 766B: quod enim intelligit melius esse quam quod intelligitur, ratio docet. 
87 111 663C: causa melior erit his quorum causa est. 
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corresponding forms in the perceiving mind. The mind is responsible not only for how 
the world appears, but how the world is, since appearance is, according to the first 
mode of being and non-being, that which accounts for the ontological structure of 
reality. 88 A peculiarity of this structure, however, is that that which per excellentiam 
suae naturae falls outside of the grasp of the intellectual faculty - and therefore is not 
- is accorded by Eriugena a higher status than that which is cognisable, and therefore 
is 89 
In Book III of the Periphyseon Eriugena suggests that the SF is hidden 
(occulta)9° beneath the waves of the accidents which obscure it from the gaze of the 
intellect (intellectualibus oculis). 91 In other words it is the fault or failing of the 
intellect that accounts for the obscuring of the substance. The fact that SF is hidden 
seems not, on this account, to be due to its inherent nature, but to its being invested by 
QFs. And this in turn is because of the nature of the intellect. Ultimately it is due to 
the fallen or sinful nature of man's epistemic capacity. The Fall of man is the subject 
of Chapter Three. 
Eriugena provides further argument for the unknowability of SF as part of his 
theory of the Primordial Causes which comprise the second division of natura, that 
`species' of natura that is both created and creative. 92 Ousia or Substance, of which 
the SFs are the substantial species, is itself the second of the Primordial Causes after 
88 1 443 A: omnia quae corporeo sensui vel intelligentiae perceptioni succumbunt vere ac rationabiliter 
dici esse, ea vero quae per excellentiam suae naturae non solum omnem sensum sed etiam omnem 
intellectum rationemque fugiunt lure videri non esse. 
89 See Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge, 1989) p. xiii: "For Eriugena ontology is not the most fundamental or universal discipline; 
in fact, he develops a negactive dialectic which counterbalances ontological affirmations and 
contstructions with a radical meontology, giving the most detailed analysis of non-being since Plato's 
Sophist and Parmenides. " See also Moran, op. cit. pp. 212-240; See also, 0' Meara, Dominic, "The 




92 1 441B 
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Goodness. 93 And the Primordial Causes surpass even the purest intellects, 94 and are 
"perceived by no sense and comprehended by no intellect and have earned the name 
of `darkness' because of the ineffable excellence of their purity. "95 Thus God's 
command, "Let there be light! " is interpreted by Eriugena as God's issuing the order 
for the primordial causes to 
proceed from the incomprehensible hiding-places of their nature into forms 
and species comprehensible and manifest to the understanding of those who 
contemplate them. 96 
And in a passage we have already quoted, Eriugena states that 
essences cannot be understood to be unless through the attachment of 
attributes, categories and sensible species. 97 
It follows therefore that SF, subsisting in the Primordial Cause, Ousia, can be 
known only by means of the accidental forms that adhere to it and which have their 
cause in the perceiving mind. And since it is not in itself accessible to the intellect, to 
reason or the senses, it can, "by a certain human convention" be said not to be. 98 
i) Substantial non-being: 
As has already been noted, according to the first mode of being and non-being, "those 
things which because of the excellence of their nature elude not only all sense but also 
all intellect and reason (omnem intellectum rationemque) rightly seem not to be. "99 
And Eriugena explicitly applies this rule to, "the reasons and essences of all things 
that are created by Him. "' 00 And since we have identified the essence and cause of a 
creature with its SF, it is therefore the case that the SF of a body is epistemically 
93 III 627C: divinae siquidem bonitatis proprium est quae non erant in essentiam vocare. 
94 II 550B: purissimos intellectus superantem. 
9s II 550C 
96 III 692C 
97 IV 779B 
98 I 444D-445A. 
99 I 443B 
100 1443 B 
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unavailable, and therefore is not. Predicating non-being of SF is an essential 
component of Eriugena's apophatic thesis: 
For if the understanding of all things is all things, and It alone understands all 
things, then It alone is all things. '°' 
The SF of a given object is unavailable to the senses and the intellect inasmuch as 
God is unavailable since the SF ultimately subsists in God, and indeed is God. And 
this unavailability is warrant (under the first mode of being and non-being) for 
claiming that SF (and a fortiori God) are not. '02 
What does it mean to predicate non-being of substance or SF? It might mean 
that there are no universals, no `man' only individual men, no `horse' only individual 
horses. From this point of view Eriugena would resemble a strict nominalist. But this 
cannot be right. As we have shown, Eriugena identifies the subject with what is said 
of a subject, and what is said of a subject is the second substance, the SF, `man', 
`horse' etc. This is not nominalism, rather it is hyper-realism: the individual is the 
genus that subsists whole and eternal in each of its instances, as their cause, as their 
substantial form. 
Thus for Eriugena, Cicero is `Man', and `Man' is Cicero. It follows that 
contemplated as to his cause, Cicero is not. And of course the same is true of all 
individual creatures. Cicero, insofar as he is cognitively available, (and is thus and so) 
is only a concourse of QFs subsisting in and around unknowable substance. 
101 III 632D 
102 For Eriugena's negative theology see, McGinn, B. J., "Negative Theology in John the Scot" Studia 
Patristica 13 (1975) pp. 232-8. See also, Carabine, Deirdre, The Unknown God. - Negative Theology in 
the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena (Louvain, 1995); Sells, Michael, Mystical Languages of 
Unsaying (Chicago, 1994); Duclow, Donald, "Divine Nothingness and Self-Creation in John Scottus 
Eriugena, " The Journal of Religion 57 (April 1977) pp. 109-23. 
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The SF is not, therefore, on account of the excellence of its nature. The 
excellence of its nature, according to Eriugena, consists in its immutability, its 
wholeness (that is its lack of parts, or its simplicity) and its eternity. 
ii) Virtus, Vis and Potestas: 
There is another reason why non-being is predicable of substance. According to the 
Third Mode of Being and Non-Being, 
whatsoever is still held in the folds of nature and is not manifest as to form or 
matter, place or time, and the other accidents... is said not to be. '°3 
This is non-being on account of latency, or potentiality. For Eriugena, all things are 
both eternal and made, 104 depending on whether they are understood as to their cause 
or as effects, as remaining or proceeding. 
The eternity of all things is expressed as their subsistence as causes in the 
Word of God potentially (vi et potestate). '°5 
For they were always as causes in the Word of God potentially (vi et 
potestate), beyond all places and times, beyond all generation <made> in place 
and time, beyond all form and species known to sense and intellect, beyond all 
quality and quantity and the other accidents by means of which it is 
understood of the substance of any creature that it is, though not what it is. lo6 
We have already identified the SF as the cause of the existence of an individual in the 
sense that without SF the individual creature could exist only in the highly attenuated 
sense that a geometrical figure or imaginary body exists. Likewise Eriugena's 
universal Ousia or Substance we found to be the causal ground of all accidental 
categories inasmuch as "without it they are not able to be. " 107 We might be tempted, 
103 I 443D: quicquid vero adhuc in ipsis naturae sinibus continetur neque in forma vel materia loco vel 
tempore caeterisque accidentibus apparet... dicitur non esse. 
104 III 666B: omnia quae ex deo sunt et aeterna simul esse etfacta. 
105 III 665A et passim. 
106 III 665AB; see also III 669B 
107 1 467D 
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therefore, to assume that universal Substance and individual SFs are the `causes' of 
the accidental categories and QFs respectively. But Eriugena thinks that it is 
impossible for causes to `jump' genera. In other words he does not allow Substance to 
be the cause of Quality, nor does he allow SF to be the cause of QFs instantiated in 
(and composing) natural bodies. Quality is the cause of QF; Substance is the cause of 
SF. However, it seems that we are justified in thinking of Substance and SF as 
indirect causes of the accidental categories and individual bodies respectively in that 
they are the necessary preconditions of the latter. If we are correct in identifying the 
SF with the cause of the existence of an individual and Substance with the cause of 
the accidental categories then we must ascribe to SF and Substance itself that 
potentiality Eriugena claims is the property of the cause. 
Eriugena characterises potentiality as a mark, if not a condition, of non-being: 
To this mode [the third mode according to which being or non-being can be 
predicated of a subject] belongs the reasoning which considers the potentiality 
(virtutem) of seeds, whether in animals or in trees or in plants. For during the 
time when the potentiality (virtus) of the seeds is latent in the recesses of 
nature, because it is not yet manifest it is said not to be; but when it has 
become manifest in the birth and growth of animals or of flowers or of the 
fruits of trees and plants it is said to be. ' 08 
This argument, though related to the argument for non-being from cognitive 
unavailibilty or from excellence, is somewhat different. Here it is not that which 
resides in its cause that is said not to be, but the power (virtus) that is latent in seeds. 
It may be objected, therefore, that Eriugena uses `virtus' to describe the potentiality 
latent in seeds, whereas for the potentiality of the cause or SF subsisting eternally in 
Ousia which in turn subsists in the Word of God he uses `vis' and 'potestas'. Does 
the terminological variation reflect a philosophical distinction? In other words are 
108 1 445BC 
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there, according to Eriugena, differing `modes' of potentiality, only one of which 
belongs to the causes? 
In Book III of the Periphyseon Eriugena draws a lengthy and complex analogy 
between the relation of numbers to the monad and of causes to their effects. 
Numbers, he claims, subsist in the monad vi etpotestate, just as causes are in the 
Word of God vi et potestate. 109 Eriugena defines the `force' (vis) of numbers as that 
substantial virtue (substantialis... virtus) "by which they [i. e. the numbers] subsist 
eternally and immutably in the monad. " l 10 He goes on to define `potestas' as the 
possibility proper to numbers, "by which they are able to be multiplied and become 
manifest to intellects by certain terminological distinctions, quantitative 
diversities. ""' It is tempting, on the basis of the analogy, to identify `vis', the 
substantial virtue of numbers eternal in the monad, with the substantial form (SF); and 
to identify `potestas', the potentiality of numbers to be multiplied and made manifest, 
with the qualitative form (QF), that by means of which a body is rendered manifest. 
The term common to both sides of the analogy - the numerical and the 
seminal - is 'virtus'. In the latter case `virtus' is given as the potentiality proper to 
seeds, in the former the substantialis virtus is the force of numbers by which they 
subsist eternally and immutably in the monad. As a property of seeds Sheldon- 
Williams translates `virtus' as `potentiality', of numbers it is rendered `virtue. ' If, 
however, we assume that Eriugena intends us to understand `virtus' univocally then 
we cannot avoid concluding that the potentiality proper to seeds is the same as that 
force of numbers subsisting after their natural mode in the monad, and therefore, by 
109 See V 869AB: nunquid et ipsa [sc. Arithmetical a monade incipiens, perque diversas numerorum 
species discedens, iterumfacta resolutione ad eandem monada redit, ultra quam ascendere nescit? Nec 
immerito, cum omnes numeri numerorumque species ab ea incipiant, et in eam desinant, et in ea vi et 
potestate subsistant, quemadmodum omnia genera omnesque species rerum continentur in ovata 
atque salvuntur. 
110 III 657C 
111 III 657C 
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analogy, it is the same as that potentiality we claimed belonged to the SF subsisting in 
its cause, Ousia. 
And yet `virtus' as it occurs in the passage above in relation to seeds is 
described as being tractable to reason (ratio). This seems to contradict our conclusion 
given above that virtus is a property of the SF since reason, as we have seen, is the 
mode whereby QFs are collected into species and genera; and the SF, to which we 
wish to attach `virtus' as its proper mode of potentiality, is expressly declared to be 
beyond the grasp of reason and in its cause, prior to its procession out into the genera, 
evades even the intellectual faculty. 
Note that in the passage on seeds (I 445BC) there are not two ways of 
considering plants and animals, one way in the seed, another way in the product. Nor 
even are there two ways of looking at seeds. Rather there are two ways of considering 
the potentiality proper to seeds; in other words there are, according to Eriugena, two 
virtutes. There is that virtus qualified by the term `substantial is' that considers the 
potentiality still latent in the recesses of nature; and there is the potentiality (virtus) 
that has become manifest in the birth and fruition of animals and flowers. 
I take it, therefore, that substantialis virtus belongs to SF and it is that in virtue 
of which something potentially is or is not; that virtus which is considered in things 
once they have become manifest is that in virtue of which something can be said to be 
thus and so, and can therefore be said to belong to QF. 
One problem remains. Eriugena still seems to claim that this `virtus' of seeds 
is accessible to reason. Eriugena discusses seeds and the seminal force again in Book 
III. And here again he seems to argue that the force of seeds can be contemplated. 
' 12 
A closer examination of the text, however, reveals that it is the effect of this seminal 
112 111 669C: Buis enim vim seminum cogitans... 
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force that is contemplated. In other words the substantialis virtus remains beyond our 
view. And in fact Eriugena goes on to state that the "how and why" of this force, 
"surpasses all sense and intellect, and it is not to be explored by any conjectures of the 
mind why it is thus or thus and it is thus or thus and not otherwise. "113 
And it is this potentiality, the potentiality of a cause as yet latent, its effects 
remaining unmanifest, that Eriugena claims can be understood not to be. So, by a 
certain human convention, the SF of any creature existing, can be understood not to 
be. 
Conclusion: 
Eriugena's dual account of form results in paradox: at the heart of being, is non-being; 
at the heart of the seen is the unseen, the known, the unknown. 114 And the dialectic 
that gives expression to these paradoxes is at once the measure of our descent from 
the Essence that resides eternally and immutably in the Word of God, and the means 
whereby we are able to negotiate our return. Eriugena's theory of form - indeed 
Eriugena's metaphysical theology as a whole - is predicated upon the contemplating 
mind. By means of dialectic a body can be contemplated as matter, as form, as cause, 
as effect, in its essence, and as manifest to the senses. 
The focus of this chapter was the form of the material body and it was found 
that this form can be contemplated in a number of ways: the reason can abstract from 
the individual its qualitative forms - this process is expressed in the Scriptural 
passage that describes the sub-celestial waters being gathered up. All but obscured by 
these forms is the substantial form. The SF remains eternally whole and immutable. 
Its cause, Substance itself, subsists wholly and eternally and immutably in each of the 
13 III 669CD 
114 111 633A; III 678C 
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substantial forms. For this reason Substance is predicable of the substantial form. 
Indeed they are identical, just as that which is predicable of a subject, and a subject 
are identical. 
This chapter presented an argument to the view that the Periphyseon contains 
a complex and yet ultimately coherent view of the role form plays in the constitution 
of material bodies. It has been necessary, in developing the argument, to iron out a 
number of textual and terminological peculiarities. It was found that these ambiguities 
were themselves a function of Eriugena's dialectical notion of cause and effect, genus 
and species. Towards the end of the chapter it became apparent that Eriugena's 
concept of substantial form (SF) had certain metaphysical entailments - eternity, 
unknowability and non-being - that at first appeared puzzling, even paradoxical. It 
became clear, however, that these entailments had been foreseen by Eriugena and 
themselves formed elements of the Periphyseon's overall metaphysical and 
theological enterprise and must therefore be retained within a model that aims to 
illustrate how the Periphyseon's theory of material substance is coherent. 
With this formal model in place, it is now necessary to turn to the other 
component of body: matter. 
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Chapter Two : Matter 
... there are two and two only, that cannot be defined, God 
and matter. 1 
Introduction: 
This chapter shall be concerned with the role of matter in Eriugena's theory of 
material substance. Central to the examination will be the relationship between two 
apparently rival theories: does Eriugena's account of corporeal substance express an 
immaterialist theory in which matter is reducible to immaterial constituents, or a 
substrate theory in which matter is an irreducible ontological principle? 
In the first half of the chapter we shall be concerned with a detailed analysis of 
Eriugena's Immaterialist Theory of corporeal substance. Worries concerning the 
internal coherence of the theory will be raised and shown to be groundless once 
nested in Eriugena's global metaphysical schema. In the second half of the chapter the 
focus shall be on the discussions of body within the Periphyseon that seem to 
presuppose a substrate. Finally, a difficulty with Eriugena's account of material 
substance, already apparent from the findings of the first chapter, will require lengthy 
and detailed consideration here: the problem of individuation. 
i) Creation and Formless Matter: 
At the risk of stating the obvious it must straightaway be made clear that matter 
cannot be extrinsic to God's creation: 
None of those who practise philosophy correctly will deny that unformed 
matter is to be reckoned in the number of all things that were made by God in 
His Wisdom; for how anyone can say that the causes of all things are eternally 
created in the Word of God, but that unformed matter does not have its own 
cause, I do not see. Then, if matter is included in the number of the established 
11 499D: duo solummodo esse quae nullo modo possunt diffiniri, deum videlicet atque materiam. 
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universe it necessarily follows that its own cause will not be excluded from the 
number of the causes which are eternally created in the Wisdom of God. 2 
Those who do not practise philosophy correctly in this instance would be falling into 
Manichaeanism. Eriugena argues that all things come from the one God, and there is 
nothing that does not come from him. 3 It follows that matter must come from God. 
Eriugena expresses the view, through the mouth of the Alumnus, that 
He who made the world from unformed matter also made the unformed matter 
from absolutely nothing. 4 
But for Eriugena, there is another reason for bringing unformed matter within God's 
creation. Eriugena wishes to take St. Paul's dictum that, exit deus omnia in omnibus (I 
Cor. 15: 28) as expressing a literal truth concerning the return of all things to God; 
there can be no eschatological remainder, just as there is no uncreated material 
principle in which or through which God effects His creation. In the most well-known 
passages of the Periphyseon, Eriugena argues that the nihil of the `creatio ex nihilo' is 
the name used to signify, "the ineffable and incomprehensible and inaccessible 
brilliance of the Divine Goodness. "5 It follows, therefore, that 
He Who made the world from formless matter did not take the matter from 
which He made it from elsewhere, but from Himself and in Himself. 6 
2 III 636C; see also III 699C; V 890B-D 
3V 956B: ab uno enim omnia, et nihil est, quod ab eo non sit. 
4 111 6361): qui enimfecit mundum de materia informi ipsefecit informem materiem de omnino nihilo. 
The view is Augustinian: cf. De Genesi contra Manichaeos (CSEL XCI p. 76): Et ideo deus rectissime 
creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, quia, etiamsi omniaformata de ista materia(acta sunt, haec ipsa 
tarnen materia de omnino nihilo facta est. See also Confessions, XII, 8: tu enim, domine, fecisti 
mundum de materia informi, quamfecisti de nulla re paene nullam rem. qui enimfecit mundum de 
materia informi ipsefecit informem materiem de omnino nihilo. Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum IV, 56; De 
Principiis 2.1.4; 2.9.1. The whole patristic and early medieval discussion of the role of unformed 
matter in relation to the creatio ex nihilo arises out of a concern to show how the account of creation in 
Genesis can be rendered consistent with the statement at Wisdom 11: 18 that, "omnipotens manus tua 
creavit orbem terrarum ex materia invisa. " The best discussion of the creatio ex nihilo in Eriugena is 
Piemonte, G. A., "Notas sobre la Creatio ex Nihilo en Juan Escoto Eriugena" Sapientia 23 (1968) pp. 
38-58. 
5 III 680D; see Duclow, "Divine Nothingness and Self-Creation in John Scotus Eriugena, " The Journal 
of Religion 57 (April 1977). See also Wolfson, H. A., "The Identification of Ex Nihilo with Emanation 
in Gregory of Nyssa, " Harvard Theological Review 63 (1970) pp. 53-60. 
6 111 699C 
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Of course it does not follow from this that Eriugena has no theory of material 
substance. On the contrary, he has a great deal to say on the subject of matter. What 
remains for us to ascertain here is whether he thinks of matter as somehow emergently 
material (an Immaterialist Theory), or whether he thinks of it as irreducibly material 
(a Substrate Theory). According to the Immaterialist Theory, body is an 
agglomeration or congregation of QFs or suchnesses. The Substrate Theory, on the 
other hand, demands that the forms are predicated of something. 
On the one hand we find Eriugena stating that visible matter, "is made from 
the coming together (coitu) of intelligible things"7 and on the other hand that, "matter 
by itself without form produces not body because by itself it is formless, though with 
the addition of form it becomes a perfect body. "8 
Although arguably not logically inconsistent, these two quotes seem to point 
towards radically different conceptions of material composition to be found in the 
Periphyseon. On the first view we seem to have a `unified' theory: it is the same stuff, 
composed in the same way, all the way down -a coagulation of immaterial 
properties. According to this view no analysis of material composition, however 
thorough, will ever distinguish between body and formless matter. In fact we could go 
so far as to say that on this view `matter' and `body' mean the same thing. Or if they 
express a difference it is one of degree. 
On the other view `matter' does mean something substantially different from 
`body' since body requires matter as its ground: 
' III 663A. For the coming together of immaterial qualities Eriugena also uses: armonia (150 1 B); 
concursus (I 498B); confluxus (III 713C); conventus (III 714A); synodus (III 714A). This 
list is in 
Moran, "Time, Space and Matter in the Periphyseon. An Examination of Eriugena's Understanding of 
the Physical World, " 0' Rourke (ed. ) At the Heart of the Real. Philosophical Essays in Honour of the 
Most Reverend Desmond Connell Archbishop of Dublin (Irish Academic Press, 1992) p. 76. 
8 III 701A (L'O"D1, 
In every body whether heavenly or earthly or watery is also observed the 
inconstant flux of formless matter. 9 
Here it seems that an analysis of body will yield a `remainder', a material substrate. 
Since our overall goal is to render an account of a single Eriugenian theory of 
material substance, we cannot allow these references to matter to fall outside of the 
scope of the theory; they must be included. So let us first of all eliminate one 
possibility: that Eriugena is presenting two wholly inconsistent theories of material 
substance. Settling for such a view would represent an hermeneutical dead end. For 
the sake of our enquiry, therefore, I suggest we apply a principle of charity and 
assume that Eriugena at least intends the definitions of body and corporeal 
composition in the Periphyseon to be mutually coherent to the extent that, taken 
together, they represent a single theory. Before attempting to solve the apparent 
discrepancy let us examine the evidence of both the Immaterialist Theory and the 
Substrate Theory. 
9 111 701B 
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I: The Problem : Two Theories 
A) Eriugena's Immaterialist Theory: 
Following Gregory of Nyssa, Eriugena makes the claim in Book I of the Periphyseon 
that 
matter is nothing else but a certain composition of accidents which proceeds 
from invisible causes to visible matter. Not unreasonably: for if in this 
corporeal and dissoluble matter there should be any simple, immutable, and 
quite indissoluble essence, then it could not be wholly dissolved by any 
thought or action. But in fact it [i. e. visible matter] is dissolved: therefore there 
is nothing in it which is indissoluble... 10 
And again that 
2. matter is nothing else, and has no other cause for its establishment, but the 
tempered mixture, among themselves in themselves and not in another, of 
things which are contemplated by the eye of wisdom alone. 11 
Let us take 1 and 2 as definitional of an immaterialist theory of material substance. 
Together the statements explicitly state that, 
i) there is no underlying substance in which the `accidents', or `things 
contemplated by the eye of wisdom alone' inhere, and therefore that, 
ii) the `accidents' or `intelligible things' are mixed or composed one with another 
in order to constitute visible matter, and therefore (according to 1 only), 
iii) visible matter is wholly dissoluble. 
iv) It is also claimed (in 2 alone) that matter has no cause other than the mixture 
of intelligible things. 
10 I 479B-C; Cf. 1501 B: sint necessariofateberis corpora in incorporea posse resolui ita ut corpora 
non Sint sedpaenitus soluta. A. H. Armstrong notes that the passage from Gregory of Nyssa on which 
1 is based (De hominis opificio 24, PG44 212D) may have been influenced by Plotinus, Enn. II, 4,11: 
"As actions and productions, times and motions, though they have no substratum of matter (onoßox71v 
U11q) in them, yet rank among beings; thus also neither is it necessary that the first bodies should have 
a matter..., but that each of them should be wholly that which it is, being more various by the mixture 
with things that have their composition from many forms. So that this matter without magnitude (tio 
&µeyeOES ToXli5) is a vain name. " For the influence of this passage on Basil of Caesarea and Gregory 
of Nyssa see Armstrong, A. H., "The Theory of the Non-existence of Matter in Plotinus and the 
Cappadocians, " Studia Patristica V (Berlin, 1962) pp. 427-429. 
"1498B 
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Only a theory of which statements expressing i) - iv) are true will qualify as an 
immaterialist theory. 
Before proceeding to test our definition in the field as it were, we need to 
analyse in more detail some of the statements of 1 and 2. 
i) Accidentium Quandam Compositionem: 
What does Eriugena mean us to understand by `accidents' in 1? Immediately 
preceding this passage Eriugena has stated that some of the categories, namely 
Quantity, Quality, Situation and Condition, when they come together constitute matter 
and are perceived by bodily sense. 12 The remaining categories - Ousia, Relation, 
Place, Time, Action and Passion - "appear in nothing and remain forever 
incorporeal"; they are never accessible to corporeal sense. ' 3 So it looks as though 
Eriugena intends the accidentium quandam compositionem to comprise Quantity, 
Quality, Situation and Condition. In order for this identification to be properly secure, 
however, we need to make quite sure that Eriugena uses the term `accident' to refer to 
an Aristotelian category elsewhere. It is important to be clear that, although Eriugena 
is using "accident" to refer to an Aristotelian category, we are not talking here about 
QFs, such as "blue", "one foot long", "running" and so on, but the categories as 
classes of accidents. Near the beginning of the discussion of the categories the 
Nutritor asks, 
although there are ten Categories, is not one of them called essence or 
substance, while nine are accidents subsisting in the substance? For they 
cannot subsist by themselves. Essence appears to be in all, for without it they 
are not able to be. 14 
And in Book III the Nutritor argues that all things 
12 I 479A 
13 I 479A 
14 467D (italics mine) 
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were always as causes in the Word of God potentially, beyond all places and 
times, beyond all generation made in place and time, beyond all form and 
species known to sense and intellect, beyond all quality and quantity and the 
other accidents by means of which it is understood of the substance of any 
creature that it is. 15 
On the basis of these passages and others it seems Eriugena believes that, since the 
nine categories require for their instantiation a prior Ousia they can properly be 
thought of and referred to as accidents of Ousia although they do not proceed from 
Ousia. Indeed Quantity is described by Eriugena as, "an accident of essence. "1 6 
Visible matter is, for Eriugena therefore, a bundle comprising Quantity, 
Quality, Situation and Condition investing a substantial form; '7 the sensible creature 
comprises the stability of a substantial form with the mutability of natural qualities. '8 
ii) The Categories: 
Eriugena is clearly not thinking of the categories as just predicables as, arguably, 
Aristotle does. Rather he assumes them to be genera under which falls the whole of 
God's creation. 19 And in making this assumption he is following the dominant strand 
in the tradition of commentary on Aristotle's Categories. Porphyry, for example, in 
Boethius' translation describes the categories as "prima decem genera. , 20 Perhaps the 
15 III 665A-B (italics mine) 
16 I 470B 
17 Richard Sorabji asserts that Eriugena has a "bundle theory of substance. " See Sorabji, Matter, Space 
and Motion (Cornell, 1988) p. 51. Moran suggests that the view that there is no underlying material 
substrate and that all visible matter consists in qualities derivies ultimately from Plotinus, and he cites 
as an example Ennead VI 3,8,19-37. See Moran, "Time, Space and Matter in the Periphyseon. An 
Examination of Eriugena's Understanding of the Physical World, " O'Rourke (ed. ) At the Heart of the 
Real. Philosophical Essays in Honour of the Most Reverend Desmond Connell Archbishop of Dublin 
(Irish Academic Press, 1992) p. 77 n. 30. 
18 V 958C: in his enim omnibus et naturalis substantiarum integritas, et qualitatum naturalium 
mutabilitas custoditur. 
19 1463 A: omnium rerum quae post deum sunt et ab eo creata innumerabiles varietates in decem 
universalibus generibus conclusit, quae decem kategorias ... vocavit. 20 Isagoge translatio Boethii, L. Minio-Paluello and B. G. Dodd (eds. ), Aristoteles Latinus 1,6-7 
(Bruges / Paris, 1966) pp. 11.22. Of all Boethius' work Eriugena only makes explicit reference to the 
De institutione arithmetica (at I 498BC, I 505B, 11165 1 B, III 655AB, IV 769C) but he feels sufficiently 
familiar with his work to refer to him magnificus Boetius at IV 769C and as magnifico Boetio summo 
utriusque linguae philosopho at I 498B. 
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most important work on the categories that was available to Eriugena, the Pseudo- 
Augustinian Categoriae Decem, states that of the ten categories the first is Ousia upon 
which the others depend and of which the other nine are accidents. 21 Eriugena is 
simply following his sources, therefore, when he claims that Quality and Quantity are 
the first and greatest accidents of substance. 22 
As genera the categories have, for Eriugena, a real existence independent of 
the particulars which participate in them. These categories or genera are assimilated 
by Eriugena into an ontological hierarchy itself clearly derived from Porphyry's 
Isagoge: 
There is no rational division, whether it be of essence into genera or of genus 
into species and individuals or of the whole into its parts - for which the 
proper name is partition - or of the universe into those divisions which right 
reason contemplates therein, that cannot be brought back again by the same 
stages through which the division had previously ramified into multiplicity, 
until it arrive at the One which remains inseparably in itself and from which 
that division took its origin. 23 
So these genera contain innumerable subdivisions the taxonomy of which is 
the primary function of dialectic. And through the `reversio' or `congregatio' of the 
most specific species into the more general species, and further, the gathering of the 
species into the genera and finally the genera themselves into the utterly simple unity 
of all things, the return of all things to God is effected. 
We might still wish to know how it is that the genera - in themselves 
incorporeal - are able to come together to create bodies. Indeed, how are they able to 
come together at all? After all the categories, even if they are taken to be genera, 
cannot play the role of universals of the sort, man, three foot long, piebald, and so on. 
21 Categoriae Decem, Minio-Paluello (ed. ), Aristoteles Latinus I, 51, p. 144: Hae sunt categoriae 
decem, quarum prima usia est - scilicet quae novem ceteras sustinet - reliquae vero novem 
o'vuße/3i 1co= (id est accidentia) suns. 
22 I 497A 
23 II 526A; I 472B; I 463AB; see also Johannis Scotti Eriugenae Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem 
CCCM 31 (Turnholt, 1975) VII, 583 p. 106. 
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As has already been mentioned the categories are names given to classes of things - 
quantities, qualities, and so on - under which these universals could be ranged; they 
occupy, therefore, a different conceptual level. In themselves they are able to tell us 
nothing about the particular body that we are told comes into existence when they 
come together. 24 Furthermore, these genera or class designators are immutable; they, 
"by no means lose their natural state and unchanging vigour. , 25 He even cites 
Boethius on precisely this point: 
And by the things which are we mean those which are neither enlarged by 
extension nor diminished by retraction nor changed by any variations, but ever 
preserve themselves in their proper strength by the exercise of their own 
resources. Such are qualities, quantities, forms, magnitudes, smallnesses, 
equalities, conditions, acts, dispositions, places, times, and whatever is found 
in any manner united to corporeal objects. They themselves are by nature 
incorporeal and flourish by reason of their immutable substance. 26 
So again, if these components of matter, namely qualities and quantities, situations 
and conditions, are immutable and indissoluble, how do they come to form endlessly 
changing material bodies? 
The answer lies in Eriugena's theory of causation. Returning to 1 we find that 
visible matter is an effect of a procession of a certain composition of accidents from 
invisible causes: 
Matter is nothing else but a certain composition of accidents which proceeds 
from invisible causes [ex invisibilibus causis] to visible matter. 27 
It is important to note here that it is the composition that proceeds, not the accidents 
themselves. 28 The accidents themselves remain eternally in their invisible causes, it is 
24 Marenbon in "John Scottus and the `Categoriae Decem"' (reprinted in Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic, 
Platonism and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West (Variorum, 2000)) makes this 
point but since he is not addressing the question of the generation of bodies he does not pursue the 
problem. 
25I500B 
26 Boethius, De institutione arithmetica I, 1 (PL 63 1079D-1081A) quoted by Eriugena at IV 769C. 
27 I 479B 
28 In English the passage is ambiguous, in Latin less so: materiam esse nisi accidentium quandam 
compositionem ex invisibilis causis ad visibilem materiem procedentem. I take it that procedentem 
depends upon quandam compositionem. 
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their composition that proceeds into visibility. 
Once again, what does Eriugena mean by `accidents' here? We have already 
identified these accidents with Aristotelian categories understood as genera. But we 
can make a further identification. Eriugena thinks of these accidents as causes, or 
rather temporal causes, through which all things come to be: 
By temporal causes I mean qualities and quantities and the other things which 
29 in time through generation attach themselves to substances as accidents. 
What can these temporal causes be but qualitative forms (QFs)? A QF, it was found in 
the last chapter, accounts for an object's being thus and so; it is susceptible of change 
and is a species of one of the general categories. 
But the QF or temporal cause is surely not that which can neither be enlarged 
nor diminished nor changed by any variation? And Eriugena (and Boethius) are clear 
that it is these genera that come together to produce body. Recall, however, that, 
according to Eriugena an effect remains eternally in its cause. 30 
Scripture reveals most clearly the genera and the species in which there subsist 
causally and invisibly whatever things (quaecunque) break forth through 
generation in quantities and qualities into the knowledge of the corporeal 
senses. 31 
The quaecunque are QFs, and they break forth in quantity and quality, that is as 
species in their genera. But since effects can be identified with their causes, species 
with their genera, Eriugena is able to claim that Quantity, Quality and Condition and 
so on come together to form body. It is not the accidental categories in themselves that 
come together, but those species in which the genera subsist wholly and immutably 
that come to form body. 
29 III 665D 
30 III 687C; III 699C-D 
31 111 705A 
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In 1 therefore we can see that the description of visible matter as "composition 
of accidents" refers to matter as a coming-together of QFs that themselves subsist in 
invisible, immaterial causes: the categories. And these categories are intelligible 
inasmuch as they reside as a unity in the intellect, that is the Word. 
In Book IV Eriugena offers a geometrical analogy: 
That very triangle which endures immutably in the discipline itself (i. e. 
geometry), where line and angle exist together, and where there is not one 
place for the line, another for the angle, another for the middle, another for the 
extremity, another for the centre, another for the distances of the sides from 
the centre, another for the distances of the angles from the centre, another for 
the point from which the lines originate and in which the angles are enclosed 
by the meetings of the lines; but all these things are one in one and the same 
concept of the geometer's mind, and the whole is understood in the particulars 
and the particulars are in the whole, and are unified in the intellect itself; for 
the intellect is the substantial cause of all things which it understands, and that 
from which the figures of the geometrical bodies proceed into their species. 32 
So, Eriugena argues from analogy, we should not think it strange that, since natural 
bodies are also composed of intelligible qualities, in just the same way as a triangle, 
they are also one in that nature in which there is a concept of them. And this is 
especially so since all our perceptions of natural bodies are also incorporeal. 
All the species in which they [viz bodies] are contained are incorporeal, nor 
would any wise man doubt that quantities and qualities are likewise of an 
intelligible nature and proceed from the intelligible reasons of vital 
substance. 33 
In discussing how Ousia relates to the other genera, Eriugena lists the 
properties of each of the categories. The properties of the genera are their proper 
differentiae. Perhaps we should think of the properties of the genera as coming 
together to form bodies, and not the genera themselves. Thus Quantity has the 
property of number, or numerousness: 
Does the property of quantity seem to you to exist anywhere but in the number 
of the parts, or in their spaces, or in their measures, whether those parts be 
continuous as are the parts of lines or of times and of other things which are 
32 IV 774D-775A 
33 IV 775B; See Boethius, De institutione arithmetica I, 1 (PL 63 1079D - 1081 A) 
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held together by continuous quantity, or are discontinuous, being marked off 
by definite natural limits as are numbers and every multitude ... ? 
34 
The property of Quality consists in shape, and in appearance; it concerns the surface 
of that extension that is measured by quantity. Situation has the property of 
apportioning or positioning. And Condition has the property of fixity or permanence, 
and so on. 
To summarise, it appears to be the case that Eriugena presents a bona fide 
immaterialist theory of corporeal substance in the Periphyseon. But this just sharpens 
the original problem: what to make of the references to formless or prime matter, 
matter that seems to fall outside of the immaterialist theory? 
What we are left with it seems, are two definitions of matter: matter as a 
bundle of accidental immaterial qualities, and matter sui generis. Let us now study 
more carefully the references to this prime matter in the Periphyseon. 
B) Eriugena's Substrate Theory: 
Thus far we have found that there are clear and reasonable grounds for interpreting 
Eriugena as positing an immaterialist theory of material substance; a material body 
has only immaterial constituents: the categorial accidents. 
But there is a problem. In the following passage Eriugena seems to attempt a 
sketch of his immaterialist theory of substance: 
The nature of all sensibles... has nothing to do with the dimensions of the 
corporeal bulk of this world but consists of a unification of incorporeal 
substances. 35 
341472D 
35 V 901 A: praesertim cum omnium sensibilium, dum in se ipsa consideratur natura, una eademque 
perspicitur, et in hoc mundo non magnitudinem corporeae molls, sed incorporalium substantiarum 
adunationem. 
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At first glance this looks unproblematic. We find that all sensible bodies consist in the 
coming together of incorporeal substances -just what we would expect him to say if 
our account of his theory of substance in the first part of this chapter is correct. But 
what are we to make of the reference in the passage above to the corporeal bulk 
(corporeae molis) of this world? Surely the strict immaterialist has no need of such a 
bulk. Indeed one might suppose that the motivation for adopting an immaterialist 
theory in the first place would be to abandon the necessity for any such material 
principle. But again in reference to the return of all things to God, Eriugena chooses 
to make reference to the 
unformed matter which was created out of nothing and from which the 
structure of this sensible world, by the diversity of the forms impressed upon 
it, is composed. 36 
What are we to make of these references to bulk or unformed matter within a 
metaphysical architecture that seems not to require it, or positively to exclude it? 
Were we wrong to conclude earlier in favour of immaterialism? Once again I suggest 
we deploy a principle of charity and assume, at least for now, that Eriugena is not 
simply inconsistent. It falls to us, therefore, to show a) what role Eriugena ascribes to 
matter in the composition of bodies, and b) how, if at all, a material principle can be 
coherently incorporated into an immaterialist account of substance. 
Let us set down a few passages that we can take as defining a theory of 
corporeal substance that requires a material substrate: 
3 Every corporeal and sensible creature is composed of matter and form, and 
therefore matter, lacking form, is called formless, which means lacking form, 
and invisible and non-composite, or waste and void. 37 
4 Matter in itself, if rationally considered, is neither in motion nor at rest. It is 
not in motion since it does not yet begin to be contained within a definite form 
- for it is through form that matter is moved; without form 
it is immobile, 
36 V 960CD: materies informis, quae de nihilo(acta est, et ex qua diversitate form arum sibi adiuncta 
huius mundi sensibilis componitur structura. 
37 II 548B 
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according to the Greeks - for how will that be moved which is not yet limited by any place or fixed time? And it is not at rest because it does not yet possess 
the end of its perfection. For rest is the end of motion. But how can that be at 
rest which has not yet begun to move? How therefore can the matter of a body 
be the place of the body which is made from it, when even matter itself is not, 
in itself, circumscribed by any certain place or mode or form, and is not 
defined in any definite way save by negation? For it is negatively defined as 
not being any one of the things that are, since it is from it that all the things 
that are created are believed to be made. 38 
Before attempting to answer the question of Eriugena's consistency I suggest we 
spend some time examining precisely what Eriugena means us to understand by 
`matter. ' 
i) Materia Informis -a definition: 
Let us begin with a comparison. On the basis of the last sentence of 4 we can now 
begin to understand the apparently paradoxical similarity between God and matter 
that was highlighted in the quotation at the head of this chapter: God and matter are 
the only two things that can in no way be defined, the reason being their formlessness, 
God because he is More-than-form, and matter, "by reason of its being deprived of all 
forms. "39 
As a result of their formlessness both God and matter are, according to 
Eriugena, inaccessible to the senses. God is formless inasmuch as he is without form 
and beyond form since he forms everything that can be formed; matter on the other 
hand is formless in virtue of its lacking form. It is the passive recipient of form. As 
authority for this view Eriugena is quick to mention the unanimity of Augustine and 
Plato on this score: 
St. Augustine... asserts that formless matter is the mutability of mutable things 
which is receptive of all forms: and with this Plato agrees in the `Timaeus', 
38 I 488AB 
39 1500B 
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saying in similar language that formless matter is the receptivity of the 
forms. 40 
But the Pseudo-Dionysius offers a different definition that Eriugena cannot ignore. 
Dionysius claims that, "matter is participation in adornment and form and species, for 
without these matter is formless and cannot be understood in anything. "41 Eriugena 
realises that this definition of matter does not coincide with Augustine or Plato. 
Matter, on the Augustinian/Platonic view, is formless on account of its being 
receptive of all forms. According to Dionysius, however, matter just is participation in 
form. The two definitions seem almost contradictory: on the one hand matter is 
formless, on the other, matter is participation in form. Nevertheless, Eriugena 
attempts a partial reconciliation: 
Whether formless matter is a mutability receptive of forms, as Augustine and 
Plato say, or a formlessness which lacks participation in species and form and 
adornment, as Dionysius says, you will not deny, I think, that if it can be 
understood at all, it is perceived only with the intellect. 42 
But any success we might hope to subscribe to this reconciliation is illusory. Eriugena 
has himself, only a couple of lines above, recognised that, on the Dionysian account, 
that which fails to participate in form and species, is not matter but something else -a 
formlessness. 
That which lacks participation in adornment and form and species is not 
matter but a certain formlessness. 43 
40 I 5000-D. Eriugena describes Plato as philosophantium de mundo maximus (I 476C) even though of 
Plato's works he may have only the Timaeus in Calcidius' partial translation, and perhaps not even this 
but only Calcidius' commentary. For the availability of Calcidius in the ninth century see Edouard 
Jeauneau, "L'Heritage de la Philosophie Antique" in his Etudes Erigeniennnes (Etudes Augustiniennes 
Paris, 1987) pp. 39-40; Cappuyns, Jean Scot Erigene, Sa Vie, Son Oeuvre, Sa Pensee, (Louvain-Paris, 
1933) p. 392 n. 4; E. Mensching, "Zur Calcidius-ueberlieferung" in Vigiliae Christianae 19 (1965) 
pp. 42-56. For Eriugena's Platonism in general see, Beierwaltes, W., "Eriugena's Platonism" 
Hermathena 149 (Winter 1990) pp. 53-72. 
41 Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus IV. 28 (PG3 729A) quoted by Eriugena at I 500D 
42 1501A 
43 I 501A: quod ornatus etformae et species participatione caret materia non est sed quaedam 
informitas. 
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But then in the passage above he assumes that that which, "lacks participation in 
species and form" is an accurate rendering of Dionysius' definition of matter. And he 
continues to confuse the situation still further when he asks, 
Do you think that the species and form and adornments themselves, by 
participation in which that formlessness or mutability we mentioned is 
changed into matter, is considered by any other means than by the eye of the 
mind? 44 
For Dionysius matter is participation in form and species and adornment. But 
Eriugena reads him as claiming that formlessness is changed into matter by 
participation in species and form and adornment. So there is the added claim made by 
Eriugena that matter, in order to be matter, must have undergone some sort of change. 
And here Eriugena's reading of Dionysius leads him into a regress: prime matter, if it 
is to serve any metaphysical function, must be the substratum upon which a body is 
constructed; it itself cannot in turn require some further, more fundamental principle 
out of which it is formed or changed since if it were formed or changed there would 
have to be a prior underlying thing from which it came to be. But that is precisely 
what matter itself is: that from which all change begins, and a component of that 
which changes. 45 In fact it is precisely the fact that matter can be shown to serve no 
necessary metaphysical function that underpins the immaterialist's thesis. 
At no point does Dionysius make the claim that formlessness is changed into 
matter; for him matter is simply identified as participation. So why does Eriugena 
twist Dionysius in this way? An answer to this question will lead us to an 
understanding of the concerns Eriugena brings to bear in his definition of matter. I 
suggest that Dionyius' identification of matter with participation is not `materialist' 
enough for Eriugena. Eriugena clearly endorses the Augustinian/Platonic definition of 
44 1501A 
45 Physics 1.9.192a25-192b4 
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matter as bulk. The distortions we have brought to light in his analysis of the 
Dionysian definition are attempts to draw a favoured source into line with the view 
that matter is formless stuff receptive of all forms. 
On either view - the Dionysian or the Augustinian/Platonic - Eriugena claims, 
matter is accessible only to the intellect; in itself it is invisible and formless. 46 Again 
the similarity between our epistemic relations with matter and God is stressed: neither 
is perceivable directly; both have to be inferred by means of the intellect from the 
appearance of things. 
For Eriugena, therefore, matter is formless stuff, perceivable only by the 
intellect. And so now that we have a definition of unformed matter we can begin to 
ponder its role in the overall scheme of Eriugena's metaphysical theology. According 
to Eriugena's exegesis, Genesis 1: 9, the `third day' of creation, refers to the 
constitution of, "soluble and perishable bodies themselves which occupy the lowest 
place of the whole creature. "47 The verse under discussion runs as follows: 
But God said, Let the waters that are under the heaven be gathered together 
into one place, and let the dry land appear, and so it was done. (Gen. 1: 9) 
The Alumnus is in combative mood and urges his master to 
expound whatever seems to you likely to be true concerning the question to be 
solved without fear of anyone, whatever his attitude may be, whether dazzled 
by the light of truth he does not understand what you say, or consumed with 
the poison of envy he treats you with contempt. 48 
And the Nutritor is happy to oblige. He claims, as we have already noted in our 
analysis of Eriugena's theory of form, that the dry land represents substantial form and 
the sub-celestial waters, according to the hexaemeral interpretation, are the qualitative 
forms. But the qualitative forms invest matter. That is why, the Nutritor argues, they 
46 III 660B 
47 III 700D: ad ipsorum solubilium et corruptibilium corporum, quae infimum totius creaturae obtinet 
locum. 
48 111 700B. Note the inspired idea that ignorance can be defined as being blinded by the light of truth. 
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are depicted as waters, since, as a result of their cleaving to (adhaerens) the flux of 
matter, they are subject to, "coming into being and passing away, "49 and are prone to, 
"the same storm of incessant and turbulent inconstancy. "50 Matter is subject to 
expansions and contractions; 51 and as such it is explicative of sensible changes in 
bodies. So although the waters and the dry land of the Genesis text refer to the kinds 
of forms, qualitative (QF) and substantial (SF) respectively, the former are necessarily 
attached to matter: they must inform something. And that something is matter. 
Eriugena goes on to define the term 'matter': 
Matter is the mutability of mutable things capacious of all forms, the 
instability of the mutable form by which the matter itself is specified and 
formed - for it is the qualitative form which, when combining with matter, 
produces body. 52 
There is an ambiguity in the English translation here; does Eriugena mean that matter 
is mutability and is capacious of all forms, or that it is the mutable things that are 
capacious of all forms? There is no ambiguity in the Latin: 
Materia est mutabilitas rerum mutabilium capax omniumformarum. 
Matter is capacious; it has a property. 53 But this cannot be a straight definition since it 
goes no way to defining what prime matter is. Rather it presents matter as a means of 
explaining certain properties that pertain to qualitative form - its mutability, its 
inconstancy. On this view matter has no ontological status beyond a necessary 
principle or condition, an occasion for the coming together of forms. But the 
definition of matter as having properties - capacity (111 701 C), and immobility (I 
488A), and so on - militates against the view that Eriugena posits an immaterial 
theory of corporeal substance. Matter must be capacious, it must allow for 
49 11170 1 BC 
so III 702A 
51 1445B: materiae distentionibus seu detractionibus. 
52 11170 1 C-D 
53 Also predicated of matter is inconstant flux (instabilis inundatio materiae): III 701C 
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specification and formation; the qualitative forms combine with matter (adiuncta 
materiae) to produce a body. It seems clear that if matter is the mutability of mutable 
things, it is not just this; it explains why corporeal bodies suffer change and decay but 
it is more than a means of explaining this fact; it is itself something. Moreover it is a 
something that underlies many discrete bodies: 
How many different bodies are made from one and the same matter! 54 
ii) Recapitulation: 
We opened our discussion by noting that there were several apparently inconsistent 
theories of body in the Periphyseon. The most common definition we found was the 
view that body consists of matter and form. 55 This statement on its own could serve 
only as a starting point since both named constituents stand in need of further 
analysis: what is meant by form? What is meant by matter? Form we found to mean 
both QFs and SF; the QFs were accidents of the substantial form (SF), proceeding 
from the genera or categories; SF is an effect of Substance or Ousia itself. In 
particular we felt we needed to know precisely what Eriugena intends us to 
understand by `matter'. Is matter itself reducible to immaterial constituents? Or is 
matter an irreducible material substrate? 
In order to frame a solution to our original difficulty therefore, we turned to an 
examination of two apparently separate and mutually inconsistent theories of body. In 
the first case body was defined as an agglomeration of immaterial qualities (the 
Immaterialist Theory). We found that all bodies were composed of the immaterial 
qualities of the elements. In the second case Eriugena seemed to imply that body 
sa I 496C: quanta diversa corpora una eademquefiunt materia! 
55 See for example I 489C; I 491A; 11 54813; III 701A et passim. 
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required a material substrate in which the qualitative forms inhered (the Substrate 
Theory). We found that far from being a redundant concept, the substrate played a 
clear and crucial role in Eriugena's ontology. The only philosophically available 
avenue, therefore, was to accept it as an element in Eriugena's theory of corporeal 
substance; it remains for us, therefore, to show how, if at all, the references we find in 
the Periphyseon to a material substrate can be squared with the immaterialist theory. 
In the conclusion that follows I hope to show that Eriugena can consistently 
retain both theories without doing damage to either. 
11 : The Quantum Solution 
In Book I of the Periphyseon the Nutritor argues for a definition of body as the 
coming together of the effects of Quantity and Quality; these effects he calls quanta 
and qualia respectively: 
For quantity and quality combine together to produce a quantum and quale, 
and these two, combining together and receiving generation in a certain mode 
at a certain time, manifest the finished body. 56 
Bodies are formed, the Nutritor explains, by the coming together of the quanta 
and qualia derived from the four elements. For Eriugena, the whole sensible 
environment arises as a result of the coming together of the elements: 
All bodies... are composed from the coming together of the four simple 
elements, extending from the greatest to the smallest. 57 
These elements are themselves bodies but of such a fine nature as to be invisible and 
beyond the grasp of every mortal sense. 58 The elements are not mundane `building 
blocks', existing just above the level of prime matter; in fact Eriugena accords them a 
56 I 497AB 
57 11170 1 A: omnium corporum ex quattuor simplicium elimentorum coitu compositorum ex maximis 
usque ad minima. 
58 I 479AB 
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place between the primordial causes and material bodies. 59 And in the Genesis 
account of creation they are represented by the firmament. They are that of which our 
mortal bodies are composed, and that to which our bodies shall return in the 
resurrection. 6o 
In Book One the Nutritor dismisses the Alumnus's theory that the elements are 
caused by the coming together of their two qualitative causes, so water is not 
substantially derived from moistness and coldness. The Nutritor points out that the 
elements are substances and substances cannot be caused by qualities. Instead, he 
proposes the view that the elements are actually incorporeal substances. Each element 
is a species of generic substance, the qualities of the elements are species of Quality. 
All sensible bodies derive from the coming together of the elements, but not from the 
coming together of the substances of the elements since they are (in common with all 
substances) incorruptibilia et insolubilia. 61 Instead, the Nutritor argues, bodies are 
formed by the coming together of the qualities of the elements. 
So the sensible world is no more than the conjunction of the qualia of the four 
elements - heat, dryness, moistness, coldness - in quanta. And these quanta are 
themselves derived from the immaterial caterory, Quantity. Eriugena's concept of 
body and material substance is thus - by means of the quantum solution - brought 
into a consistent relation with the Immaterialist Theory, the Elemental Theory and the 
Substrate Theory. Or rather, the three theories can be shown - by means of the 
quantum solution - to jointly express a single, coherent notion. But the Alumnus is 
still confused. How can it be, he wonders, 
59 III 713 B: medietatem quondam inter primordiales causas et composite corpora. 
60V958CD 
61 111 712B 
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that things incorporeal and invisible in themselves, by coming together with 
one another, produce visible bodies, so that matter is nothing else, and has no 
other cause for its establishment, but the tempered mixture, among themselves 
in themselves and not in another, of things which are contemplated by the eye 
of wisdom alone? 62 
The Alumnus still cannot see how the sensible and manifest can be derived from 
principles that are wholly intelligible and invisible (viz immaterial categories). 
Furthermore, if what is understood of the cause must also be understood of the effect, 
the Alumnus continues, why is that bodies are not immutable? For if the cause of a 
quantum is Quantity, and if Quantity in and of itself is immutable, surely the quantum 
must likewise be immutable? 63 And yet the matter or quantum of a body is that in 
virtue of which a body is said to suffer change. For the Alumnus the main cause for 
concern is his failure to see how the mixture of incorporeal constituents can in 
themselves be enough to produce body; there must be, he still thinks, something in 
which they subsist. The obvious candidate for this `something' is the material 
substrate. 
"You are seriously misled, or wish to mislead others, "64 the Nutritor responds. 
And in order to show how the Alumnus has become confused the Nutritor asks a 
question: by what means is the matter itself, the matter from which bodies are made, 
contemplated? Is it by sense or by reason? The Alumnus replies that since the matter 
is unformed it cannot be perceived by any corporeal sense. 65 It must, therefore, be 
contemplated by the reason alone. The Alumnus cannot accept that the sensible and 
62 149813; see also II 602CD: ex una terra diversorum corporum diversae quantitates nascuntur - 
quantitatem nunc dico non ipsam incorpoream sed ipsam molem quam diversarum partium 
compositionem esse nemo ambigit. In this passage Eriuegna seems to identify two quantities: an 
immaterial quantity (this we may assume refers to the category Quantity) and those quantities that 
come together to form visible matter, or bulk (and these we can take as quanta, effects of Quantity). 
63 499A: nam quod de causis intelligitur cur non etiam de effectibus earum intelligatur, ut 
quemadmodum quantitates et qualitates caeteraque similia solo animi contuitu aspiciuntur ita et 
materia et corpus non sensibus corporeis sed intellectui succumbant? 
64 499B 
65 1 499B 
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corporeal ultimately consists in intelligible, immaterial principles. But if he accepts 
that quanta and qualia are in themselves immaterial and invisible and are therefore, 
"contemplated by the eye of reason alone, " and if he likewise accepts that matter is 
itself contemplated by reason alone, then his double standards are obvious. Why argue 
against the quanta and qualia on the grounds that they are, "contemplated by the eye 
of reason alone" and yet accept a material substrate that is itself unavailable to the 
sense? 
Prima facie this is pretty feeble. Claiming that the unformed matter of bodies 
is itself inaccessible to the senses does less to alleviate the Alumnus's problem than to 
compound it. And of course it does not follow from the Nutritor's answer that there is 
no unformed material substrate. At no point does the Nutritor attempt to argue that 
there is no such thing as unformed matter, or that, it if it does exist, it cannot be 
shown to play a role in the constitution of bodies. 
The Nutritor therefore fails to answer the Alumnus' original question: how can 
the mixture of incorporeal and invisible things account for the manifest and sensible 
nature of bodies? 
But perhaps this judgement is unduly harsh on the Nutritor. The Alumnus was 
not asking for a definition of how the corporeal and manifest is produced from the 
incorporeal and invisible, he was claiming not to see how it can be the case. And the 
Nutritor simply points out ad hominem that the same difficulty arises if we consider 
the matter "out of which bodies are made. "66 In other words the Nutritor's theory of 
corporeal substance cannot be shown to be false on the grounds that the constituents 
from which corporeal substance is derived are themselves perceivable only to reason, 
if the alternative theory of corporeal substance suffers from the same difficulty. 
66 I 499A: formatam materiam qua corpus efficitur [nam informis omnino intelligibilis est] sensu 
corporeo percipimus. 
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Nevertheless, the Nutritor's ad hominem response to the Alumnus' query certainly 
does not exclude the possibility of a material substrate. 
The Nutritor's apologetic, although it offers no substantive definition of 
material substance, does at least indicate the direction in which he is thinking. In fact 
the Nutritor could be seen to be suggesting some sort of middle ground between the 
Immaterialist Theory and the Substrate Theory; if there is unformed matter, he claims, 
it is invisible and can only be perceived by the eye of the mind. Underlying the 
Nutritor's argument here is the assertion that matter itself, far from being an 
irreducible principle, is itself composed of quanta. Here then may be the solution to 
the original problem. The quantum furnishes Eriugena with a substrate of which the 
QFs are predicable but which is itself ultimately an effect of an immaterial cause: 
Quantity. Eriugena thus synthesises the Immaterialist and Substrate theories. 
The resolution of our problem lies in a dialectical analysis of matter, firstly as 
immaterial Quantity and secondly as a material quantum. This double identification 
will account both for why it is that corporeal substance is defined as requiring a 
material substrate for the qualitative forms and that body is itself composed of 
constituents that are the effects of an immaterial cause. 
The solution to the problem requires us to adjust the findings of the last 
chapter. The material ground of any body is a quantum; the quantum derives from 
Quantity, an immaterial category. 67 The species of Quantity (quanta) becomes a 
subject of which the other QFs are predicated. It is the case, therefore, that our notion 
of QF is not fine-grained enough. Quantity, we argued previously, is a QF and it is 
clearly impossible to predicate a QF of a QF since QFs are defined as predicates, 
67 I 478D - 479A; See I 478B: nil aliud quantitas nisipartium quae seu sola ratione seu naturali 
differentia separantur. 
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those things that are said of a subject or are in a subject. The species of Quantity 
(quanta) will, therefore, have to be removed from the list of QFs. 
Quantity is, as it were, a second subject after oix ta, and that is why it is 
placed first after it in the order of the categories, since without quantity quality 
cannot become manifest. 68 
In Chapter One it was discussed how the Nutritor draws a careful distinction 
between the SF beheld in ousia not as an accident but as it itself, - and the form 
which "from quality in combination with quantity (quantitati adiuncta) produces the 
perfect body. "69 This is our finessed qualitative form (QF) from which we removed 
the effects of Quantity, that is quanta. The Nutritor is claiming therefore that the SF 
and the QF when joined to quantity, or more accurately, with the effects of Quantity 
(viz quanta) produces a body. Unformed matter is bare quantum. This quantum is 
material only in an attenuated sense; it derives from an immaterial cause, and, until it 
is informed by QFs at a certain time and after a certain mode, it is invisible and 
formless. 70 
The Alumnus claims to see his master's drift: iam video quo tendis. Thus 
encouraged, the Nutritor asks a supplementary question: 
Do you think I mean that it is the essential form (SF) which, in combination 
with matter (materiae adiunctam), produces the natural body? 71 
It has already been shown that it is not the SF that combines with matter to produce 
body, it is the QF. So it is less the content of the Nutritor's question that is of interest 
here, than the terminology he employs. In the space of a few lines he has claimed that 
68 I 496AB: Quantitas siquidem veluti secundum subiectum est post of riav ideoque in ordine 
kategoriarum prima post eam ponitur, quoniam sine quantitate qualitas nescit manifesta fieri. 
69I495B 
70 For Eriugena, Quantity (and therefore its effect, quantum) is measure, or number. See 1478B: nil 
aliud est quantitas nisi partium quae seu Bola ratione seu naturali differentia separantur certa 
dimensio eorumque quae naturalibus spatiis extenduntur, longitudine dico, latitudine et altitudine, ad 
certos terminos rationabilis progressio. 
71 1 495B 
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a) the perfect body is produced by form (QF) in conjunction with quantity, 
and, 
b) that the perfect body is produced by form (QF) in conjunction with matter. 
On this basis are we justified in squaring a) and b) by identifying matter with 
quantity? The Alumnus elaborates the position a little later (I 495C) by claiming that 
the natural body is produced by that form which is brought from quality (QF) into 
conjunction with the quantity which is taken from matter (adiecta quantitati quae ex 
materia assumitur). But although this passage seems to confirm our earlier suspicions 
it also raises a problem: if quantity is unformed matter, how can quantity be taken 
from (assumitur) matter? 
Although a body, which is nothing else but the quantity of oix ta, or, to speak 
more accurately, not the quantity but a quantum, can be separated into parts by 
an act and operation or at least by suffering its own fragility, itself, that is, the 
oi. a of which the body is a quantum, remains immortal and inseparable by 
virtue of its proper nature. 72 
The quantum derives from Quantity, just as QF derives from Quality, and SF derives 
from Ousia. The formula is refined thus: 
A body is not the quantity of obaia, but a quantum, just as visible colour 
which is perceived about a body is not the quality of o1x ta, but a quale 
constituted in a quantum. 73 
What does it mean to say that a body is a quantum of ousia? One way of answering 
this would be to claim that the quantum in question is an accident of an individual 
substance or substantial form: 
oixta itself, in so far as it is oxßia, can by no means possess a visible or 
tangible or spatially extended appearance, but it is the concourse of the 
72 14921); see also I 495AB: si itaque naturali discretione quantitas corporis ab intellectu ousiae 
separatur, quamvis sibimet adhaereant, ita ut oloza subiectum quantitatis sit et quanti, ipsa vero 
quantitas seu quantum accidentia sint ousiae nonne luce clarius est aliam esse formam quae in 
ipsa 
oI6k x, non ut accidens sed ut id ipsum ei perspicitur, aliam quae ex qualitate quantitati adiuncta 
corpus efficitperfectum? Note here again that the QF is `joined' (adiuncta) to quantity 




accidents which are in it or which are understood about it which, by coming 
into being, is able to create something sensible and extended in space. 74 
This conjunction of accidental quanta and qualia "in or about" substantial form 
constitutes body. If in turn we wish to identify the quantum of a body with its matter 
we can make the following claim: a body's matter is an accident of its substance or 
ousia. Note that the matter of a given body is an accident of its substance but not an 
effect of that substance; it is an effect of Quantity. 75 This is not somehow to deny 
matter the role of substrate: in order for a sensible body to be a sensible body it must 
have matter. Nor does the identification of matter with a quantum lead us to conclude 
that matter is somehow reducible to a non-material constituent; the quantum, as 
Eriugena is at pains to define it, is, (in contrast to Quantity), material: 
Now the reason why I added that a body is more rightly called a quantum than 
quantity is that those accidents which are called natural, when regarded in 
themselves as they naturally are, are incorporeal and invisible and are beheld 
only by the eye of reason (as being) about oix to itself or within in it and are, 
as it were causes having their effects, as quantity itself and quality are the 
cause of a quantum and quale... that is that whereas they are invisible, they 
produce visible effects. 76 
Eriugena is here making the point that the quantum, in contrast to its cause (viz 
Quantity), is material and, when in conjunction with qualia, is visible. A cause is 
necessarily greater than its effects. 77 We can conclude, therefore, that, 
C1 The quantum fulfils the conditions we stipulated for a material 
substrate. 
At the same time, however, the quantum is an effect of Quantity. And as such 
74 I 497A 
75 II 605AB: quamvis enim qualitas in substantia contineatur - nulla siquidem qualitas per se subsistit 
- non tarnen causam qualitatis substantiam esse 
dixerim; etenim omnis species suum genus sequitur 
quoniam a suo genere nascitur et in eo immutabiliter custoditur ac per hoc omnis substantia ex 
generali essentia defluit, omnis autem qualitas ex generali qualitate. 
6I 492D - 1493A 77 III 663C; V 913D 
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it can be said to continue to subsist in its immaterial cause, Quantity. 78 An effect is no 
more than a caused cause and nothing proceeds from a cause that is foreign to the 
nature of that cause. 79 Therefore, 
C2 The quantum, qua caused cause (Quantity), is immaterial and can 
therefore consistently be adopted as an element in an immaterialist 
theory of corporeal substance. 
C1 and C2 look inconsistent but since the relationship between the quantum and 
Quantity is causal we can deploy Eriugena's maxim that 
one and the same thing is made known by the investigations of the 
contemplation in one way in its causes, in another way in its effects. 8° 
It remains now only to show how this double identification works and then to 
open up the investigation to include problems that arise as a result of the adoption of 
this formula. 
The duality of the identification can be articulated by means of Eriugena's 
dialectical understanding of the nature of causation. 
III : Dialectic : How Body is Grouped Intellectually 
Eriugena's being able consistently to hold both CI and C2 as valid rests on an 
understanding of the nature of causation that seems to be derived wholesale from his 
Neoplatonic sources. Thus we find the pseudo-Dionysius making the claim that 
in this divine yearning shows especially its unbeginning and unending nature 
travelling in an endless circle through the Good, from the Good, in the Good 
and to the Good, unerringly turning, ever on the same centre, ever in the same 
78 III 639C: omne causativum semper in causa subsistit. See also II 547A; II 552A; 
II 605AB; IV 
860C. For the incorporeality of the categories see I 478D - 479A: omnes igitur kategoriae incorporales 
sunt per se intellectae. 
79 III 687C 
80 III 704B 
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direction, always proceeding, always remaining, always being restored to 
itself. 8' 
The emanationist theory of causation finds its scriptural endorsement in Paul's 
statement that, "ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso omnia ipsi Gloria in saecula" (Rom. 
11: 36) and is given its clearest definition by Proclus: "Every effect remains in its 
cause, proceeds from it and returns to it. "82 
What at first appeared to be two inconsistent theories of causation running 
concurrently can now be seen to express the Neoplatonic theory of a cause and its 
relation to effect in terms of a circular process. Firstly, there is the view that a cause is 
necessarily like its effect and vice versa; 83 the effect remains in its cause. At its 
strongest this theory stretches almost to the view that cause and effect are actually 
identical. As we have already seen, Eriugena thinks "an effect is nothing else but a 
made cause... for nothing proceeds from a cause into its effects that is foreign to its 
nature. , 84 And again as we have already seen, an effect subsists eternally in its cause 
just as numbers subsist eternally in undistributed unity. 85 Accepting as true the view 
81 De divinis nominibus IV, 14 (PG 4 712D - 713A) trans. Colm Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius The 
Complete Works, (Paulist Press, 1987) p. 83. Eriugena translates the Greek in his Versio operum Sancti 
Dionysii - De Divinis Nominibus as follows: et infinitum seipso, et carens principio, divinus amor 
ostenditur differenter, sicut quidam aeternus cyclus, per optimum, ex optimo, et in optimo, et in 
optimum inenarrabili conversione circuiens, et in eodem, et per idipsum et proveniens semper, et 
manens, et revolutus. (PL 122 1136D - 1137A) 82 E. R. Dodds (ed. ), Elements of Theology no. 35 (Oxford Clarendon, 1963). For the view that the 
pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus, "lived in the same philosophical climate" even if the latter cannot be 
proved to have been a direct influence on the former, see Sheldon-Williams, I. P., "The Greek Christian 
Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena", The Cambridge History of Later 
Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967) p. 457 n. 8. See also his "Henads and Angels: 
Proclus and the Pseudo-Dionysius", Studia Patristica vol. II (Berlin, 1972) pp. 65-71. H-D Saffrey 
argues for a substantial, direct influence in "New Objective Links between the Pseudo-Dionysius and 
Proclus", 0' Meara, D. (ed. ), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (Albany, New York, 1982) pp. 64- 
74. 
83 I 499A: quod de causis intelligitur cur non etiam de effectibus earum intelligatur? 
84 111 687C 
85 149213; III 624AB see also Lutz, C. ed., Johannis Scotti Annotationes in Marcianum, (Cambridge 
Mass., 1939) 367.15, p. 155: Postquam omnes numeri consummantur, monas remanet ... quia supra 
eam nihil est, quiafinis omnium in ea constat. See Marcia Colish, "Mathematics, the Monad, and John 
the Scot's Conception of Nihil" in S. Knuuttila, R. Tyorinoja, S. Ebbesen (eds. ), Knowledge and the 
Sciences in Medieaval Philosophy: Proceedings of the 8`h International Congress of Medieval 
Philosophy, Vol. II, (Helsinki, 1990) pp. 461-483. 
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that an effect remains in its cause, Eriugena concludes that all things are both eternal 
and made : 
The universe, since it is caused, that is, participates in its cause, is eternal in its 
cause. Therefore it is evident that the universe of the whole creation is eternal 
in the Word of God. 86 
But an effect also proceeds from its cause. When this aspect of the process is 
stressed a cause is characterised as necessarily greater than its effects. Eriugena's 
more apophatic passages are underwritten by the view that God, qua Cause of being, 
cannot himself be Being or a being: "For being is from Him but He is not Himself 
being. "87 A theology stressing this aspect of the causal process will characterise its 
ultimate cause as utterly transcendent. Negotiating this understanding of the cause / 
effect relation is the function of dialectic. 
In Book V Eriugena defines dialectic as, "the science of good disputation, " 
and he goes on to explain that it 
concerns itself with o&x to as its proper principle, from which every division 
and every multiplication of those things which that art [viz dialectic] discusses 
takes its origin, descending through the most general genera and the genera of 
intermediate generality as far as the most special forms and species, and again 
perpetually returning according to the rules of synthesis by the same steps by 
which it descended until it reaches that same o1ßia from which it issued 
forth, does not cease to return to it, in which it yearns to rest forever, and in 
the neighbourhood of which it seeks to operate by an activity wholly or largely 
intelligible. 88 
Clearly, therefore, good disputation is good only inasmuch as it precisely reflects 
certain ontological realities: the divisions of nature. In this respect the descent of all 
things from their ultimate cause, Ousia, is identical to the ascent conceived as a 
dialectical grouping of diverse effects into their simple causes: 
86 III 639C; see also V 907D - 908B 87 I 482AB 
88 V 869A. Compare with Hrabanus Maurus' definition: De institutione clericorum 111.20 (PL 107 
397C): dialectica est disciplina rationalis quaerendi, d ferendi, et disserendi, etiam vera afalsis 
discernendo potens. 
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For the procession of the creatures and the return of the same are so intimately 
associated in the reason which considers them that they appear to be 
inseparable the one from the other. 89 
The role of dialectic and the liberal arts in the sciptoria of Laon, Corbie, St. 
Gall, Compiegne, and the other embryonic cathedral schools cannot be over- 
stressed. 90 For now we need only note that the harnessing of the arts to the service of 
speculative theology had been established by Augustine91 and that Eriugena's 
commentary on Martianus' De Nuptiis heralded a new style of line-by-line analysis of 
the primary text for an education in the liberal arts. 92 
From the time of Alcuin the liberal arts, dialectic and grammar in particular, 
had increasingly come to be seen as legitimate tools to be employed in the service of 
theology. So although Alcuin disapproved of secular learning for its own sake, in his 
De vera philosophia he prefaces his pedagogical programme with the statement that 
the seven liberal arts correspond to the seven pillars supporting Solomon's Temple of 
89 II 529A 
90 "The arts became the bedrock of Carolingian schooling, the foundation that some students used to 
mount to the highest study of all, the study of the wisdom and mystery of Scripture. " J. J. Contreni, 
"The Pursuit of Knowledge in Carolingian Europe" in Richard E. Sullivan (ed. ), The Gentle Voices of 
Teachers: Aspects of Learning in the Carolingian Age, (Ohio, 1995) p. 118. Contreni must have in 
mind here Alcuin's recommendation in the De vera philosophia that the liberal arts should be studied 
not for their own sake but rather as the stages in an ascent ad culmina Sanctarum Scripturarum (PL 
101 854A). 
91 In the De Ordine Augustine discusses the value of the liberal arts in the practice of theology. A man, 
he claims, can be virtuous but, nesciens tarnen, quid sit nihil, quid informis materia, quid formatuni 
exanime, quid corpus, quid species in corpus, quid locus, quid tempus, quid in loco, quid in tempore, 
quid motus secundum locum, quid motus non secundum motum, quid stabilis motus, quid sit aevum, 
quid sit nec in loco esse nec nusquam, quid sit praeter tempus et semper, quid sit et nusquam esse et 
numquam non esse et numquam esse et numquam non esse, quisquis ergo ista nesciens, non 
dico 
summo illo deo, qui scitur melius nesciendo, sed de anima ipsa sua quaerere ac disputare voluerit, 
tantum errabit, quantum errari plurimum potest... Cum enim antes illae omnes liberales partim ad 
usum vitae partim ad cognitionem rerum contemplatione discantur. De Ordine 2.16.44, ed. 
W. M. 
Green, CCSL 29 p. 131 
92 See Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge, 1989) p. xi and p. 40: "Martianus' allegorical work was undoubtedly the most popular 
compendium of the liberal arts in the middle ages. " See also Liebeschutz, H., "The Place of the 
Martianus Glossae in the Development of Eriugena's Thought", 0' Meara, J. J. and Bieler, L. (eds. ) 
The Mind of Eriugena (Dublin, 1973) pp. 49-58. 
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Wisdom. 93 
Alcuin's teachings, and those of Candidus Wizo, the pupil either of Alcuin 
himself or of Hrabanus Maurus, became popular in the second half of the ninth 
century as the Dicta Albini and the Dicta Candidi. Both the Dicta employ logic in the 
analysis of doctrine and scripture: the Trinity, Christ's dual nature and the existence 
of God. The texts were widely distributed throughout the ninth century. 94 Sets of 
glosses on Aristotle's Categories were being produced, especially at the school of 
Auxerre, and employed as tools in the unpicking of knotty theological problems. In a 
letter, Alcuin asks a nun whose dialectical acuity he praises, to examine fifteen 
interrogationes by which he hopes to prove the Adoptionist position absurd and to 
`demonstrate' according to accepted logical rules, that Christ is fully God. 95 And at 
the time of the Periphyseon's composition in the early 860s Gottschalk of Orbais and 
Hincmar of Reims were embroiled in a heated exchange over the appropriateness of 
singular and plural nouns used in reference to the Trinity or Unity of God. 96 
This tendency towards incorporating the liberal arts, and particularly logic and 
dialectic into the metaphysical and theological programme was, as we have already 
seen with the quoted passage from the De Ordine (n. 91 above), endorsed by St. 
93 PL 101 853B-C. The dialogue-form De vera philosophia is usually considered to be the short 
introduction to Alcuin's De grammatica and this is how it is presented in the PL edition. For the 
symbolic connection between the liberal arts and the pillars of Solomon's temple (Prov. 9: 1) see 
Cassiodorus, De artibus ac disciplinibus liberalium litterarum (PL 70 1149D). 
94 For the texts of the Dicta Albini and the Dicta Candidi see Appendix One: Texts from the Circle of 
Alcuin in Marenbon, From the Circle ofAlcuin to the School of Auxerre (Cambridge, 1981) pp. 144- 
170; on the question of the authorship of the Dicta Marenbon has this to say: "None of the various 
arguments which have been brought against Alcuin's authorship of the Dicta Albini or Candidus' 
authorship of the Dicta Candidi are... compelling. There is no good reason to doubt the attributions... " 
op. cit. p. 37 
95 Alcuini Epistolae no. 204 in MGH Epistolae Karolini Aevi II (Munich, 1978) p. 339.30: 
Interrogandum est, si aliquid adorandum nobis sit auf colendum, nisi verus Deus. Si dicit non esse, 
inferendum est: quomodo adorabis filium virginis, si non est verus Deus? His ita confirmatis per 
interrogationes et responsiones, quid superest, nisi Christus Jesus verus credatur Deus? Verus et 
plenus et unus credatur flius? Proprius etperfectus adoretur et laudetur ab omni creatura? 
6 See Marcia Colish, "Carolingian Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae: A Study in Theological Method" 
in Speculum 59/4 (1984) pp. 757-795 esp. p. 787. 
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Augustine himself. 97 Clearly, therefore, by the time of Eriugena's writing the 
Periphyseon dialectic was being used to render tractable certain problems arising 
within the ambit of speculative theology. 
For Eriugena the causal process of remaining, procession and return is 
articulated by means of dialectic. Indeed, the central metaphysical structure of the 
Periphyseon - the divisions of nature - can be seen as a novel means of articulating 
the Neoplatonic emanationist theory. 98 By means of, "that science which the 
philosophers call 6c, voc, Mfraicq"99 it is possible to resolve individuals into their 
species, species into their genera, and ultimately the genera into the primordial causes 
that subsist in the Word. 
By means of this resolution or analysis one and the same thing can be analysed 
qua cause or qua effect. And these twin analyses will yield different, perhaps 
contradictory, conclusions concerning the thing analysed, although these conclusions 
are both valid. 
For although between the obscurity of the causes and the brightness of the 
effects a division and a difference is understood, yet it is one and the same 
day, that is they have one meaning. For it is not understood that one creature is 
made in the causes, another in the effects of the causes, but one and same is 
made, in the eternal reasons as though in a darkness of the wisdom most secret 
and removed from every intellect, and subject to intellects in the processions 
of the reasons into their effects, as though revealed in a day of perfect 
knowledge. 100 
9' As a further example of the importance of the liberal arts in Augustine see De doctrina christiana II, 
16,25, CCSL XXXII p. 50: numerorum etiam imperitia multa facit non intellegi translate ac mystice 
posita in scripturis. 
98 Cappuyns claims that, "les explications d'Erigene sur les quatre « especes de natures » nous 
montrent qu'en realite ce qui se cache sous ces formules ingenieuses n'est rien d'autre que le double 
schema des neo-platoniciens : la processio de la cause aux causes, et jusqu' aux effets ; puis la reversio 
de ceux-ci, par celles-la, jusqu' a la cause ." Cappuyns, Jean 
Scot Erigene (1933; reprint ed., Brussels: 
Editions Culture et Civilisation, 1964) p. 310 
99 II 526A 
100 111 69313: quamvis enim inter obscuritatem causarum et claritatem effectuum divisio intelligatur ac 
differrentia, unus tarnen idemque dies est, hoc est unus eorum intellectus. Non enim alia crreatura 
intelligitur in causisfacta, alia in effectibus causarum condita, sed una eademque in rationibus 
aeternis veluti in quibusdam tenebris secretissimae sapientiae omnique intellectu remotaefacta et in 
processionibus rationum in effectus intellectibus succumbens veluti in quadam die perfectae notitiae 
manifestata. 
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The duality of cause and effect is really no more than a function of our limited 
reasoning capacity; the truth for Eriugena is much more `dynamic' than our 
understanding will allow us to comprehend. ' 01 Creation looks dual, "as a consequence 
of the double direction of our contemplation, " 102 but in reality, "all the things that are 
are nothing else, in so far as they are, but the participation in Him who alone subsists 
from and through Himself" 03 
Conclusion: 
It is now possible to see how Eriugena intends, 
C1 The quantum fulfils the conditions we stipulated for a material 
substrate, 
and 
C2 The quantum, qua caused cause (Quantity), is immaterial and can 
therefore consistently be adopted as an element in an immaterialist 
theory of corporeal substance, 
to be rendered consistent. 
According to a dialectical understanding of causation, there is no substantive 
difference between Cl and C2; the difference expressed in the two formulae is a 
reflection in our understanding of the underlying dynamic structure of reality; or 
perhaps vice versa, it is a reflection in reality of our dialectical intellection. 
101 Gersh suggests that Eriugena's Greek Neoplatonic sources see reality as, "a continuous series of 
causes and effects in which each term is related dynamically to the previous one: it `remains' in its 
prior (manifests an element of identity with it), it `proceeds' (manifests an element of difference), and 
`returns' (strives to re-establish identity)" Gersh, Stephen, From lamblichus to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill, 
1975) p. 125. 
102 II 527B: propter duplicem nostrae contemplationis intentionem. See also II 528A: in ipsa rerum 
creaturam natura... in qua causae ab effectibus separantur et effectus causis adunantur quoniam in 
uno genere, in creatura dico, unum sunt. 
103 11 528B 
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In the first place, body is cognised as a compound of immaterial qualities; this 
is body viewed, as it were, in its causes, all of which are incorporeal. In the second 
place body is defined in terms of its visible effects -a quantum invested by QFs and a 
single SF. But with a dialectical understanding of causation it is now possible to see 
that Cl and C2 are actually resolvable under the same general description. C1 defines 
body in terms of its immaterial causes. C2 defines body according to the effects of 
those causes. But since an effect both proceeds from and remains in its cause it is 
quite legitimate to speak of the same body as being material and immaterial. The 
`confusion' detected by modem interpreters of Eriugena's theory is thus not a 
confusion at all, but a function of his use of dialectics in analysing the the nature of 
the relationship between Creator and creation. 
So is Eriugena an immaterialist or a materialist? In the sense that both C1 and 
C2 are valid conclusions to draw from his theory of material substance he is both. It is 
the case, however, that Eriugena clearly wishes to endorse C2 as the `correct' or 
preferable option. The different values accorded to C1 and C2 shall become apparent 
when we come to examine Eriugena's interpretation of the doctrines of the Fall and 
the general Resurrection. The world is sensible and complex and material (C 1) 
inasmuch as humanity has fallen away from its original created nature. The 
Materialist Theory explains how and why the world appears as it does to us. Since, as 
we shall see, the Fall is essentially a fall into falsehood and unreality, it is only a step 
in the dialectic towards the Immaterialist Theory that is Eriugena's ultimate analysis. 
IV : Two Objections 
Let the above conclusion represent the resolution of the apparently inconsistent 
theories of body and material substance in the Periphyseon. 
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Before testing the dialectical theory of body in the theological contexts of Fall 
and Resurrection, it is necessary first to address two non-theological difficulties that 
appear to arise as a result of the adoption of this model of corporeality. 
i) Individuation: 
The problem of individuation in the Periphyseon arises out of two closely related 
elements of Eriugena's metaphysics. Firstly, from his view that an effect continues to 
subsist in its cause, a species continues to subsist in its genus. The species subsists 
along with all the other species of the genus in a perfectly simple single substance. 
The related difficulty has a theological motivation - the Return of all things to God. 
The Return shall be the subject of Chapter Four but it must be touched upon here 
since it is conceived by Eriugena as a process of simplification, of the stripping away 
of qualitative and quantitative difference towards unification. And yet, again for 
theological or rather doctrinal reasons, Eriugena cannot admit that this process of 
unification consists in a reduction in the number of individual substances or in the 
elimination of individuals as such. Clearly the notion of the Return has implications 
for whatever we might wish to say about individuation. Both aspects of the problem 
are expressed in the following passage: 
For those things which in the processions of natures appear (videntur) to be 
divided and partitioned into many are in the primordial causes unified and one, 
and to this unity they will return and in it they will eternally and immutably 
remain. 104 
Our reasons for requiring a principle whereby individuals are distinguishable 
one from the other are grounded in our antecedent beliefs that there are as a matter of 
fact individuals. Note that the passage quoted above from Book II seems to suggest 
104 II 527A: nam quae in processionibus naturarum multipliciter divisa atque partita esse videntur, in 
primordialibus causis unita atque unum sunt, ad quam unitatem reversura in ea aeternaliter atque 
immutabiliter manebunt. 
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that individuality, and the difference that gives rise to it, is no more than an 
appearance. If, for Eriugena, there are no individuals, then it clearly follows that any 
principle of individuation is superfluous to his requirements. Let it be assumed, 
however, that Eriugena is actually committed to the view that there are as a matter of 
fact individuals. This commitment is clearly predicated upon certain theological 
presuppositions: 
The natures of the visible things were established all together and at once for 
their own times and places, and in no case did the generation of any one of 
them into forms and species, quantities and qualities, precede by temporal 
intervals the generation of any other, but that they proceeded simultaneously, 
each according to its genus and species and indivisible particulars, from their 
eternal reasons in which they subsist as essences in the Word of God. 105 
Although the procession is simultaneous, there is no sense in which the procession is 
somehow unreal, that the natures of the visible things do not exist as much as the 
species and genera. With this assumption made, let us proceed to an examination of 
individuals. 
It has already been shown that an individual body consists in an agglomeration 
of QFs in conjunction with a quantum investing an essence or SF. The question here, 
however, is where in this formula is the locus of individuality? Let us list a few 
preliminary possibilities. It cannot be the matter or quantum because that is utterly 
devoid of any distinguishing characteristics; it is formless (recall that we removed 
quantity and quanta from our definition of QF). Nor can it be the SF since 
in all it is one and the same and in all it is equally whole, and in none does it 
admit any variation and dissimilarity. 1 06 
105 III 699AB 
106 III 703AB: in omnibus una eademque est et in omnibus tota aequaliter, in nullis ullam varietatem 
vel dissimilitudinem recipiens. 
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Furthermore, SF is simple, 107 incorruptible, 108 incorporeal and imperceptible. 109 So it 
must be the QFs that account for individuation, and individual difference. ' 10 Eriugena 
seems to endorse this view when he claims that 
the dissimilarity of men one from another in feature, size, and quality of their 
several bodies, and the variety of custom and conduct result not from human 
nature (humana natura), which is one and the same in all in whom it exists, 
and is always most like itself and admits of no variety, but from the things 
which are understood about it (ex omnibus quae circa substantiam 
intelliguntur), namely from places and times, from generation, from quantity 
and quality of their diets, their habitats, the conditions under which each is 
born, and, to speak generally, from all thin s which are understood about the 
substance and are not the substance itself. ' 1 
In this passage Eriugena identifies human nature -a specific substance - with the SF 
of all individual human beings. Understood around (circa) this SF are arrayed all the 
QFs that account for the sensible differences between individual human beings. 
So prima facie our initial conclusion appears correct, it is by means of the QFs 
that individuation is effected. Since substantially all things are identical it follows 
that, apart from accidents they are not individually distinct. And that it is through the 
variety of accidents that individuality appears in the world. 
In Book III the Nutritor wishes to convince his pupil that all things are both 
eternal and made, eternal inasmuch as all things subsist substantially in their eternal 
primordial causes, made inasmuch as they become manifest to the senses at a time 
through the attachment of accidents. 
So it [viz a substantial nature] somehow comes to be, not in respect of its 
subsistence in the primordial causes but in respect of receiving from temporal 
causes - now, by temporal causes I mean qualities and quantities and the other 
things which in time through generation attach themselves to substances as 
accidents. 112 
107 1490A 
tos I 491A 
1091478D 
110 See Garcia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, (Catholic 
University Press of America: Munchen, Wien, 1984) pp. 129-135. Garcia argues that for Eriugena, "it 
is only through the variety of accidents that individuality appears to the world. " 
111111 703BC 
112 II1665D; III 657C 
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On the evidence of the two above quoted passages it seems to be the case, therefore, 
that Eriugena believes individuality simply to be an expression of accidental 
difference. 
There are, however, two problems with the view that the ontological status of 
the individual qua individual depends upon accidental difference. The first problem 
Garcia recognises, the second he does not. 
The accidental differences by means of which individuals are individuated are 
themselves universals. 
All accidents are themselves universal. The black that colors Socrates' hair 
and the one that colors Plato's are one and the same. Eriugena does not 
explicitly specify how, if this is the case, we can still speak of Socrates' hair 
color as opposed to Plato's. 113 
Individuals - such as Socrates and Plato - are, in fact, bundles of universals. And 
according to Garcia, they are to be individuated by means of spatio-temporal location. 
Eriugena certainly accords space and time a prime importance in the picking out of 
discrete bodies. 
Place is simply the natural definition of each creature, within which it is 
wholly contained and beyond which it by no means extends: and from this it is 
given to understand that whether one call it place or limit or term or definition 
or circumscription one and the same thing is being denoted, namely the 
confine of a finite creature. ' 14 
Eriugena must accept it as somehow axiomatic that no two bodies can at the same 
time occupy the same physical space. Socrates' black hair colour, and Plato's black 
113 Garcia, op. cit. p. 131 
114 I 483C. Cf. I 489A: non enim ulla creatura certo suo loco atque immutabili certisque temporum 
spatiisfinibusque, sive corporea sit sine incorporea, potest carere, ideoque, ut saepe diximus, duo 
haec, locus profecto et tempus, a philosophis &P d vev, appellantur, hoc est quibus sine; nam sine his 
nulla creatura generatione inchoans et aliquo modo subsistens potest consistere. For place and time in 
Eriugena see M. Cristiani, "Lo Spazio e il Tempo nell' opera dell' Eriugena" Studi Medievali 3a serie, 
14 (1973) pp. 39-136; Moran, Dermot, "Time, Space and Matter in the Periphyseon. An Examination 
of Eriugena's Understanding of the Physical World, " 0' Rourke (ed. ) At the Heart of the Real. 
Philosophical Essays in Honour of the Most Reverend Desmond Connell Archbishop of Dublin (Irish 
Academic Press, 1992) pp. 67-96 esp. pp. 89-96; See also Marenbon, "John Scottus and the Categoriae 
Decem, " Aristotelian Logic, Platonism and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West 
(Variorum, 2000) V. pp. 131-133. 
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hair colour are individual patches of colour because they are spatially discrete. And 
this is the case even though black is a universal. Underlying this notion is a theory of 
the non-identity of indiscernibles. 1 15 
But there is another problem that does seem to militate against Garcia's view 
that for Eriugena individuals are individuals in virtue of their accidental differences. 
Let us look again at the passage from Book III: 
The dissimilarity of men one from another... results not from human nature, 
which is one and the same in all whom it exists... but from the things 
understood about it [viz substantial human nature. ]' 16 
Eriugena does not here make the claim that individuals are individual only because 
they are qualitatively different from one another; they may be dissimilar, but that is 
not to say that their individuality is somehow a function of that dissimilarity, as 
Garcia seems to believe. Although human nature is one and the same, admits of no 
variety or change, and so on, it clearly is instantiated in every human. This is the 
substantial form (SF) human and these SFs are individual. It does not follow from the 
statement quoted, therefore, that, were SFs stripped of their qualitative differences, 
the individuals would cease to exist. And indeed Eriugena has good grounds for 
denying any such claim since later he is going to insist that individuals continue to 
subsist even after the matter and sensible forms (QFs) have all passed away. 
The unformed matter which was created out of nothing and from which the 
structure of this sensible world, by the diversity of the forms impressed upon 
it, is composed: this matter he shall burn up like hay, when it shall be 
sanctified, that is purged, in that nature that was made in the Image of God, so 
that nothing material or earthly or visible or transitory or mutable shall remain 
in it for it shall be totally changed into spiritual stability and oneness. 
117 
115 In fact the argument resembles a thought experiment devised by Max Black in which we are asked 
to imagine a universe consisting solely of two iron globes. These globes are identical 
in every 
conceivable respect - including relational properties. 
Black concludes, on the basis of the experiment, 
that it is not logically impossible for there to exist two qualitatively indiscernible things. In other words 
qualitative indiscernibilty does not entail identity. Max Black, "The Identity of 
Indiscernibles, " Mind 
LXI, 242 (April 1952) pp. 156ff. The argument against the identity of indiscernibles goes 
back at least 
as far as Kant. See Critique of Pure Reason, A 263f = B319f. 
116 III 703B 
"'V960D 
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At the general Resurrection, when only simple and uncompounded reasons continue 
to subsist in the Word of God, then, "all things are one, and not distinguished by 
accidents. " 118 Although things are not distinguished by accidents, they remain 
nonetheless individuals. Thus he is able to claim that even in this unified state the 
individuals retain their own subsistence and property (unaquaeque proprietatem suam 
et subsistentiam). 119 
It is now possible to show that, contrary to Garcia's conclusion, an individual 
is not an individual in virtue of accidental differences such as spatio-temporal 
location. We have already noted in the last chapter Eriugena's peculiar identification 
of subject and predicate; since this identification has an obvious bearing on the 
present discussion it is necessary to cite the passage in full. 
For according to the opinion of the dialecticians everything that is is either a 
subject, or what is predicated of a subject, or what is in a subject, or what is 
predicated of and is in a subject. But if right reason is consulted it replies that 
`subject' and `what is predicated of a subject' are one, and differ in no respect. 
For if, as they say, `Cicero' is a subject and first substance, while `man' is 
predicated of the subject and second substance, what difference in regard of 
nature (iuxta naturam) is there except that one is in the individual while the 
other is in the species, since species is nothing else but the unity of the 
individuals and number nothing else but the plurality of the species? If then 
the species is total and one and indivisible in the individuals and the 
individuals are an indivisible unity in the species, what difference there is in 
respect of nature (quae quantum ad naturam distantia) between `subject' and 
`what is predicated of a subject' I do not see. 120 
Eriugena expresses here the view that to say `Cicero is a man' is to specify Cicero 
substantially, that is, to say that Cicero belongs to the species `Man. ' As we have 
already seen, species and SF are identical so `Cicero belongs to the species Man' and 
`Cicero has the SF Man' are synonymous statements. With this established, Eriugena 
goes on to claim that there is no difference, "in regard of nature" between Cicero and 
118 V 906A: omnia unum sunt, neque ullis accidentibus discernuntur. 
119 V 879A 
120 1470D -471A 
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his SF. This iuxta naturam is crucial. The `nature' refers to that nature in which all 
men were originally created. 121 It follows, therefore, that within the overall 
metaphysical context of the Periphyseon, the prima facie peculiar claim that subject 
and predicate are identical, is in fact trivial. Eriugena is simply claiming that Cicero is 
identical to his substance. Cicero qua individual is patently not to be identified with 
the accidental differences that invest his substantial form. To individuate Cicero in 
this way is a result of our fallen nature. 122 
In conclusion, an individual for Eriugena is individual because of its having a 
certain non-qualitative thisness. This thisness is a function of the individual's 
substance, or maybe it is the substance itself; Eriugena is unclear. In other words, 
Eriugena need not accept the possibility of non-identity relations obtaining between 
qualitatively indiscernible things since for him the locus of individuality is not in the 
suchnesses presented by a given thing, but in that thing's primitive thisness. 123 
Although it does not follow that the individuality of a composite sensible 
body, is identical to its substance, it does follow that were it not for the presence of a 
SF, there would be no individual. 
Now that we have reached an understanding as to the ontological status of an 
Eriugenian individual it remains to be shown how individuation is possible. After all, 
if Cicero is, according to created nature, identical to Man, how is it possible, once all 
the accidental differences, forms and matter, are stripped away, to individuate him? 
Eriugena is making the implausible claim that all bodies are substantially identical, 
and yet individuals. And he offers no guidance on this matter anywhere in the 
121 1445A; IV 760B et passim. 
122 IV 855A: postquam vero peccavit, per organa exterioris sensus nonnisi solas sensibilium 
superficies, et quantitates, et qualitates, situs quoque et habitudines, caeteraque quae corporeo sensui 
succumbunt, animus percipit.. 
123 For primitive thisness, see Robert Merrihew Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity, 
" 
Journal of Philosophy LXXVI, 1 (January 1979) pp. 5-26. 
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Periphyseon. At points he appears to express the view that individuation is impossible 
both before the Fall and at the fulfilment of the Return: 
In the one [that is, before the Fall] he receives the knowledge in a general 
manner and secretly in the causes, in the other [that is, after the Fall] he 
receives it in a special manner and openly in the effects. For in that primordial 
and general creation of all human nature no one knows himself as species nor 
begins to have a particular knowledge of himself, for there is one general and 
common knowledge of himself, for there there is one general and common 
knowledge possessed by all, known only to God. There all men are one, and 
that one is made in the image of God, in Whom all were created. 124 
Individuation is, for Eriugena, a form of definition. It is therefore impossible to 
individuate that which by its nature lacks definition. God does not lack definition, he 
transcends it. Unformed matter does lack definition and it too cannot be individuated 
as a result. Likewise, 
no wise man asks of all essence in general what it is, since it cannot be defined 
except in terms of the circumstances which circumscribe it, so to speak, within 
limits, I mean place and time, quantity and quality, connection, rest, motion, 
condition and the other accidents by which the substance itself, by reason of 
being subject, unknown and indefinable through itself, is shown only as 
subsisting, but not as to what it is. 125 
It is not the generality of this essence that leads the wise man to conclude that it 
cannot be defined as to what it is, it is, rather, the transcendent nature of the essence. 
For Eriugena the essence of all things is identical to God's understanding of 
all things: 
For the understanding of all things in God is the essence of all things because 
with God it is one and the same thing to know before they are made the things 
which He makes, and to make the things which He knows. God's knowing and 
God's making are therefore one. For by knowing He makes and by making He 
knows. 126 
124 IV 776D - 777A 125 II586D-587A 
126 11 559AB Cf. I 516C; 11 59613; 111 6321); III 659A-B; 111 67113; 111 6761); 111 6811); III 683A; III 
684Cff; IV 768B; IV 770C; IV 772B; IV 778B - IV 779A 
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It seems to follow from this view that an individual's status as an individual depends 
on God's knowledge of the individual as such. It certainly cannot depend on our 
essential knowledge, since we have none: 
The concept (notio) of man in the Mind of God is... simple and cannot be 
called by this or that name, for it stands above all definition and all groupings 
of parts, for it can only be predicated of it that it is, not what it is. 
It appears, therefore, that although we can abandon the view that Eriugena conceives 
of individuation as being effected by means of qualitative difference, we can replace 
this view only with the ultimately mysterious notion of God's knowledge of 
individuals bringing about their existence. 
ii) Visibility: 
Visibility presents a problem for Eriugena, or for an interpreter of the Periphyseon, 
because while he claims that, "bodies, if not perceived by the senses, are not 
bodies" 128 he also argues that, "there are such things as bodies without sensible 
form. " 0 29 These two statements appear to be contradictory; the first statement makes it 
clear that there are no bodies that cannot be perceived by the senses, but the second 
sentence asserts the existence of bodies that lack sensible form and are therefore 
unavailable to the senses. The second sentence therefore allows for the existence of a 
class of invisible bodies that the first statement denies. 
By way of a conclusion to the first part of this analysis of body and material 
substance, it is the aim of this section to show how these superficially contradictory 
statements can be shown to be consistent with one another when couched within the 
127 IV 768C 
128 I 479A: corpora vero si sensibus non percipiantur corpora non sunt. Thus, for Eriugena, those who 
futurae beatitudinisparticipes sunt (I 483A) shall transcend their own corporeal nature. He explains 
this transcendence as follows: hoc est naturam transcendere: naturam non apparere (I 483B). It is of 
our nature to be manifest, visible. Indeed creation, for Eriugena, just is manifestation or self- 
manifestation. See I 455B. 
129 V 896D: sunt corpora formis sensibilibus carentia. 
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notion, developed over these two chapters, of body grouped intellectually or 
dialectically. 
According to the first view a body, in order to be a body, must be available to 
the senses of a perceiver. This account of body falls within Eriugena's extended 
discussion of the categories at the point where the Nutritor is attempting to 
demonstrate to his pupil the distinction between body and place. The two are 
categorically distinct on account of body belonging to the genus Quantity. 
Quantity is nothing else but the definite measuring out of parts which are 
separated either by the reason alone or by natural differentiation, and the 
rational extension to definite limits of those things which extend in the 
dimensions of nature, I mean in length, in breadth, and in depth. 130 
Whereas Place is 
nothing else but the boundary and enclosure of things which are contained 
within a fixed limit. ' 31 
It follows, the Nutritor argues, that the world is not a place, but a body. The Alumnus 
is confused as to why this world should not be called a place since many things are 
placed within it. The Nutritor now aims to prove his case by arguing that Aristotle's 
ten categories can be divided into two groups, the first group being those categories 
(viz Quantity, Quality, Situation and Condition) that come together to form visible 
matter (materiem visibilem) through their marvellous commingling (mirabili... 
coitu). 132 The second group comprises those of the categories (viz Ousia, Relation, 
Place, Time, Action, Passion) that are never reached by the bodily sense. If Place 
belongs to that group that is never perceivable, while Quantity, in virtue of its coming 
to be perceivable as body, belongs to the other group, it follows that place and body 
are not the same. 
133 
'30I478B 
13 1I 478B 
132 1 479A 
133 1 479B: aliud est igitur locus et aliud corpus. 
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In this passage of Book I, therefore, the body under discussion is specifically 
visible body, or visible matter; were it not so, the Nutritor's categorial argument 
would not go through. 
I am speaking here (nunc) of the bodies that are produced by the coming 
together of the four elements of the world. 134 
The use of nunc, seems to imply that there are other types of body about which it 
would possible to speak at other times, and in other ways. Perhaps these `other' 
bodies do not have to be perceivable to the senses in order to be bodies. It appears, 
therefore, that the problem with the statement, "a body in order to be a body must be 
perceivable to the senses, " is the implied presence of a universal quantifier. In fact, 
however, the `body' under discussion is not all bodies, but a discrete class of bodies. 
And that this is the case is demonstrated almost straightaway. Having made 
the apparently normative claim concerning the necessary perceptibility of bodies, the 
Nutritor goes on to speak of the four elements that are themselves bodies but, 
because of the indescribable fineness and purity of their nature, surpass all 
mortal sense. 135 
And in Book V Eriugena claims that 
the four simple elements of the world are not bound to particular shapes. For 
they are in the world everywhere, and there is no part of it where their 
concourse is absent. But how can that which is in the world everywhere be 
confined to any form? There are such things, then, as bodies without sensible 
form. 136 
That which lacks sensible form (QF) is clearly unavailable to the senses. So here 
already is an exception to the rule that all bodies must be perceivable. It must be the 
case, therefore, that a certain class of bodies, in order to be bodies, must be 
134 I 479A: corpora nunc dico quae ex coitu quattuor mundi elementorum conficiuntur. 
135 147913; cf. II 606C; 111 711 D-712A: quattuor simplicium elimentorum universitatem, quae dum per 
se purissima sint et incomprehensibilia omni corporeo sensu et ubique universaliter diusa. 
136 V 896D 
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perceivable to the senses. But there are other classes of bodies, for example the four 
elements, that are both imperceptible and bodies. 
Having thus drawn the sting of the first statement, let us turn to examine the 
claim that there are such things as bodies without sensible form. What is a body 
without a sensible form? The definitions of body that opened the first part of this 
study were all more or less complex: a body consists in matter and form; a body is an 
agglomeration of sensible qualities; a body is composed of the qualities of the 
elements. What these definitions had in common was the qualitative form (QF). The 
claim that there are bodies without sensible form (QF) contradicts this claim. But only 
if `body' is a term that refers to a single class of objects that are identical in certain 
relevant ways. In the light of the above findings, however, it appears that `body' 
ranges over a number of classes of objects that differ from one another at least in that 
some are visible and some are not. Why, therefore, should it not be possible for there 
to exist a class of bodies that lack QFs? Is it the case, therefore, that Eriugena posits 
two classes of bodies, those that are sensible, and those that are not? 
Interestingly, Eriugena does not want to adopt the view that there are two 
types or classes of bodies, or that the class of bodies comprises a number of different 
types. For him `body' denotes a singular class of objects. There is only one type of 
body - that which is a species of Quantity; to have a body is to have spatial extension. 
The difference, once again, lies in the epistemological focus of the perceiver - 
whether they remain in thrall to material effects or have chosen to contemplate the 
substantial nature of creation: 
In every sensible body we have one way of regarding with the corporeal 
senses the mass of its quantity which forms the base of its qualities, another of 
93 
understanding with the keen mind its invisible substance and the proper 
species that subsist in it. 137 
The `invisible substance' in this passage is the invisible substance that was analysed 
in Chapter One and which we have now identified as the locus of individuality. And 
the `proper species that subsist in it' are the specific substances from which it 
proceeds (Man, Creature etc) and which are present wholly and immutably in each 
individual substance. 
There are two possible ways of perceiving sensible body. Firstly, there is the 
corporeal sense which perceives an agglomeration of quanta and qualia, and then 
there is the understanding of the keen mind which is able to penetrate to the body's 
individual substance; this substance is identical to the species. 
It is now possible to conclude this first part of the study of material substance 
in the Periphyseon. These two modes of understanding material substance mark out 
the metaphysical spectrum upon which the perceiver must align him or herself. And, 
of course, this epistemological alignment has certain entailments. To engage the 
understanding in contemplation of created material substance is to look towards the 
primordial causes, the Good in which all things are made; it is to initiate the Return 
and to counteract the effects of the Fall. It is to turn towards reality and away from the 
mutable, transient unreality of the material world. To turn away from the substance 
and allow the sensory apparatus to rest on the qualities of sensible bodies is to be 
beguiled by false phantasies, to turn away from the Good, and from God. 
138 
137 III 711 C: aliter nanque in omni sensibili corpore quantitatis molem qualitatibus suis subiectam 
corporeis sensibus consideramus, aliter invisibilem substantiam speciesque proprias in ipsa 
subsistentes mentis acie intelligimus - secundum quas rerum omnium visibilium et invisibilium 
numerositas multiplicatur, universalitas colligitur, proprietas custoditur. 
138 On phantasia in Eriugena see Foussard, J-C., "Apparence et Apparition: La Notion de Phantasia 
chez Jean Scot, " Roques (ed. ) Jean Scot Erigene et L'Histoire de la Philosophie (Paris CNRS, 1977) 
pp. 337-348. 
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Paradoxically, for Eriugena therefore, visibility is obscurity. An object's 
visibility is an index of the fallen, benighted natures of both the perceived and the 
perceiver; it represents a failure on the part of the perceiver to deploy correctly his or 
her faculties, and ultimately this is a failure of the will. 
This paradox - that visibility is obscurity - is itself a call to ascesis. Expressed 
by means of this paradox is Eriugena's fundamental belief that the sensible, transient, 
corruptible world, is not the proper object of the human intellect; it is ultimately false. 
In order to attain the truth, the eye of the mind must be turned away from the sensible 




At the beginning of Book IV of the Periphyseon the Nutritor offers a warning to his 
pupil. Compared to the task now before them, he says, the first three books of the 
work 
seem like a smooth sea upon which, because of the calmness of the waves, 
readers could sail without fear of shipwreck, steering a safe course. Now, 
however, we enter upon a voyage where the course has to be picked from the 
mass of tortuous digressions, where we have to climb the steeps of obscure 
doctrines, encounter the region of the Syrtes, that is to say, the dangers of the 
currents of unfamiliar teaching, ever in immediate danger of shipwreck from 
the obscurity of the subtlest intellects, which like concealed rocks may 
suddenly split our vessel. ' 
The changed state of the waters is a reflection of the shift from what we might call 
speculative philosophy to speculative theology. The last two books of the Periphyseon 
deal primarily with the Fall, the Incarnation, and the Resurrection. The dangers, as 
Eriugena perceives them, are therefore greater; to make a mistake in a discussion of 
the categories, or the primordial causes would be to fall into error, to make a mistake 
in explicating doctrine is heresy. 
For this reason, Eriugena explicitly conceives his role as different from that of 
the natural philosopher of the first three books of the Periphyseon. In the final two 
books - but particularly in the fourth - he sees his role more as a purveyor of possible 
positions. To this end he presents the reader with a number of options, and frequently, 
once the positions have been cited, he urges the reader to choose between them: 
1 IV 743D - 744A. Cf. De Prae 355B: nos vero e diverso inter undosum velivomquepelagus 
imperil 
senioris nostri, domini videlicet gloriossimi Caroli, quasi quaedam navicula diversis 
fluctibus agitati. 
For the use of navigation and nautical imagery in Eriugena see, Moran, "Wandering from the Path: 
Navigatio in the Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena" in The Crane Bag Book of Irish Studies 
(Dublin: Black-water Press, 1982) pp. 244-50. Eriugena uses this imagery at III 636A; V 923D - 924C. 
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We have made it our aim to say only those things which seem to us to be 
probable (verisimilia). To refute the opinion of others who think otherwise, or 
to treat it with contempt, or to pronounce it false, is none of our business. 2 
This position reflects not so much over-cautiousness on Eriugena's part as a 
sensitivity to the fact that the subject matter no longer admits of right or wrong under 
the lamp of cold reason, but the arguments must always be to probability, or 
likelihood, or that which accords best with a sensitive and rational reading of 
Scripture. 
Although the focus of Eriugena's attention has shifted, his ultimate aim, I 
suggest, remains unchanged: to to engage the reader in contemplation of substantial 
reality and thereby to facilitate the ascent to God. As we shall see over the course of 
what follows, this contemplatio is not conceived by Eriugena as the personal 
fulfilment of a religious vocation, but as the Resurrection itself. The doctirnes of the 
Fall of Man, and the general Resurrection are, for Eriugena, not conceived as 
historical processes or events, but as a universal gauge upon which it is possible to 
read the endlessly dynamic relationship between Creator and Creation. 
Our aim therefore is to show how Eriugena's dialectical theory of corporeal 
substance functions in the context of his metaphysical theology. It shall be found that 
Eriugena's thinking is essentially ascetical; he advocates withdrawal from the sensible 
world and the adoption of a life of contemplation. Indeed `withdrawal' and 
`contemplation' themselves are mapped onto the metaphysics as `death' and 
`resurrection' 
. 
2 IV 813D-814A; see also IV 804: mihi autem et tibi, si placet, sufficiat sententias sanctorum patrum 
de constitutione hominis ante peccatum legere, et quid unusquisque eorum voluit cauta et diligenti 
inquisitione quaerere. Lites autem inter eos constituere, non est nostrum, auf Nunc constituere, hunc 
autem refellere, scientes post sanctos apostolos nullum apud graecos fuisse in expositiones divinae 
scripturae maioris auctoritatis Gregorio Theologo, nullum apud romanos Aurelio Augustino. For 
Eriuegna's hermeneutical method in relation to Augustine see B. Stock, "The Philosophical 
Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena, " Studi Medievali ser. 3a, 8 (1967) pp. 1-57; Russell, R., 
"Some Augustinian Influences, " in 0' Meara and Bieler, L., (eds. ), The Mind of Eriugena (Dublin, 
1973). For Eriugena's hermeneutics in general see Van Riel, C., Steel, C., McEvoy, J. J., (eds. ) 
Johannes Scottus Eriugena: The Bible and Hermeneutics (Leuven, 1996). 
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The purpose of Part One was to reconcile several apparently inconsistent 
theories of corporeal substance. In Part Two we shall be obliged to ask how the 
findings of Part One can be squared with revealed doctrine. How is material 
substance, how are visible bodies, to be evaluated within the divine plan? Perhaps the 
aims of Part Two can best be summarised as follows: In Part One we asked of 
Eriugena, What is material substance? In Part Two we are asking precisely the same 
question but are no longer hoping for an answer as to its composition, but as to its 
place within the divine scheme. 
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Chapter Three : The Fall 
God's plan made a hopeful beginning, 
But Man spoilt his chances by sinning, 
We trust that the story, 
Will end in great glory, 
But at present the other side is winning. ' 
Part One : The Fall 
Introduction: 
In this chapter an attempt shall be made to show that, although Eriugena conceives of 
matter and corporeal substance as base and low, he does not think of them as evil. It 
shall be noted that for Eriugena material substance and body are `added' by God to 
created nature as punishment for sin. And this addition constitutes the Fall. It shall be 
necessary therefore to look in detail both at created human nature, human nature in its 
pristine, pre-lapsarian form, and at fallen human nature in an attempt to define as 
precisely as possible the effects of the Fall. 
In the opening sections two contentious views will be discussed, firstly, that 
there is no doctrine of the Fall to be found in the Periphyseon, and secondly, that the 
Fall just is creation. Although it is possible to develop arguments for these two views, 
it shall be found that neither reflects Eriugena's intention. In conclusion I aim to show 
that the Fall for Eriugena serves a protreptic function; it is a guide to right living. 
One further programmatic point: let it be a requirement that our findings 
concerning the doctrine of the Fall in the Periphyseon sit consistently with the 
conclusions of the first part of our analysis. As the Alumnus recognises, "every 
authority which is not upheld by true reason is seen to be weak. "2 
1 Traditional, The Wordsworth Book of Limericks (Wordsworth, 1997) p. 82 
2 I513B 
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We are, therefore, following Eriugena's own normative stipulations if we enforce the 
rule that, however authoritative, that which does not admit of `rational' proof - 
though it may have the weight of authority behind it - will not be allowed to stand. 
For our purposes that means that any definition of matter or body inconsistent with 
the conclusions of Part One will be inadmissible. 
I: The Fall 
I behold man driven forth from Paradise; formerly blessed, now become 
wretched; once rich, now needy; once an eternal being, now a temporal; once 
enjoying everlasting life, now mortal; once wise, now foolish; once a spiritual 
creature, now an animal; once heavenly, now earthly; once enjoying eternal 
youth, now growing old; once happy, now sad; once saved, now lost; once the 
prudent son, now the prodigal; straing from the flock of the heavenly powers 
I behold him, and I grieve for him. 
The above is a typical expression of the extremes of the Fall to be found in the 
Periphyseon - the heights and the depths. Man's former state is contrasted with his 
present. Whereas the former `created' state was blessed, eternal, intellectual and 
spiritual, the present state of man is characterised by corruption, animality and 
ignorance. 
The Fall is often also expressed by Eriugena as a fall away from a likeness to 
God, a spoiling of the Image in which man was created. It is, "tarnished by a kind of 
unlikeness. "4 According to Eriugena, there are two types of difference between man 
created in the image of God, and the principal exemplar, the Word. Firstly, the Trinity 
subsists substantially through itself, while man's nature is made by and in the Word. 
This is the substantial difference, or the difference "in respect of subject" (rationem 
subiecti). 5 The second difference is explained by means of the doctrine of the Fall; it 
3V 862BC 
4V 871D: quadam disimilitudine propter peccatum decolorata est. 
5 11 598B 
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is a dissimilarity between image and exemplar that does not come from nature, "but is 
an accident produced by sin. "6 It is an examination of this accidental difference that 
concerns us in this chapter. 
The first man is depicted as falling from 
the delight of eternal bliss and the happiness of divine similitude, in His image 
and likeness, that is, in an image which in every way resembles Himself save 
only, as I have said before, in his status of subject -a nature which is greater 
and more excellent than the whole sensible universe, not in respect of size, but in respect of the dignity of its nature. 7 
The depths are thus characterised in terms of the marring of the Image, an unlikeness. 
The Fall is also a forgetfulness of the original creation, an ignorance of God. This is 
the Fall characterised as an epistemic crisis: 
Deceived and fallen, blinded by the murkiness of [sc. the soul's] depraved 
will, she has forgotten herself and her Creator. And this is the most wretched 
feature of her death, and the deepest profundity of her submersion in the fog of 
ignorance, that she has drifted so far from herself and her Creator and 
approached in likeness so near and so shamefully the irrational and mortal 
animals. 8 
And this epistemic crisis has a number of metaphysical corollaries: 
Sexual propagation in the manner of the irrational beasts; bodily increase and 
decrease; all the diseases to which the body is heir, including its final 
dissolution; also the irrational impulses to which the rational soul is subject, 
and which deriving from matter, revolve about it. None of these things are part 
of the primal creation of man, but originate from his general sin. 9 
Sexuality is characterised by Eriugena as the manifest product of man's fallen nature: 
God... superimposed upon human nature an alternative mode of propagation, 
by which this world might be extended in space and time to allow for man to 
pay for his general offence a general penalty, by being born like the rest of the 
animals from a corruptible seed. '0 
6 II 598B 
7 IV 822AB 
8IV761A 
9V 939D - 940A 10 IV 799BC; see also V 893B where Eriugena explains that the division of humankind into male and 
female is the fifth and final division of all created nature. 
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This chapter aims to discern the role that material substance plays in this cosmic nose- 
dive from paradise into the mire. 
For Eriugena the Fall acts as an explanation of how humanity comes to occupy 
a middle ground between creator and creation. 
The whole soul [of man] is on the one hand produced from the earth in the 
genus of the animals, and on the other hand is made in the image of God. 11 
In his Homily on the Prologue of St. John's gospel Eriugena places man at the 
junction of the celestial and material worlds. In man, he claims, the spiritual and 
corporeal are joined and made one, 
for he consists in both body and soul. Combining the body of this world with 
the soul of the other world, he makes one adornment. For body indeed is 
wholly corporeal, while soul possesses a wholly incorporeal nature. 12 
The characteristics of our fallen nature are generation through sexual means, 13 the 
impairing of our intellectual faculty, 14 and a resultant ignorance of God. ' 5 
11 IV 755A: tota igitur et in genere animalium de terra producta est, et tota ad imaginem dei(acta. Cf. 
IV 795B (quoting Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio 17 [16] PG 44 181 BC): Duorum quorundam 
per extremitatem a se invicem distantium medium est humanitas, divinae videlicet incorporalisque 
naturae, et irrationalis pecudalisque vitae. See also V 893C: Hinc etiam medietas solet appellari [Sc. 
homo], extrema siquidem longeque a se distantia, spiritualia scilicet et corporalia, in se comprehendit 
et in unitatem colligit, corpore et anima consistens. See also IV 833C-834A: Quomodo de limo terrae 
estformatus qui ad imaginem et similitudinem deifactus? Aut quomodo de eo diceretur: Factus homo 
in animam viventem? Quod de caeteris bestiis de terra prolatis similiter dictum est: Producat terra 
animam viventem. Nonne ergo duarum hominis conditionem ratio datur intelligi? Primo quidem 
scriptus est: Et creavit deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem dei creavit illum. Ecce prima 
conditio, in qua nulla terreni limi commemoratio(acta est, neque animae viventis. Sequitur autem 
secunda, quae ex divisione naturae in duplicem sexum, poena praevaricationis superaddita, exordium 
sumpsit: Masculum, inquit, et feminam creavit eos. 
12 Johanni Scotti Homilia in Prologum S. Evangelii secundum Johannem (PL 122 294B - my 
translation): corpore enim constat et anima. corpus de hoc mundo, animam de altero mundo colligens, 
unumfacit ornatum. et corpus quidem omnem corpoream, anima vero omnem incorpoream possidet 
naturam. 
13 IV 799B: quapropter si homo non peccaret, nullus utriusque sexus copula. See also IV 807D: Haec 
autem sunt consequentia peccati, propter peccatum, priusquam fieret peccatum, ab eo cuius 
praescientia non fallitur, in homine et cum homine, veluti extra hominem ac superaddita: animale 
quidem corpus atque terrenum et corruptibile, sexus uterque ex masculo etfemina bestiarum 
similitudine procreationis multiplicatio, indigentia cibi et potus indumentique, incrimenta et detrimenta 
corporis, somni ac vigilarium alterna inevitabilisque necessitas, et similia, quibus omnibus humana 
natura, si non peccaret, omnino libera maneret, quemadmodum liberafutura est. See also IV 761 A; cf 
II 532A in which the division of the sexes is characterised as the final division of nature. Also II 532B. 
14 IV 777CD: casus quippe illius maximus et miserrimus erat scientiam et sapientiam sibi insitam 
deserere, et in profundam ignorantiam suimet et creatoris sui labi. 
15 IV 744B: veritatis contemplationem, quam lapsu primi hominis perdiderat; IV 761 A; IV 852A; IV 
777CD. 
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But of most interest to us here is the possibility that Eriugena conceives the 
Fall as either 1) the explanation as to why we are corporeal beings, or 2) the cause of 
our corporeality. 16 Of course 1) and 2) are not mutually exclusive. The Fall could 
provide a causal account for material substance as well as act as a principle for 
explaining why the material world is the way that it is. In other words it is possible to 
think of 1) as providing an Aristotelian final cause, and 2) as an efficient cause. 17 As 
we shall see the doctrine of the Fall is essentially teleological in function; it is 
designed by God to punish man and ultimately to bring him back into a correct 
alignment with created nature. But there is, as shall become clear over the course of 
the following discussion, a particular problem with 2). 
II : Two Possibilities 
If we accept that 2) is true - that the Fall is the cause of our corporeality - then we are 
immediately faced with two possibilities. Either it is arguable that Eriugena offers no 
doctrine of the Fall at all, or, if this seems unacceptable, it could be claimed that the 
Fall and the Creation are in fact one event. 
16 That the Fall is the cause of our corporeality is Origen's view. See Origen, On First Principles II, 7, 
3, ii: "The creation of all rational creatures consisted of minds bodiless and immaterial without any 
number or name, so that they all formed a unity by reason of the identity of their essence and power 
and energy and by their union with and knowledge of God the Word; but they were seized with 
weariness of the divine love and contemplation, and changed for the worse, each in proportion to his 
inclination in this direction; and they took bodies, either fine in substance or grosser, and became 
possessed of a name, which accounts for the differences of names as well as of bodies. " See also, 
Origen, On First Principles II, 1,3: "What other cause can we imagine to account for the great 
diversity of this world except the variety and diversity of the motions and declensions of those who fell 
away from that original unity and harmony in which they were at the first created by God. " Trans. 
Butterworth, Origen on First Principles (SPCK, 1936). Deidre Carabine acceps the Origenist reading 
of Eriugena: Carabine, Eriugena, (Oxford, 2000) p. 79: "The most important consequence of the fall is 
that it effected the creation of the body and the material world. " This is also Dermot Moran's view, see 
Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 
1989) p. 108. 
17 Aristotle, Physics 2,3,29 - 35. 
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i) There is no Fall: 
The argument that there is no doctrine of the Fall to be found in the Periphyseon 
depends on a number of passages in Book IV claiming that man's tenure of Paradise 
had no temporal extension. God foreknows that man will fall from the beauty and 
dignity of his original divine nature into animality. 18 To this end, Eriugena argues, 
God made man both in the Image of God, and in the genus animal simultaneously. 
At the same time as He created man He created the consequences of his sin. 19 
And if it appears precipitate on God's part to punish man before he has sinned, 
Eriugena immediately points out that to think so is in itself an indication of our sinful 
nature. He reminds us 
that in God nothing is before and nothing after, because for Him there is 
nothing past, nor future, nor between past and future, for to Him all things are 
at once present. Why should He not then simultaneously create those things 
which He saw were to be created and willed to be created? For when we say 
`before' and `after' sin we are demonstrating the mutability of our thought 
processes which is due to the fact that we are still subject to temporal 
conditions: but to God the foreknowledge of sin and the consequence of sin 
itself were contemporaneous. 20 
This double creation of man - both in the Image, and in the genus Animal - has an 
exegetical impulse. It is an attempt to render consistent the two creations of man to be 
found in the Genesis text (Gen. 1: 27 and Gen. 2: 7). The dual creation of man shall be 
examined in greater detail later in the chapter. It suffices for our purposes here to 
show that, according to Eriugena, man is created from the start under the genus 
animal. The Fall, it follows, must be simultaneous with Creation. 
The claim that man is in Paradise for no length of time finds support, Eriugena 
believes, in a passage from Luke's gospel. In the parable of the Good Samaritan there 
is the following verse: 
'8 IV 807B 
19 IV 807C: peccati consequentia in homine et cum homine simul concreavit. 
20 IV 808AB 
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A certain man was descending from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among 
thieves. (Luc. 10: 30) 
Eriugena interprets this passage as allegorically referring to the Fall of man. He notes 
that the man, according to the parable, was already descending when he fell among 
thieves. Jerusalem is to be understood as referring to Paradise or the Vision of Peace, 
and Jericho to the, "weakness and instability of temporal nature . "21 The man was not 
attacked in Jerusalem. He was already falling at the time he was tempted by the devil. 
For it is not to be believed that the same man could both have been abiding in 
the contemplation of eternal peace and also have fallen at the persuasion of a 
woman corrupted by the poison of a serpent; or that that serpent, I mean the 
devil, who had already fallen from Paradise, that is, from the dignity of the 
angelic nature, could have prevailed over a man who was not yet in a state of 
sin and was not already falling from the sublimity of the Divine image. 22 
Eriugena reinforces his view that creation and Fall are simultaneous by 
pointing out that the devil is described as, "a man-slayer from the beginning" (John 
8: 44). Now, the Nutritor asks, from what beginning was the devil a man-slayer? Was 
it from the beginning of his own creation, or the beginning of man's? And were man 
and the devil created at the same time? If the devil was created first, then he could not 
have been a man-slayer from the beginning of his creation since there was no man to 
slay. And if man was made first, how can the devil be a man-slayer from the 
beginning of the creation of man? If the devil and man were created simultaneously 
then it follows that the devil was slaying and man being slain from the first. And 
therefore, Eriugena asks, what time remains for man in Paradise? 
But if there is no temporal space between creation and Fall how or why do we 
render the two distinct? Surely it would be neater to think simply of a single act of 
creation - an emanation, a procession of cause into effect, if the Neoplatonic 
language 
21 IV 811 C: defectum instabilitatemque rerum temporalium. 
22IV811CD 
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is to be retained - without recourse to any further `events' or interventions such as the 
Fall to explain why the creation is as it is? 
It might be neater, but neatness goes no way at all to show that the two events 
- Fall and Creation - are identical. For surely simultaneity does not imply identity. 
Indeed despite the simultaneity, Eriugena continues to maintain the difference 
between man's creation and his fall. And he does so by means of a counterfactual: 
That praise of the life of man in Paradise must refer rather to the life that 
would have been his if he had remained obedient than to its happening which 
only began and in which he did not continue. 23 
ii) The Fall is identical to the Creation: 
As we noted above, Origen's assertion that the irrational movement of man's created 
will is the cause of material reality seems to be inconsistent with Eriugena's own view 
that 
the wholesome doctrine of the Church most firmly believes and most clearly 
perceives that the one omnipotent God who is principle and cause of all things, 
of the things that are and the things that are not, endowed the world at the 
moment when He willed to do so with both matter and form. 24 
It seems that, for Eriugena, the act of Creation and the Fall of man must be entirely 
different events. One has a divine Cause, the other is a, "penalty which our nature 
must pay for its transgression. "25 
And yet in a passage concerning the likeness of the human trinity (Intellect, 
Reason, Sense) with the Holy Trinity, the Nutritor argues that 
the human intellect, through an act of knowing, creates, by a wonderful 
operation of its science (mirabili quodam operatione scientiae), whatsoever it 
most clearly and unambiguously receives from God. 26 
23 IV 809B 
24 V 890C; Cf. II 535BC; III 632D et passim. It goes counter to Eriugena's thinking to claim that man 
is the creative cause of anything. After all, man belongs to that third species of the genus natura that 
Eriugena classifies as `created and un-creating. ' (144 1 B-442A) 
25 IV 777AB 
26 11 579BC 
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And a little later he reiterates that 
everything that our intellect can understand [concerning God and the causes of things] after a universal mode it creates [that is, it forms] by an act of science through knowledge in the reason; and after a particular mode, through the 
sense which is consubstantial with it, divides unconfusedly [that is, 
accomodates its knowledge to each (particular) by the most careful 
observation of distinctions] by the power of its contemplation into the 
individual definitions of the things which in the reason it gathers together. 27 
From this the Alumnus concludes that, "the trinity of our nature... creates the senses 
which are subjoined to it, and the instruments of the senses, and the whole of its body 
-I mean, this mortal body. , 28 
According to these passages there is no requirement for a fall in order to 
explain the diverse nature of reality or our having mortal bodies. Complexity, 
mortality and change are explicable by means of our own cognitive grasp of that 
which we, "most clearly and unambiguously receive from God. " 
We cannot, however, on the basis of these passages, conclude that i) the Fall is 
a redundant concept in Eriugena, nor that ii) Eriugena is here unequivocally 
articulating the view that man creates, through cognition, the orders of reality. Let us 
take ii) first. Note that man's act of creation is qualified in both quoted passages (II 
579BC and II 580AB). Firstly, it does not create simpliciter but but by means of "a 
wonderful operation of its science. " Nor is this creation ex nihilo; it "creates", or 
rather forms, what it receives from God; it is creation after the event. Likewise in the 
second passage (II 580AB) Eriugena has made several later insertions that markedly 
dilute the idealist tone. Creation is "forming"; rather than actually dividing, 
distributing that which it understands after a universal mode, it "accomodates its 
27 II 580AB: intellectum nostrum omnia quaecunque [de deo causisque rerum] potest intelligere 
universalfiter in ratione per cognitionem actu scientiae creare [hoc estformare] et per sensum 
consubstantialem sibi particulariter in singularis rerum d ynitiones quas in ratione colligit 
contemplationis virtute inconfuse dividere [hoc est suam cognitionem unicuique cautissimo discretionis 
contuitu accommodare. ] Square brackets mark inserts to MS Rheims 875 in Eriugena's own hand. 
28 II 580AB 
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knowledge" to prior distinctions. This is not so much creation as taxonomy. Or rather 
it is creation understood after a different fashion. Eriugena is careful to draw this 
distinction between the two modes of knowledge that bring about creation: 
The knowledge in the Creative Wisdom is itself rightly held to be the primary 
and causal essence of the whole of creation, while the knowledge in the 
created nature is the secondary essence and subsists as the effect of the higher 
knowledge. 29 
It is important to note that since the secondary mode of creative knowledge subsists as 
an effect in the higher mode, there is, strictly speaking, only one knowledge and one 
creation - that of the higher causal mode. Eriugena sums up as follows: 
Just as the understanding of all things which the Father made in His only 
begotten Word is their essence and is the substance of all those attributes 
which are understood to be attached by nature to that essence; so the 
knowledge of all things which the Word of the Father has created in the 
human soul is their essence and the substance of all those attributes which are 
discerned to be attached by nature to that essence; and just as the Divine 
intellect is prior to all things and is all things; so the intellectual knowledge of 
the soul is prior to all things which she knows and is all the things which she 
fore-knows. 30 
It is this secondary creation, the effect of the primary creation, that is of interest here. 
It is tempting to identify this creation with the Fall. And yet, returning to passages 
under discussion from Book II, we find no mention of the Fall. Surely if the doctrine 
of the Fall is to explain a feature of reality it must be the mortal nature of the body, 
our susceptibility to death and corruption. The reason for this absence is perhaps 
contextual. In this section of Book II Eriugena is concerned to make clear the likeness 
of human nature to the Holy Trinity. And in another passage from Book IV he 
continues to fail to identify this `secondary' or taxonomical creation with the Fall, or 
as arising as a result of the Fall. 
29 IV 779AB: de prima et causali essential in creatricis sapientiae notione constituta, 
deque secunda et 
effective, quae in anima humana subsistere non incongrue asseritur. 
30 IV 779BC; for a detailed discussion of Eriugena's idealism see, Moran, "Idealism in Medieval 
Philosophy: The Case of Johannes Scottus Eriugena", Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (1999) pp. 
53-82. 
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Whatsoever in human bodies is seen (intelligitur) to be immutable is proper to 
the first creation, but whatever in them is perceived (percipitur) to be mutable 
and variable, this has been added later, and subsists outside the body's true 31 
nature. 
Note, however, the difference in epistemic modes identified in this passage; the mode 
proper to substantial human nature is intellection; the mode proper to the non- 
substantial or lapsarian body is perception. 
For either it [sc. our nature] explores by its rational and intellectual motions 
those things which its Creator created out of nothing, and deposits in the 
innermost recesses of its reason the things which by the clear observation of 
its intellect it gets to know in nature, and it either gathers together into a unity 
its cognitions of all the things it can know, (for instance, by the operation of its 
science it unifies genera in essence, species in genus, individuals in species); 
or it divides them into many, distributing each cognition (that is to say, to take 
the same example, dividing by a gnostic operation essence into genera, genus 
into species, species into individuals. And this is the principal and higheset 
activity of the rational nature. 32 
According to Eriugena, therefore, it remains within the range of human capabilities to 
perform this dialectical, taxonomical function free from sin. It is, however, also 
possible to `create' after this fashion in a sinful manner. 
For, as our reason teaches us, this world would not have burst forth into a 
variety of both sensible and divers multiplicities of the parts if God had not 
foreseen the fall and ruin of the first man when he abandoned the unity of his 
nature. 33 
Note that although God foresees man's fall, He does not initiate it. Rather man's 
abandonment of his unity results in the bursting forth of sensible multiplicity. The Fall 
does not ultimately account for the metaphysical dichotomy: substance and accident, 
unity and diversity; nor does it express our epistemic relation to creation; the locus of 
31 IV 801C: quodcunque enim in humanis corporibus immutabile intelligitur, primae conditionis 
proprium est. quicquid vero in eis mutabile ac varium percipitur, illud est superadiectum, extraque 
naturam substitutum. Note that 0' Meara's translation goes further than Eriugena in claiming that the 
variable and mutable is outside of the true nature. There is no corresponding term in the Latin. 
Although it may ultimately be the case that for Eriugena true nature is simple and substantial rather 
than sensible and qualitative, the over-translation represents, at this stage in the dialectic, an 
unwarranted weighting towards immaterialism. 
32 II 581AB 
33 11 540A 
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the Fall is in our attitude to creation, whether or not we choose intellection over 
perception. 
These two creative possibilities - epistemic motions to simplicity or diversity 
- are a way of expressing the moral choice that faces man. 
Rather than straightforwardly identify the Fall of man with the creation of the 
material world (as Origen does) Eriugena offers a more complex model of creation as 
moral choice. 
III : Matter and Evil 
The Fall is about evil. Partly (perhaps primarily) it is designed to answer the 
questions: why is there evil, and why does God allow it. But also, what is it? What is 
to be included in the class of evil things? Of particular interest here are matter and 
body. Are they evil? Or are they punishment for man's having been evil? 
The Fall, the expulsion from Paradise, is essentially a theodicy. It is an attempt 
to render consistent the following statements: a) The Creation is solely the work of an 
omnipotent and perfectly benevolent Creator, and b) Creation is imperfect and 
contains evil. That b) is a brute fact about the nature of the world seems incontestable. 
So if we wish to retain a divine, creative force we will have to alter a). The 
Manichaean answer was to remove from a) `solely' and perhaps `omnipotent'; God 
did his best with the recalcitrant material to hand. But this position is not open to the 
Christian apologist who accepts that Creation is effected ex nihilo by a wholly 
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benevolent God. 34 
Just as it was found in the first part of this study that matter cannot stand 
outside of God's creation, so matter cannot be evil. 
Matter... which is both made and made good by the Creator of all things... 
can be by no means evil. 35 
Matter is a creation of God's, and therefore cannot be in itself evil. 36 These are the 
two prongs of the anti-Manichaean fork - matter is part of creation, and creation is 
effected by a wholly good and omnipotent creator. There remains, however, the 
problem of evil. Eriugena's answer to the problem of evil is characteristically 
Neoplatonic: 
No evil... is found to exist substantially in nature, nor proceeds from a fixed 
and natural cause - for considered in itself it is absolutely nothing but the 
irrational and perverse and imperfect motion of the rational nature. 37 
The view that evil is the perverse motion of the rational nature will be discussed later 
in this chapter. For now, we can conclude that evil is not part of nature. In other words 
it is not caused by God; it is not part of creation. 
For evil is inconstant and without cause, for as a substance it does not occur 
anywhere in nature. 38 
But there is no doubt that matter bears some relation to the evil that Eriugena hopes to 
account for by means of the doctrine of the Fall. After all matter and material bodies, 
34 The doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo was not officially formulated until the Fourth Lateran Council 
1215 but arguably it finds its first Christian formulation in Tatian (c. 120 - c. 179), Oratio ad Graecos 5, 
3: "God was in the beginning; but the beginning, we have been taught, is the power of the Logos. For 
the Lord of the universe, who is Himself the necessary ground of all being, in as much as no creature 
was yet in existence, was alone. " See May, Gerhard, Creatio ex Nihilo, The Doctrine of `Creation out 
of Nothing' in Early Christian Thought (Edinburgh, 1994). For Medieval Manichaeism see Runciman, 
Steven, The Medieval Manichee. A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy (Cambridge, 1960 ). 
35 IV 828A; III 636C; Cf. III 699C: qui de materia informi mundumfecit quemadmodum non aliunde 
accepit materiem de qua faceret sed a se et in se ipso. 
36 This assumes that it is impossible for a wholly good God to will evil. See IV 826A; IV 827D-828A; 
V 926A. 
37 IV 826A: malum nec in natura rerum substantialiter invenitur, neque ex certa causa et naturali 
procedit (per se enim consideratum, omnino nihil est, praeter irrationabilem et perversum 
imperfectumque rationabilis naturae motum). 
38 IV 828A 
"occupy the lowest extremity of the universal creature. "39 
And Eriugena does sometimes adopt a position that seems to come close to the 
view that matter is in principle evil. Consider the following passage in which 
Eriugena is attempting to show why the stars are pale and cold: 
So where the fiery force bums it is heat, where it does not burn it is cold; and 
it does not burn unless there is matter in which it may burn and which it may 
consume. And that is why the rays of the sun when they are diffused through 
the ethereal regions do not burn. When, however, they descend into the 
regions of the corporeal air, they find a kind of matter on which to work, and 
begin to blaze, and the more they go forth into denser bodies, the more they 
exercise their force of burning in those things which are or can be destroyed 
by the power of heat. But when they rise upwards into the uppermost regions 
of the world which are closest to the most rarefied and spiritual nature, not 
finding any matter for kindling, they produce no heat, and display only the 
operation of illumination, and therefore the ethereal and pure and spiritual 
bodies which are established in those regions are always shining, but are 
without heat. And hence they are believed to be both cold and pale. 40 
This passage seems to express a certain platonic distaste for matter; the closer one 
rises to, "the most rarefied and spiritual nature" the less matter one encounters. But it 
is worth noting that matter is in no way portrayed as an obstacle to God's will. 
Compare the above passage with a similar discussion in Augustine: 
God, by whose laws the axes revolve, the celestial bodies complete their 
courses, the sun rules the day, the moon governs the night, and the whole 
world (insofar as perceptible matter allows) maintains the great stability of 
things by the ordering and repetition of times. 41 
Although the Eriugenian passage concerns created nature solely, and Augustine is 
attempting to explain God's continuing role in creation, the characterisations of matter 
can, I suggest, legitimately be compared. For Augustine, supposedly free from his 
Manichaean past, matter is still conceived as a hindrance to God's creative energy. 
Eriugena on the other hand thinks of matter as playing a role within God's creation; it 
may be a role that explains corruption and change but nonetheless creation 
is 
39 II 541D - 542A: extremitatem universae creaturae 
deorsum. See also V 875C; V 903AB. See also 
IV 759B: extrema pars eius [i. e. hominis] et vilissima, corpus 
dico. 
40 III 697BC 
41 Soliloquies, I, 1,4. 
112 
inclusive of the material, rather than in spite of it. And the same position - that matter 
is not intrinsically evil - is maintained in his discussion of the incarnation. Eriugena 
follows Maximus the Confessor in ascribing to man four parts - body, sense, soul and 
42 intellect. Christ, in adopting human nature therefore takes upon himself the parts of 
that nature and unifies them in himself. 
For He was made perfect Man. For He left nothing of man, except sin, that He 
would not receive into the unity of His Substance and would not unify, that is, 
would not make one, in Himself. For in Him after His resurrection body and 
sense, soul and intellect are not four but one, and not a composite one, but 
simply one. 43 
Of interest here is the relation of body to the other three parts. The first thing to note 
is that it is given here (by Maximus and Eriugena) as a part of man, indeed an 
essential part of man. Further, there is no direct or necessary association made 
between sin and body. Sin finds no place in the incarnate Christ. But there is no hint 
here that the body is in itself sinful or distasteful. 
It appears that although the material and the spiritual are to be accorded 
different values, they are both to be conceived as comprising one perfectly good 
creation. 
There are both heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, but the glory of the 
heavenly is one thing, and that of the earthly is another. (1 Cor. 15: 40) 
And Eriugena endorses the Pauline position, conceiving of the material or corporeal 
as a `perfection' within God's creation. 
We maintain that when we were first created, body as well as soul subsisted 
without the capacity for corruption and death. For it would be contrary to 
reason to suppose that He Who created our whole nature together made one 
part of it (the soul) immortal and incorruptible, and the other part (the body) 
mortal and corruptible. Therefore, we have the right, I think, to suppose that 
the whole of human nature, soul and body, was at first created immortal and 
incorruptible. 44 
42 I1541 B-542B. Eriugena is following Maximus, I Ambigua xxxvii (PG 91 1390B 13 -D3. ) 
43 II 541C 
asV884C 
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It appears that, although Eriugena's characterisation of matter is broadly negative - 
and that the virtuous have a healthy contempt for the frailty of earthly things45 - it 
remains the case that, as created by God, matter is not intrinsically evil. In fact, since 
evil is characterised by Eriugena as a falling away from perfection, it follows that 
individuals are evil not on account of what they are, but on account of what they are 
not. 46 
In his distaste for the earthly, Eriugena expresses not only the Neoplatonic 
yearning for the transcendental, but also a characteristically ascetical disregard for the 
mundane. It remains for us to investigate the possibility that matter serves a 
teleological function; God created matter in order that man might be punished and 
thereby brought back into a correct alignment with his Creator. 
IV : Matter as Punishment 
Now that we have dismissed, for sound theological reasons, the possibility that matter 
is in itself evil, we must turn to a consideration of the view that material substance is a 
punishment for sin. Eriugena gives expression to this view throughout the 
Periphyseon: 
The earthly and mortal members of men should unhesitatingly be accepted and 
understood as the penalty of transgression which has been added (adiuncta) to 
the simplicity of the nature which was created by God. 47 
This addition of material substance for punishment should help explain why it is that 
Eriugena consistently characterises matter and body in negative terms as that which 
accounts for corruption and suffering and so on. If corporeality is a punishment, this 
as V 916C: nam et superbia, quae veluti caput totius malitiae perhibetur, in amorem caelestis 
excellentiae, et in despectum terrenae infirmatis in bonis hominibus vertitur. 
46 V 934D: non secundum quod sunt, sed secundum quod non sunt, mall dicuntur. 
47 IV 852C; see also II 538B: qualitatibus et quantitatibus caeterisque varietatibus, quaepropter 
peccatum generale generalis humanae naturae adpoenam eius... huic terrae habitabilii superaddita 
sunt. IV 783A: terrena haec habitatio mortalis corporis post peccatum impedit. Also V 884B et 
passim. 
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would allow for its negative characterisation, and render its existence consistent with 
the view that creation is effected by a wholly benevolent and omnipotent creator. 
Corporeality is a penalty, and it is a corrective: 
For it is not to be believed that the most divine clemency of the Creator thrust 
forth sinning man into this world as though actuated by anger or desirous of 
revenge... but as a kind of ineffable teaching and incomprehensible clemency, 
so that man... might, having learnt from his punishments, seek the grace of his 
Creator. 48 
So here is the teleology behind the doctrine of the Fall. It serves a clear and manifest 
function - to bring man back to God. 
There is one further aspect of the view that matter and body constitute a 
punishment for man's sin, that stands in need of examination, and that is the idea of 
`addition. ' Note that for Eriugena, man is not changed into a corruptible, mortal, 
animal. These characteristics are `added' (adiuncta) to the simplicity of man's created 
nature. This simplicity remains, hidden behind these superficial additions. 
The natural form of the body... remains ever incorruptible and immutable. For 
whatever is added to the natural body from the mixture of elements, and 
whatsoever is added to the soul from the impurity of irrational motions, is for 
ever in a state of flux and in process of decay. 49 
And yet for punishment to be effective, there must be a way for that which is being 
punished to recognise its punishment and the reasons for its punishment. Then there 
must also be the means to act upon this recognition and the means whereby it is able 
to take measures to correct the fault in the light of the recognition of the reasons for 
its being punished. After all if the punishment consists in permanently or essentially 
altering the punished, then punishment is reduced to revenge. And this, as a motive of 
God, Eriugena has explicitly ruled out. Eriugena offers, by way of illustration, the 
examples of Naaman the Syrian (2 Kings 5) and the lepers (Luc. 17: 11): 
48 II 540B 
49 V 872D; for the incorruptibility of created human nature see IV 8000; V 908B; V 922AB. 
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For that Syrian, and those ten, had not lost the human countenance; they had 
only been smitten and covered up by the tumours and filthiness of leprosy; 
from which we are to understand that our nature is neither lost nor changed, 
but tarnished by the stains of vice. 50 
The illustration is borrowed from Gregory of Nyssa who aims to show that, "the body 
undergoes change by increase and diminution, like garments, which are changed with 
the changing of one's age. But throughout all these changes there is a form which 
abides and is itself unchangeable. "s 1 
Eriugena clearly intends the changeable, corrupt, leprous aspect to be 
identified with the mutable sensible form (QF) of a body, and that to which this 
sensible aspect has been added as the abiding substantial form (SF) or essence. This 
SF is the punished, the QF is the punishment. But this solution to the problem is not 
without a remainder: evil. Evil and punishment cannot be allowed to collapse into one 
another; punishment is administered for evil. Evil itself serves no purpose at all 
because it is nothing at all. 52 So it seems that matter and body cannot be evil on two 
counts. Firstly, they cannot be evil because they fall within the creation of a wholly 
benevolent and omnipotent God. And secondly, they cannot be evil because they are 
punishment for evil. 
V: Two Bodies, Two Creations 
Two scriptural accounts: 
And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him. 
(Gen. 1: 27) 
And, 
Then the Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into 
his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being. (Gen. 2: 7) 
50 V 873A 
51 Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opifrcio 27,4 quoted by Eriugena at V 872AD 
52 De Prae 394C: omne malum perversa voluntate descendens nihil sit. 
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How to square these two apparently contradictory accounts of the creation of man? 53 
For Eriugena the two creations of man represent the extremes demarcated by the Fall. 
The first creation of man is the pinnacle from which he has fallen. The second 
creation describes the state in which he now finds himself. 
As a preliminary let us note that this is the Fall of Man. What, for Eriugena, 
constitutes a man? Eriugena is explicit in stating that a disembodied soul is not a man: 
It is agreed that man is composed of two natures, the invisible nature in the 
soul and the visible nature in the body. 54 
A man consists essentially in a body and a soul. It cannot be the case, therefore, that 
the first creation of man according to the Image refers to the creation of the soul, and 
that the second creation passage describes God's fashioning the body, or visible 
aspect of man. It follows from Eriugena's statement quoted above that both creation 
passages must each account for an integral man - body and soul. But then it must be 
asked what kind of body that was which man possessed at the first creation. 
"The body which was created at the establishment of man in the beginning"55 
is, according to Eriugena, immortal and spiritual. It is like (or identical with) the body 
that shall be ours after the resurrection. 56 This is the `invisible' body we were able to 
identify at the end of the last chapter: 57 lacking all sensible form, it is strictly 
indefinable; it is possible to make of it only the claim that it is, not what it is. In fact it 
lacks all suchness and consists solely of a primitive substantial thisness. 
53 See Otten, The Anthropology of John Scottus Eriugena (Leiden, 1991) p. 135: "On the one hand 
Genesis wants to define man in terms of his rational dignity by calling him the image of God. On the 
other hand it undeniably presupposes some sort of irrational nature by describing him as an animal. " It 
is worth noting that at no point does the Genesis account describe man as the Image of God, but as 
having been made in the Image of God. Eriugena notes this at II 580A. 
sa IV 800A. `Visibility' seems to be used here as a distinguishing feature. See the discussion of 
invisible bodies in Chapter Two, Part Two, Section IV, ii). 
ss IV 800B 
56 For the spiritual body see IV 760A-761B; IV 764A; IV 776A; IV 802Bff; IV852Cff; V 893D; V 
929CD. 
57 See Chapter Two, Part Two, Section IV ii. 
117 
There is no one who doubts but that spiritual bodies are without [sc. place or time or quantity or quality. ]58 
The adherence to this individual substance of a quantum and qualia that render it 
visible, definable, corruptible and so on is a result of the Fall; or rather this process of 
adherence or addition is the Fall. Thus 
I would not easily admit that it could have been a corruptible and material 
body at a time when the cause (causa) of corruption and materiality, that is, 
sin, had not yet appeared. 59 
That the Fall is a form of creation finds endorsement here. Eriugena claims that sin is 
the cause of the material world. But it was earlier accepted that sin can be given as the 
cause of the material world inasmuch as it is God's purpose, in causing man to have a 
material body, to punish his sinful nature. 
It has been established that, for Eriugena, both passages in Genesis must refer 
to the integral man, that is, to man as body and soul. It has also been established that 
Eriugena explicitly denies that the first body is corruptible or material. It is a spiritual 
body. Closely following Gregory of Nyssa, Eriugena goes on to deny that this 
spiritual body is changed (conversum est) or transformed (transmutatum)60 into the 
corruptible body. The corruptible, material body of man is a superstructure 
(supermachinatum), added to the spiritual body. 61 Although Eriugena claims that this 
is quite apparent to reason (maxime cum manifesta ratio)62 he offers no rational proof, 
merely adverting to the authority of Gregory. He then proceeds, however, to give 
Gregory's position: that which is created in the Image of God must be eternally 
58 II 539A: his enim omnibus [sc. loco vel tempore vet quantitate qualitateve spiritualia corpora 
carere] nemo qui dubitat. 
59 IV 800B 
60 IV 800C 
61 See IV 802A: illud exterius a deo estfactum et superadditum. We shall find in the next chapter that 
the opposite is the case when it comes to the Return: the corruptible body is transformed and changed 
into the spiritual body (see V 893D; V 930B). The reason for this difference is again essentially 
theodical. Whereas man (and not God) must be found to be responsible for corruption and sexuality 
etc., God (and not man) must be found to be responsible for our redemption. 
62 IV 800B 
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incorruptible. That is, both soul and body must be of an incorruptible nature since the 
whole man was made together in the Divine counsel (in divino consilio). 63 In an 
earlier passage Eriugena draws a series of sharp distinctions between the spiritual 
body, and the material body. In man, he says, 
there mind is to be found, there reason, there sense, there the seminal life, 
there the body (corpus) - not this corruptible body which is the result of sin, 
but that which man had before the Fall: not this composite and dissoluble 
body, but that simple and indivisible body; not this animal and earthly body, 
but that which is spiritual and heavenly; not this body begotten by both sexes 
from seeds through carnal intercourse, but that which was brought forth before 
the Fall out of the simplicity of nature and which is to be in the Resurrection; 
not this body which is known to the corporeal senses, but that which is still 
(adhuc) hidden in the secret place of nature; not that which was laid upon us in 
recompense for sin, but that which was already inherent in us in our 
uncorrupted nature and to which the corruptible and mortal body will be 
restored. 64 
Again we find that no change takes place within the body; there is no transformation. 
So man's pre-lapsarian nature (body and soul) remains in secreto naturae adhuc 
occultum, even after the Fall, intact, pristine, eternally incorruptible. 
For everything which her Creator primordially created in her remains whole 
and intact, though remaining hidden until now, `awaiting the revelation of the 
sons of God. ' (Rom. 8: 19)65 
The only change that has taken place is the super-addition of a material body. And the 
exterior body relates to the interior in the same way that clothes relate to the exterior 
body. The exterior body is a vestimentum. 66 
[The exterior body] is moved through times and ages, suffering increase and 
loss of itself, while the interior body remains ever immutably in its proper 
state. But... the exterior body also is created by God, and is added by Him to 
the other. 67 
63 IV 8000: nec animas ante corpora fuisse creatas, nec corpora ante animas, sed simul et semel totum 
factum in divino consilio. 
64 IV 760AB 
65 IV 761B 
66 IV 802A 
67 IV 802A 
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It is no accident that the relation between exterior body and interior is precisely that of 
qualitative forms and substance or ousia. The QFs are a superficial and ever-changing 
presentation to the senses, while the SF remains hidden, simple and uniform, 
unavailable to the senses or the intellect. 68 The different terminology reflects the new 
theological, evaluative agenda announced at the beginning of Book IV. 
But Eriugena is careful to point out that man does not have two bodies, or two 
natures, one material and one spiritual. There is in reality only one nature. The 
material or exterior body is a seal (signaculum) of the interior body, "in which the 
form of the soul is expressed. "69 Furthermore, this impressed seal, this expression of 
the interior body is, "not so much regarded as a true body as a kind of mutable and 
corruptible garment of the true and natural body. "70 Although the relation that obtains 
between interior and exterior bodies is not, therefore, precisely that of cause to effect, 
it is a relation of dependence. The interior body is a necessary condition of the 
exterior. And this corroborates the earlier identification of interior and exterior bodies 
with QF and substance. The QFs exist only in relation to substance; the non- 
substantial Categories depend on Substance. 
i) Conclusion: 
Before moving on to an analysis of Eriugena's concept of Paradise, let us conclude 
this section by briefly returning to an earlier question and asking, was there any time 
at which man belonged in Paradise? Was there any time before the Fall? The 
following passage has already been quoted in order to explain the dual nature of man. 
68 III 703A-C; I 494AB et passim. 
69 IV 802D-803A: est enim exterius et materiale corpus signaculum interioris, in quo forma animae 
exprimitur. `Exprimitur' would perhaps be more helpfully translated as `impressed' rather than 
`expressed. ' 
70 IV 803A 
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I would not easily admit that it could have been a corruptible and material 
body at a time when the cause of corruption and materiality, that is, sin, had 
not yet appeared (priusquam causa corruptionis et materialitatis fieret). 71 
How are we to understand priusquam? It must refer to a time before the super- 
addition of this corruptible body. 
If we are to retain our earlier conclusions, not only that the Fall and creation 
are simultaneous, but also that there was no time at which man was not falling, we 
must interpret this `priusquam' in an allegorical fashion. In the same way that a cause 
can be understood as `before' an effect, and yet temporally simultaneous with it, so 
also man enjoyed Paradise `before' his fall. The relation `priusquam' is to be 
interpreted logically, or metaphysically, rather than temporally. The Fall is not a 
temporal event. And as such it becomes the explanatory principle by recourse to 
which it is possible to understand of nature not why material substance is, nor what it 
is, but why it is the way it is. Could a temporal Fall not play the same role? Not 
precisely. By de-historicizing the Fall, Eriugena places the doctrine within the 
unending dialectic of procession and return. In a sense we must understand not only 
the result of the Fall as being present to us now, but also the Fall itself. This is not a 
post-lapsarian world, but a lapsarian world. This dialectical, atemporal understanding 
of the Fall, Eriugena articulates through the language of causation: 
The mind receives the cause of its formation, without any intervening creature 
from God, while the vital motion receives it from the mind, and finally matter 
receives the cause of its formation from the mind through the vital motion. 
Thus matter follows vital motion, and vital motion follows mind, and finally 
mind follows God: when therefore it turns towards Him it preserves the beauty 
and integrity of its nature: but when it turns away from Him it wastes and 
disfigures not only itself but also that which is subject to it, that is, the material 
life principle and matter itself as well. 72 
In this passage Eriugena is explicitly making the claim that our moral or 
evaluative judgements precisely match the ontological structures of reality. And this 
" IV 800B 
72 IV 790D-791 A 
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`matching relation' depends not on historical or temporal processes or events, but on 
our alignment - either with God, or with sensible effects. Indeed, the `matching 
relation' has, we found a taxonomical, or quasi-creative function. In line with our 
findings in Part One of this chapter, there is nothing intrinsically evil in matter or 
corporeality; the evil resides in our attitude. The Fall is a state of mind. 
Part Two : Paradise 
Introduction: 
Consistent with his view that man, as a result of sin, fell away from the perfection of 
his original created nature, Eriugena characterises Paradise not as a locality, but as 
that perfection of man's original state. 
Paradise is a mere figure of speech (figuratae locutionis modo) by which Holy 
Scripture signified the human nature that was made in the image of God. 73 
Thus Eriugena interprets the first two Genesis chapters as an allegorical psychology, a 
pictorial explanation of how human nature came to be as it is. Following Ambrose 
(whom he believes is himself following Origen), 74 Paradise or Eden is to be 
understood as referring to perfect human nature. Paradise is, therefore, truly 
substance. Adam and Eve represent Mind (voi S) and Sense (at66Tjßtc) 
73 IV 822A; Cf. V 981A 
74 At IV 815C Eriugena quotes Ambrose De Paradiso 2,11 (CSEL 32,1, p. 271,8-16; PL 14 279B): in 
figura mulieris sensum, in animi mentisque tupo virum constituens. And at IV 815D he quotes 
Ambrose De Paradiso 3,12 (CSEL 32,1 p. 272,3-4; PL 279C): est etiam vovs tanquam Adam, et est 
at0817oig (id est sensus) tanquam Eva. Eriugena believes that Ambrose is indebted to Origen here. 
See Origen, In Genesim Homiliae I, 15; IV, 4; In Exodum Homiliae II, 1; XIII, 5, in Koetschau, (ed. ) 
Die Griechlischen Christlichen Schriftseller 29 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1899) pp. 19,54,155,277. For 
Eriugena's use of Origen and endorsement of his ideas see Moran "Origen and Eriugena: Aspects of 
Christian Gnosis" in Finian, T. and Twomey, V. (eds. ), The Relationship between Neoplatonism and 
Christianity (Four Courts Press : Dublin, 1992). Jeauneau (see n. 223 in IV p. 324 ) suggests that 
Ambrose is more likely to have been following Philo for the view that Mind (vovS) corresponds to 
Man, and that Sense (ai (TOTrnS) corresponds to Woman: Philo, De Opificio Mundi 165, L. Cohn- 
Wendland (ed. ) Philonis Alexandrini Opera (Berlin, 1896) p. 57,14-15. Eriugena first makes the 
identification of male with mind, and woman with sense at 11541 A. 
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respectively. Of interest here, however, is the presence of the body in Paradise. As has 
already been noted, for Eriugena human nature can be understood as comprising two 
bodies - one natural body, and one added to that natural body as punishment. And this 
additional body - an impression of the original - is corruptible and falls under the 
genus animal. It is therefore not surprising to find that the natural or substantial body 
of man is to be found within Paradise. 
The fertile earth of this Paradise was the essential body (corpus essentiale), 
which possesses a possible immortality. For the natural body is said to die 
because it appears to share the death of that which is added (superaddito) to it: 
but in fact it is always immortal in itself. 75 
This body has an intellectual faculty represented allegorically by the ether; it has 
reason represented by the rays of the Divine wisdom. And it also has sense. 
The water of this Paradise was the sense of the incorruptible body able to 
receive forms and formed by the phantasies of sensible things without being 
deceived. 76 
The view that man has two bodies - one created, one fallen - both equipped with 
sense, reason and intellect, thus finds scriptural endorsement. 
I: A Tale of Two Trees: The Fall as Epistemic Crisis 
The Genesis text names two trees in the garden of Eden: 
Out of the ground the Lord God made to grow every tree that is pleasant to the 
sight and good for food, the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil. (Gen. 2: 9) 77 
And Eriugena is at pains to stress that Paradise is not a dense forest thick with many 
varieties of trees. Certainly not. Genesis names two trees: the All-tree, or Iläv, and 
's IV 822B 
76 IV 822B 
77 Gen. 2: 9: Produxitque Dominus Deus de humo omne lignum pulchrum visu et ad vescendum suave 
etiam lignum vitae in medio paradisi lignumque scientiae boni et mali. (Vulgate) 
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the Tree of Knowledge, or I'vco6ti6v. And that's it: duo solummodo. 78 
Following Gregory of Nyssa, Eriugena understands the `All-Tree' to be an 
allegorical reference to Christ the Word, the Cause of creation, in whom all things are 
made and subsist. 79 The Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil is the direct opposite of 
80 the tree of life. Whereas the former is all good, the other has only the appearance of 
good and is in fact the totality of all evil (in isto universitas totius mali. )8' 
Just as the Tree of Knowledge plays a pivotal role in the Genesis story, the 
tree, as it is understood in the Periphyseon, provides the key to Eriugena's 
understanding of the Fall. Central to this understanding is the appearance of sensible 
matter, or body. 
i) The Gnoston: 
Eriugena asserts at the opening of his discussion of the Tree of Knowledge that a 
translation of `knowable' for yvcoatibv, "does not satisfactorily express the meaning 
(intellectum) of the tree. , 82 Instead he prefers the term `mixed' (mixtum). No reason 
for this translation is given beyond its being preferable in the light of what follows. 
For, Eriugena explains, the tree is 
evil disguised under the colour of good which is instilled into the bodily 
senses (corporis sensibus). 83 
78 IV 823B 
79 IV 823B. Eriugena finds a double identification of the All-tree with Christ. Firstly, the tree represents 
Christ as that principle in which man participates. And secondly, since the tree is planted in the midst 
of human nature, Eriugena detects a reference to the incarnation. The Tree therefore functions as a 
reminder of Christ's dual nature - divine and human. 80 IV 824B: omnino contrarium. 
81 IV 824B 
82 IV 823A 
83 IV 824B 
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It has the appearance of good. But under the veil of good, it is pure evil. It is, 
therefore, a mixture. The goodness of the tree is only a lure: "It seduces all evil men 
by its appearance of good. "84 
Eriugena offers a significantly more complex account of the Tree of 
Knowledge of Good and Evil in a later passage. Eriugena quotes Augustine, 
explaining that the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not in itself 
bad. Eve was tempted to eat of the tree too soon; the fruit was being reserved for a 
more suitable occasion. 
It was by their overhastiness (festinatione) that those first human beings 
anticipated their desire for knowledge of good and evil, and... they wished, 
before the time was ripe, for that which was being reserved for them at a more 
opportune occasion. 8 
The fruit could have been profitably eaten, Augustine claims, without the dire 
consequences, at a later occasion. And Eriugena endorses this view: "Those who hold 
such opinions concerning the Forbidden Tree do not seem to me to depart from the 
truth. "86 The view expressed by Augustine and adopted by Eriugena in this later 
passage is inconsistent with the previous position proposed, that the tree is the totality 
of evil, disguised as good. It is hard to see how the fruit of this `evil' tree could "be 
profitably enjoyed" (salubriter perfrui)"87 
This more sophisticated, Augustinian exegesis provides Eriugena with the 
keystone in his own construction of Man's Fall. 
It is likely and quite in accordance, I think, with sound reason that man should 
have been driven by the most righteous judgement of his Creator away from 
the sweetness of the Tree of Life, that is to say, from the delights of the 
internal contemplation, in which and for which he was created, at the very 
moment that he began to feed on the Forbidden Tree, that is, to presume to 
84 IV 824BC 
85 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram XI x1i, 56 (CSEL 28,1, pp. 375,24 - 376,8); quoted at IV 843D - 
844A. 
86 IV 844B 
87 IV 844A 
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make improper use of the sense knowledge of sensible matter (cognitione 
videlicet sensibilis materiae per corporeos sensus abuti praesumentem). 88 
This `presumption' to abuse the sensory faculty is the locus of the Fall for Eriugena. 
Notice again that man's sin lies in a pre-sumption, that is in a too-soon-picking of the 
fruit. Note also that the transgression is in essence epistemological - the improper use 
of sense knowledge. And the punishment fits the crime, since the penalty for the 
transgression is also primarily epistemological: man is driven from the delights of 
internal contemplation (ab internae contemplationis... deliciis). 89 The penalty is only 
primarily but not solely epistemological for the penalty has a metaphysical corollary: 
man was made in and for this internal contemplation that is represented by the Tree of 
Life, that Image in which and for which man was made. It follows that man is driven 
out of his true nature. The Fall is not so much an act of creation, as an act of 
uncreation. Thus, according to the Fifth Mode of Being and Non-being, 
through sin it [sc. human nature] renounced the honour of the divine image in 
which it was properly substantiated, deservedly lost its being (merito esse 
suum perdidit) and therefore is said not to be. 
90 
To return to the Gnoston, it now seems that the Forbidden Tree is not in and of 
itself evil, but rather it is dangerous. Nor is the appearance of sensible matter evil, nor 
does sensible matter incline the perceiver towards evil. Rather, Eriugena claims that 
man should 
contemplate the creature with the reasonable sense controlled by the dictates 
of the mind, and to refer all its beauty to the glory of the Creator, whether the 
inner beauty of the principles or the outward beauty of the sensible forms. 
91 
The problem is not, therefore, with a principle of evil that exists in creation, even 
within the creation of human nature; evil is nothing more than a 
disordering of human 
88 IV 844B 
89 IV 844B 
90I445C 
91 IV 843C. Note that here again sense perception and its objects are not themselves evil. 
Rather it is 
the debased or sinful manner in which the faculties are deployed that accounts 
for the Fall. 
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nature, an improper use of the sensory and intellectual faculties. The mistake made by 
the first human is, in short, to place the material, external effect above the immaterial, 
internal cause. 
For it is impossible that knowledge of the creature could be an impediment to 
the rational soul, in which the perfect contemplation of the Creator begins to 
shine forth. But where the observation of created nature precedes (praecedit) 
the knowledge of the Creator, there is no way of escaping the phantasies and 
beguilements of sensible things. 92 
The Fall represents a disordering of the human intellect, a sort of 
epistemological crisis. 93 In a later passage, Eriugena discusses the Genesis passage, "I 
will multiply your sorrows and your conceptions: in labour shall you bring forth your 
sons. " (Gen. 3: 16). For Eriugena, as has already been noted, Eve (whom God is 
addressing here) represents c taOT n, , or the sensory faculty. 
94 And on this basis the 
above Genesis passage is glossed as follows: 
If man had not sinned he would have contemplated the natures and the 
principles of all things in a most pure manner with the utmost ease not only 
with the interior intellect but also with the exterior sense, for he would have 
been freed from the necessity of all logical discourse. But after he had sinned, 
the mind perceives through the corporeal sense only the surfaces of sensible 
things, with their quantities and qualities, their positions, their conditions, and 
the other aspects which submit to corporeal perception. 95 
This is a fascinating passage and warrants further study. Here Eriugena 
explicitly links the work on the Categories in Book I with the theological, exegetical 
agenda of Book IV. For Eriugena all human knowledge is predicated on sense data, 
92 IV 844C 
93 The idea that the mind's association with the body results in the impairment of the mind's natural / 
essential faculties has an ancient provenance. Cf. Ammonius, On Aristotle's Categories, 15,4-8: "If 
souls were on high, separate from the body, each of them would on its own know all things, without 
need of anything else. But they descend at birth and are bound up with the body, and, filled up with its 
fog, their sight becomes dim and they are not able to know things it is in their nature to know. " Trans. 
S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews (Duckworth, 1991) p. 22. 
94 IV 813B: corporeum sensum, per quem Adam deceptus est, infigura mulieris vult intelligi. Nam 
spud graecos cd c U0770-1 S (id est sensus) feminini generis est. 
95 IV 855A 
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and is therefore fallible. 96 In accordance with the conclusions of Book I's long 
commentary on the Categories, Eriugena claims that the categories themselves - 
Quantity, Quality, Position and Condition etc. - are not available to the intellect, only 
their phantasies. The human epistemological apparatus is therefore at a double remove 
from the true nature and principle of all things. It must rely on phantasies of surface 
"aspects which submit to corporeal perception. " And these aspects, as has already 
been discussed, are not to be identified with the substance. 
The waters in Paradise, Eriugena interprets as referring to the sense of the 
incorruptible spiritual body, "able to receive forms and formed by the phantasies of 
sensible things without being deceived. "97 Of course this mode of sensation is barred 
to man on account of his having drunk from the, "poison of transgression (veneno 
praevaricationis). "98 
But there is more to be gleaned from the above passage. In the second 
sentence it was claimed that, "the human mind perceives through the corporeal sense 
only the surfaces of things. " A number of points need to be raised here. The Latin is 
as follows: 
Per organa exterioris sensus nonnisi solas sensibilium superficies... animus 
percipit. 
At first glance it appears that Eriugena wants to make the claim that prior to the Fall 
man could have contemplated the nature of things with both the intellect and the 
senses. After the Fall, however, only the exterior sense is available. But this cannot be 
right. Elsewhere Eriugena explicitly states that the human cognitive faculty consists in 
96 V 1021BC: Nil enim perfectum est in humanis studiis adhuc, ut opinor, in hac caliginosa vita, quod 
omni errore careat... Non enim crediderim, ullum mortalibus membris carnalibusque sensibus 
gravatum, excepto Christo, adperfectum virtutis habitum veraeque contemplationis altitudinem 
pervenisse. 
97 IV 822B 
98 IV 822B. Cf. Augustine, de Genesi ad litteram. VI, xxv-xxvi, 36-37 (CSEL 28,1 pp. 197-8). 
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the intellect allied to a sensory faculty. 99 A closer reading of the text shows that there 
is no lack of intellect in the fallen human psychology. In the Latin there is no 
confusion; the `only' qualifies the `surfaces', not the `exterior sense'. So it is not the 
case that there is only the exterior sense available to the human mind. Rather it is the 
exterior sense itself that falls short by perceiving only the surfaces of things. 
Is it possible to conclude, therefore, that in both his pre- and post-lapsarian 
states man's epistemic apparatus consists in intellect and sense? Not quite. Let us turn 
to another passage: 
The First Man... was able to contemplate all the animals and birds... by 
contemplation not of a localised kind nor by the corporeal sense (sensu 
corporeo), but by the observation of the mind alone (solo mentis) (which 
excels every corruptible sense, and all place and all time) of the principles 
according to which they were created. ' 00 
In this passage Eriugena reflects upon the power of the human epistemic faculty 
before the crisis. And it seems that the corporeal sense is either not present as part of 
the human cognitive apparatus, or, if it is present, it is not necessary. 
The two passages are seemingly inconsistent with one another in regard to the 
exterior sense prior to the Fall. In the first passage Eriugena claims that prior to 
sinning, man was able to use this exterior sense but in an elevated manner that did not 
perceive only the surfaces of things. In the second passage, however, the exterior 
sense is non-existent. Presumably, according to the second view, the exterior sense is 
added after - or indeed because of - the Fall. In another passage 
Eriugena adopts the 
same somewhat ambivalent position: 
And the First Man had so spiritual a nature that he did not require the use of 
any corporeal sense (corporalium sensuum), but could depend wholly on the 
function of his intelligence. 101 
99 11171 IC 
100 IV 835A 
101 IV 834C 
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Again no explicit statement as to the existence of a pre-lapsarian sensory faculty is 
given. Here it is merely not needed. In the next section we shall examine more closely 
the faculties of the human being, body and soul. Before moving on, however, let us 
briefly recapitulate. 
The aim of the present enquiry has been to try to discern whether or not 
material substance or the sensible body represents the wages of sin. We found that 
since creation is wholly the work of a wholly benevolent creator, the object of sense 
perception is not evil in itself. Through the examination of the Gnoston, it was found 
that the sensory faculty is not evil. It cannot be so since - although Eriugena is not 
completely clear on this point - the pristine, created interior body may also be in 
receipt of a sense faculty. Therefore, neither the perceived nor the means of 
perception are in themselves evil. The locus of evil must, therefore, be the perceiver. 
11 : The Six Parts of Man 
Eriugena follows Gregory of Nyssa in dividing human nature into six parts. ' 
02 Firstly, 
there is the primary division between body and soul. Eriugena then asserts that each 
of these two parts can be further subdivided into three. Thus the body or exterior man 
(exteriori videlicet homini), 103 consists in the body itself which is, "constituted out of 
formed matter, of which only being may be predicated, than which the human 
understanding finds nothing lower in human nature. "104 It has already been discussed 
how matter or bare corporeality, though not evil in itself, is base or low. Above this 
corporeality but still part of the exterior man is the, "nutritive and auctive part" 
(nutritiva et auctiva) or "vital motion" (vitalis motus), 
'°5 responsible, as we might 
102 IV 824C - IV 825C 103 IV 824D 
104 IV 824D 
105 IV 824D and IV 825A 
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expect, for nourishment and growth and movement, but also for holding the body 
together so that it does not fall apart and dissolve. '06 It is also defined as that which 
gives life to the body. The third and final part of the exterior man is the sensory 
faculty, that which "receives the phantasies of all sensible objects which surround 
man externally and conveys them to the memory. " °7 
So much for the exterior man. The interior man, Eriugena tells us, subsists in 
the soul alone. And it is this part of man that is made in the image of God. It consists 
in that faculty whereby the phantasies of sense objects, transmitted to it from the 
`receptive' faculty - the highest faculty of the exterior man - are distinguished and 
judged. Next comes the reason by means of which man is able to, "investigate the 
`reasons' of all things which are apprehended by the intelligence or the sense. " 108 And 
finally there is the mind, the highest part of human nature, 
whose function is the government of the parts which are inferior to it, and the 
contemplation of what lies above it, namely God, and of what lies in Him and 
subsists about Him, according as it is allowed to ascend. 109 
Having listed each of the six parts of man, Eriugena recapitulates, underlining the 
difference according to function and property between the body and soul. Thus 
human nature is, and lives, and perceives through the body; it perceives and 
reasons, and intellects outside of the body. ' 10 
As might be expected, the first triad is corruptible and susceptible of dissolution, 
whereas the second triad is incorruptible, indissoluble and eternal. 
This clearly raises questions. Is it to be assumed that that which survives 
corporeal dissolution (viz the soul) does not `live', and indeed is not? For note that 
106 IV 824D-825A: continet in uno, ne defluat et solvatur. 
107 IV 825A: phantasias omnium rerum sensibilium quae circa hominem exteriorem intelliguntur 
recipit, memoriaeque. (NB O'Meara's translation of exteriorem adverbially. Eriugena means to say that 
sense objects surround the exterior man, not that the whole man (interior and exterior) is surrounded by 
sense objects. The difference is, I take it, philosophically trivial. ) 
log IV 825B: rationem possidet, per quarr omnium rerum, quas vel intelligere vel sentire potent, 
rationes investigat. 
109 IV 825B 
110 IV825B: Est enim, et vivit, et sentit per corpus; sentit extra corpus, ratiocinatur, intellegit. 
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`being' is, according to the above quote, properly predicated only of the exterior or 
corporeal man. Or rather it is predicated of human nature only in its integral form, that 
is body and soul, exterior and interior. Eriugena conceives of `life' as the second part 
of the exterior man. He calls it vital motion (vitalis motus); it is the animating 
principle; it gives life to the bare formed matter or body. Man shares this faculty with 
both sentient and non-sentient life, for although it does control movement locally 
through space (localiter spatia locorum) 111 which is a faculty peculiar to animals, it is 
also responsible for motion through numbers of place and time (per numeros locorum 
et temporum). 1 12 By numbers of place Eriugena means to refer to the proportions, or 
fullness, of the body's parts. And the numbers of time measure the temporal 
increments by means of which the body is brought to its perfection. This form of 
motion is clearly not simply peculiar to animals but includes plants as well. 
`Being' too, Eriugena seems to imply, cannot be predicated of the interior man 
once it is separated from the exterior. Eriugena claims that the first and lowest part of 
the exterior man is the body constituted out of formed matter; of this body, "only 
being may be predicated" (de quo solummodo praedicatur esse). 
113 And here we 
encounter an ambiguity. Does Eriugena mean us to understand that, 
a) `being' is the only available predicate of body, or, 
b) only of body can `being' be predicated? 
Proposition a) makes the claim that no predicates can be applied to body except 
`being. ' 
In Book I, Eriugena has argued that body is a concourse of accidents. Body 
cannot subsist by itself without its accidents. 
111 IV 825A 
112 IV 825A 
113 IV 824D 
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For if you withdraw quantity from body it will not be a body; for it is held 
together by the dimensions and number of its members. Similarly if you take 
quality away from it, what is left will be shapeless and nothing (deforme et 
nihil. )114 
It follows that there cannot be a body of which it is possible to predicate only `being'. 
For there to be a body at all, it must be understood to have quantity, quality, and so 
on. So a) is false. 
But prima facie b) looks no better. It appears to run counter to a great deal of 
Eriugena's thinking, and perhaps specifically to his thinking here concerning the 
soul's eternal existence compared to the body's temporal and corruptible nature. 
Recall, however, that, according to Eriugena, 
all things which fall within the perception of bodily sense or within the grasp 
of the intelligence are truly and reasonably said to be, but that those which 
because of the excellence of their nature elude not only all sense but also all 
intellect and reason rightly seem not to be. l 15 
Eriugena quotes at length from Gregory of Nyssa to illustrate his own view 
that, since man is made in the Image of God, he, like the Image in whose likeness he 
was made, is incomprehensible. And therefore, according to the programmatic 
statement quoted above, is not. 
Since the very nature of our mind, which is made in the image of its Creator, 
escapes knowledge, it possesses a scrupulous likeness to that which is placed 
above it by the fact that in itself it is unknowable, showing the characteristic of 
an incomprehensible nature. 116 
Corporeality and its epistemological concomitant - perceptibility, are attributed to the 
image (man) as a result of his fault. 
So b) can stand as long as we accept that `being' cannot be predicated of any 
substance because substance falls beyond the grasp of the sensory and intellectual 
114 1 503B 
115 I 443A: omnia quae corporeo sensui vel intelligentiae perceptioni succumbunt vere ac rationabiliter 
dici esse, ea vero quae per excellentiam suae naturae non solum omnem sensum sed etiam omnem 
intellectum rationemquefugiunt lure videri non esse. 
116 Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio 11,4 (PG 44,153C - 156B), quoted at IV 789A. 
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faculties. It is only the material or exterior body that is added as a result of the Fall. 
But prior to the Fall, and after the Resurrection man still has a body. Only then it is a 
spiritual, or essential body. 
I think that the quality of the spiritual body is such as to be a fitting abode not 
only for all hallowed and perfected souls, but also for the whole creature that 
is to be liberated from the servitude of corruption. It is of this body that the 
Apostle says, `We have a dwelling not made with hands, being eternal in the 
heavens (2 Cor. 5: 1), i. e. in the mansions of the blessed. ' This gives us an 
indication of the purity and subtlety and glory of that body compared with 
those which are now, even the most splendid and heavenly, visible and made 
with hands. But of the other we are told that it is not made with hands, but is 
eternal in the heavens. Since, then, those which are visible are temporal 
whereas those which are invisible are eternal, all these bodies which we 
behold or can behold on earth and in heaven and which are made with hands 
and are not eternal are far excelled by that which is neither visible nor made 
with hands but eternal. I 17 
III : Conclusion 
It was the aim of this chapter to try to discern whether Eriugena conceives matter and 
body as evil, or as punishment for evil. The Manichaean solution that matter itself is 
evil was quickly abandoned; and it was found that Eriuegna himself, although his 
attitude to matter and body is largely negative, does make it clear that matter is made 
by God, and well-made. Pondering the second position - that matter and body are 
punishment for sin - led to a further question: does the Fall explain why we have 
corporeal bodies, or is it actually the cause of our corporeal bodies? It was found that 
within the dialectic of procession and return the Christian exegete is faced with two 
candidates for the outward movement. It is possible to map the Neoplatonic 
emanation onto the Creation, or onto the Fall. The Christian Neoplatonist is spoiled 
for choice. But Eriugena is careful not to conflate the two, and the assertion that the 
Fall, if not the creation, is a second quasi-creation was adopted: the Fall explains the 
multiplicity of creation. In order to consolidate this position we attempted to 
117 V 929C - 930A 
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demonstrate that, for Eriugena, the Fall takes place within the human epistemic 
capacity. The Fall accounts for the way the material, transient world appears to us 
(that is, as material, transient, susceptible of change, and so on) but it is not itself the 
direct cause of this world. ' 18 There is ultimately only one cause, and that is God. God 
is the efficient, material, formal and final cause of the world. 
God created the visible creature to this purpose, that through it, as likewise 
through the invisible, His glory might abound and that He might be known - not as to what He is, but that He is - to be the One Creator of the whole 
creature, visible and invisible. 119 
It is important to note from the quote above that the creation would comprise invisible 
and visible even if the Fall had never taken place. Matter, including visible matter, is 
not evil. The evil is in man's turning away from God; according to the Genesis 
account, the sin consists in Adam and Eve's eating of the forbidden fruit. The events 
in the garden are explained by Eriugena as follows: 
The Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil is pernicious and deadly wickedness 
masquerading under the form of good, and this tree is planted, as it were, in a 
woman, that is, in the carnal sense, which it deceives. And if the mind 
consents to the sense, then the integrity of the whole human nature is 
destroyed. 120 
At this point in the argument it was necessary to examine more carefully Eriugena's 
anthropology: the six parts of man, the corporeal and spiritual bodies. It was found 
that the difference the Fall hopes to explain between `what would have been' and 
`what is' lies not in substantial nature, but in qualitative appearance. And this 
qualitative appearance originates not in substance but in the, "likenesses of sensible 
118 "His [sc. man's] thought is the spatio-temporal becoming of nature as the Divine Wisdom is its 
eternal essence. " I. P. Sheldon-Williams, "The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the 
Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena" in Armstrong, A. H. (ed. ), The Cambridge History of Later 
Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967) p. 528. 
119 IV 843B 
120 IV 826D-827A: lignum scientiae boni et mall malitia perniciosa mortiferaque infigura boni 
imaginata; et hoc lignum veluti intra quandamfeminam (in carnali scilicet sensu, quem decipit) 
constitutum. Cui sensui si animus consenserit, totius naturae humanae integritas corrumpitur. 
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things coming from the qualities and quantities of the outside world. " 121 It is in the 
exterior sense, or rather in the abuse of it, that the Fall takes place. In turning away 
from the contemplation of God (for which he was created) man found himself 
bewitched by the surfaces of things, the qualitative, the quantitative. 
When therefore it [the human mind] turns towards Him it preserves the beauty 
and integrity of its nature: but when it turns away from Him it wastes and 
disfigures not only itself but also that which is subject to it, that is the material 
life principle and matter itself as well. 122 
It is worth noting in this passage the use of the present tense. The doctrine of the Fall 
is presented by Eriugena `ahistorically. ' The Fall is a continuous and unending 
process. The metaphysical / theological grounds upon which this unprecedented 
rendering of the Fall rests is God's atemporality. This atemporality results in 
Eriugena's conception of the Fall being simultaneous with creation. And this 
simultaneity raised a number of superficial (mainly exegetical) difficulties. 
In conclusion, however, let us return to an examination of the non- 
metaphysical ramifications of de-historicizing the doctrine of the Fall. This 
examination will prove crucial to an understanding of Eriugena's attitude to body and 
material substance. 
i) The Fall as Guide for Living: 
The Fall, when dishistoricized, becomes a guide to living. How is this claim to be 
squared with our initial assertion that the Fall is a theodicy? It has already been noted 
that the punishment, in order to act as a corrective, must contain the possibility of its 
avoidance. The lesson is learnable. 
The Fall for Eriugena, therefore, has a protreptic function; it is designed to 
lead man back into a correct alignment with his created nature, and therefore with the 
121 11 5691): similitudines ex qualitatibus et quantitatibus exterioris mundi venientes. 
122 IV 791A 
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Creator. An acceptance of the Fall is a necessary first step on the Return. In this 
respect, Eriugena is close to Maximus: 
The passion of love, when reprehensible, occupies the intellect with material 
things, but when rightly directed unites it with the divine. For the intellect 
tends to develop its powers among those things to which it devotes its 
attention; and where it develops its powers, there it will direct its desire and 
love. It will direct them, that is to say, either to what is divine, intelligible and 
proper to its nature, or to the passions and things of the flesh. 123 
Of course, Maximus is not using the language of the Fall here, but the epistemological 
and psychological position is identical. As has already been shown, Eriugena does not 
believe that, as a result of the Fall, the human intellect is removed or unavailable, 
rather it is impaired. Maximus identifies the impairment with the misdirection of the 
intellect, an occupation with the passions and things of the flesh. And this is precisely 
Eriugena's position. The fault (or the Fall) lies not in the things of the flesh 
themselves, nor in the human intellect, nor, for Maximus, in the passion of love; it lies 
in the manner in which the intellect is deployed. 
There is no evil which is found to exist substantially in nature, nor proceeds 
from a fixed and natural cause - for considered in itself it is absolutely nothing 
but the irrational and perverse and imperfect motion of the rational nature - it 
can find no other abode in the universal creature save where falsehood resides: 
and the proper residence of falsehood is in the corporeal sense. 
124 
ii) There is no Fall -a Reprise: 
This discussion of the doctrine of the Fall in the Periphyseon opened with an 
examination of the possibility that there is in fact no doctrine of the Fall to be found in 
the Periphyseon. In conclusion I would like to return to this question. This sounds 
perverse since this chapter has been devoted to showing how for Eriugena the Fall 
is - 
after all the problems and difficulties -a necessary stage in Eriugena's overall 
123 St. Maximos the Confessor, Third Century on Love, 71 in The Philokalia: The Complete Text Vol. 2 
trans. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherard, Kallistos Ware (Faber, 1981) p. 94 
124 IV 826AB 
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explication of the nature of the relationship between God and Creation. This time, 
however, I would like to approach the claim that there is no Fall from an entirely 
different direction. 
First time around we pondered a pair of possibilities, firstly that there could be 
no Fall if there was no time during which man was in Paradise, and secondly, that the 
Fall is redundant if it serves precisely the same function as Creation. Now I would 
like to consider a further possibility. How can we speak of a Fall, if man never left 
Paradise in the first place? 
For on His [sc. Christ's] return from the dead into paradise He conversed in 
this world with His disciples, clearly showing them that paradise is not other 
than the glory of the resurrection which first appeared in Him and which He 
would bestow upon all the faithful; and teaching them that our habitable globe 
has not any difference in paradise in respect of the reason of its nature; for it is 
not by nature that they are separated but by the qualities and quantities and 
other variations, things that were added subsequently to this habitable earth as 
the consequence of the general sin of human nature in general for its 
punishment, and, what is more, also for its correction and education. 125 
It would appear from this passage that there is no natural difference between Paradise 
and the created universe. By `natural' here Eriugena means something like 
`substantial'. Thus it seems that Paradise just is this habitable globe understood as 
subsisting in its substantial causes. And yet there is no suggestion that, if this is the 
case, there is no Fall. Rather, the Fall becomes immediately and glaringly necessary 
as a means of explaining why, if there is no substantial difference between this world 
and Paradise, this world is subject to corporeality, corruptibility and so on. The 
difference between this world and Paradise is, Eriugena explains, non-substance - the 
qualitative or sensible forms. So, when in Chapter One, it was noted that QFs are 
125 115 3 8AB: nam ex mortuis in paradisum rediens in hoc orbe cum discipulis suis conservatus est, 
ostendens eis manifeste non aliud esse paradisum praeter resurrectionis gloriam quae primum in eo 
apparuit et quam omnibus fidelibus daturus est docensque nostrum orbem terrarum differentiam in 
paradiso iuxta rationem naturae non habere non enim natura separantur sed qualitatibus et 
quantitatibus caeterisque varietatibus, quae propter peccatum generale generalis humanae naturae ad 
poenam eius, immo etiam ad correctionem et exercitationem, hiuc terrae habitabili superaddita sunt. 
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"joined to (adhaerens) matter so as to constitute body, " 126 we were actually 
discussing the Fall. We also noted that a QF is, according to Eriugena's definition, "a 
species of quality that, when it is joined to (superadditam) matter, produces body, of 
which the substance is o1x ta. "127 Again, the Fall. 
Now, if QFs, deriving from the categories of Quality (Qualitas), Situation 
(Situs), and Condition (Habitus), are, when joined to quanta, prerequisites for 
perception, 128 and if these QFs are added to substantial or natural body as punishment 
for sin (the Fall), and if "bodies, if not perceived by the senses, are not bodies" 129 then 
it follows that an exhaustive account of body, for Eriugena, must necessarily make 
reference to the Fall. In other words, a body is a body qua perceivable in virtue of the 
fact that it has had added to it certain superficial (i. e. non-substantial, or non-natural) 
features. It is in this sense, and for this reason, that it is possible to speak of the Fall as 
that which, "effected the creation of the body and material world. " 130 It has been the 
aim of this chapter to balance this claim with the view that the Fall also represents an 
`uncreation', a falling away from the perfection of created nature. The Fall is, on this 
reading, a `misperception', the wilful corruption of the intellect by the exterior sense. 
Were it the case that Eve (aisthesis) and then Adam (nous) had not succumbed to the 
blandishments of the serpent then, "the sensible nature would not in him [sc. Man] be 
1261II 703B 
127 I 495B; note the terminology. In the bare metaphysical account and in the theological 
/ scriptural 
account the verb `superaddere' is used. This surely suggests that the same verb 
is being used to explain 
the same process. 
128 I 479A 
129 I 479A: corpora vero si sensibus non percipiantur corpora non sunt. 
'30 Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena (Oxford, 2000) p. 79. Cf. Sheldon-William's claim that man is "a 
kind of subsidiary creator. " Sheldon-Williams, "The Greek Christian Platonist 
Tradition from the 
Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena, " The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval 
Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967. p. 528. Moran calls the mind, "a quasi creator of the universe... It 
is due 
to the movements of the mind that the ontological orders come to be 
formed. " Moran, The Philosophy 
of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge, 1989) p. 126. The 
ambivalent "due to" is worth noting; the relation is neither causal nor coincidental. 
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distinct from the intelligible. " 13 1 According to Eriugena the difference between the 
world as it is and the Paradise that God created is a function of man's moral failing. 
For it is not by matter or spatial intervals that paradise is distinguished from 
this inhabited globe but diversity of conduct and difference in degree of 
blessedness. ' 32 
The difference, and the Fall that explains the difference, exist only in the 
cognitive faculty of man. 
The unification of natural substances is in the intellect alone, but not in the 
things themselves, that is to say, that it is not those things which through 
generation into divers genera and divers forms and infinite individuals 
received from the Creator's Providence their intelligible and sensible 
diversity... but their primordial causes and reasons, that are gathered into a 
certain unification, and that by an act of intelligence, not in the thing itself. 133 
Finally let us turn to an examination of a Fall narrative that should make clear 
the difference between the `reality' of created nature, and the `phantasy' of fallen 
nature. 
Not that even now God is not all in all, but after the sin of human nature and 
its expulsion from the abode of paradise, when, that is, it was thrust down 
from the height of the spiritual life and knowledge of the most clear wisdom 
into the deepest darkness of ignorance, no one unless illuminated by Divine 
Grace and rapt with Paul into the height of the Divine Mysteries can see with 
the sight of true understanding how God is all in all, for there intervenes the 
cloud of fleshly thoughts (nube carnalium cogitationum) and the darkness of 
variegated phantasies (variarumque phantasiarum caligine), and the keenness 
of the mind is weakened by the irrational passions, and is turned back from the 
splendours of clear truth and is held in the grasp of bodily shadows 
(corporalibus umbris contenta) to which it has become accustomed. 134 
Of particular interest here is the claim that the truth is unavailable to the mind and that 
the mind is somehow `held' by "bodily shadows. " By "bodily shadows" Eriugena 
means to refer to the sensible body, that agglomeration of QFs investing a single and 
131 II 536C: sensibilis natura ab intelligibili in eo non discreparetur. 
132 II 538B: non enim mole vel spatiis discerniturparadysus ab isto habitabili orbe terrarum sed 
diversitate conversacionis differentiaque beatitudinis. Cf. V 871 D: non enim gressibus corporis, sed 
affectibus mentis elongatur a Deo. 
133 II 535CD 
134 III 683CD 
can see with 
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simple substantial form. But it is also to be noted that the fallen nature of the sensible 
world is not how things really are. The body is merely a shadow, an illusion. 
In the next chapter we shall be concerned with how we are to go about 
crossing this conceptual gap between shadow and reality, between ignorance and true 
understanding, between earth and Paradise. 
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Chapter Four : The Return 
The end of this sensible world will be nothing else but its return into God. ' 
Part One : Death and Resurrection 
Introduction: 
Whereas in the last chapter it was necessary to unravel the whole of the Fall in order 
to examine effectively the fallen nature of material substance and body, here the 
requirement is less exhaustive. There is no need to follow the whole arc of the Return 
of human nature into God as only some of this process concerns body and material 
substance. Instead the focus shall be on the death of the exterior body, its dissolution 
and its resurrection. The second half of the chapter will be devoted to an analysis of 
the Return as a process of unification. 
Eriugena admits that much of his thinking concerning the resurrection and the 
Return of all things to God contains "unprecedented ideas" (incognita nondum 
patefacta sunt). 2 Since these ideas find little or no support in Scripture or in the 
Patristic authorities we can expect them to depend to a large extent on the 
metaphysical groundwork of the first three books of the Periphyseon, that is, in the 
relation of cause to effect, genus to species, categorial difference, the means of 
individuation, the roles of form and matter in constituting body. 
Book V of the Periphyseon is, as a consequence, markedly less exegetical than 
the last third of Book III and the whole of Book IV. Still, although for the Return of 
all things to God, Eriugena is able to lay his hands on no Biblical passage to match the 
Genesis accounts of creation and Fall, his starting point when it comes to the Return is 
nonetheless Scriptural. The notion of the Return of all things to God is ultimately 
1 11 539D-540A: non autem aliumfinem mundi huius sensibilis... esse futurum nisi in 
deum ... reditum. 
2V 909D 
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Pauline, deriving from the Apostle's claim that, "God will be all in all" (Deus erit 
omnia in omibus: I Cor. 15: 28). But Eriugena takes from Paul more than the 
underlying concept of the Return, in fact the basis for Eriugena's detailed account of 
death and resurrection is solidly Pauline. Eriugena cites I Cor. 15: 43-44: "it is sown 
an animal body, it will rise a spiritual body" six times in the Periphyseon, three times 
in Book V alone. As shall become clear over the following analysis, this passage 
informs a great deal of Eriugena's thinking about death, about the human body, and 
its post mortem existence. 
And much of what Eriugena will have to say in Book V concerning death and 
the Return of all things derives from Paul's description of living and dying in Christ 
as it is expressed in Romans 6: 
For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we will certainly be 
united with him in a resurrection like his. We know that our old self was 
crucified with him so that the body of sin might be destroyed, and we might no 
longer be enslaved to sin. For whoever has died is freed from sin. But if we 
have died with Christ, we believe that we will also live with him. We know 
that Christ, being raised from the dead, will never die again; death no longer 
has dominion over him. The death he died, he died to sin, once for all; but the 
life he lives, he lives to God. So you also must consider yourselves dead to sin 
and alive to God in Christ Jesus. 
It could be argued that Paul's notion of death here is ambiguous. By `death' does he 
actually mean us to understand a life led free of sin, a death to the sensible world? Or 
does he mean the physical death of the body? The same ambiguity is also present in 
Eriugena's notion of death and resurrection. Even a cursory reading of Book V 
reveals a tension between, as it were, the brute facts concerning the death and 
dissolution of the body, and the dialectical metaphysics that Eriugena deploys in 
3 Rom. 6: 5-11; Vulgate version: si enim conplantati facti sumus similitudini mortis eius, simul et 
resurrectionis erimus. hoc scientes quia vetus homo noster simul crucifixus est ut destruatur corpus 
peccati ut ultra non serviamus peccato. qui enim mortuus est iustificatus est a peccato. si autem mortui 
sumus cum Christo credimus quia simul etiam vivemus cum Christo scientes quod 
Christus surgens ex 
mortuis iam non moritur mors illi ultra non dominabitur quod enim mortuus est peccato mortuus est 
semel quod autem vivit vivit Deo ita et vos existimate vos mortuos quidem esse peccato viventes autem 
Deo in Christo Jesu. 
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articulating his theory of the Return. At points it reads as though the Alumnus and the 
Nutritor are arguing past each other, each having a different definition of death, the 
Alumnus sticking to a physicalist, commonsensical understanding of the term, the 
Nutritor expressing a Pauline, ascetical notion of death as death to the world. 4 
Eriugena will argue, without denying the reality of bodily death, that the death of the 
body is actually the beginning of the Return, and therefore a boon. True death, 
however, is the enslavement of human nature in the sensible and corporeal. And from 
this enslavement human nature is able to free itself through the acceptance of God's 
Grace, turning back towards the Creator. Confusingly perhaps, this turning back to 
God is itself conceived by Eriugena (following Paul) as death, or rather as the death of 
death. 
For if the sages are right in giving the name of death to this mortal life which 
is spent in the corruptible flesh, why should the end of that life be called death, 
when it does not so much bring death to the dying as liberation from death? 
5 
Death is a denial, or rather an absolute contradiction of its opposite, life. If, therefore, 
it is wrong to conceive of sensible existence or this life as a good, and the taking away 
of that good or life as an evil, it follows that death is the good, and sensible existence 
or life the evil. The values commonly attached to life and death must be reversed. 
This paradox lies at the heart of Eriugena's notion of death and resurrection. Before 
proceeding to a detailed examination of the death and resurrection of the body in the 
Periphyseon, it is necessary to give an account of what, in general terms, Eriugena 
means by the Return. 
4 That turning towards God (and therefore away from the world) is a form of death, or akin to 
death 
would have been a familiar trope to Eriugena. See Paschasius Radbertus, 
In Mat. 3.5: (PL 120, 
223AB): idcirco verae beatudinis amator ab omni labentium rerum iucundidate sese extrahat, et 
avertens se convertatur ad dilectionem aeternorum. Contempletur ex 
desiderio incommutabilem et 
immensan unitatem Dei, eamdemque Trinitatem Deitatis incapabilemfidei 
intellectu comprehendat. 
Ob cuius amorem, expletis gradibus ab omni strepitu rerum, et appetitu concupiscentiarum 
alienam se 
faciat, quoadpossit videre Deum, quantum potent ab his qui 
huic saeculo moriuntur. Hunc itaque 
tantum quisque videt inquantum saeculo moritur. 
5V 875C 
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I: The Return 
Whereas the downward movement, conceived either as creation or as Fall, had as its 
cause the efficient component of the four-part division of nature - that which creates 
but is not created (creat et non creatur), 6 the Return has the Final cause - that which 
neither creates nor is created. 
For every division, which is called by the Greeks µtptcµoq, seems to be a 
kind of descent from some finite unity down into an infinite number of 
individuals, that is to say, from the most general to the most specific, while 
every recollection, which is like a return back, starting from the most specific 
and ascending to the most general is called 6c, va, kvtual. Thus it is the return 
and resolution of individuals into forms, of forms into genera, of genera into 
otßiat, of oißiat into the Wisdom and Providence with which every 
division begins and in which every division ends. 7 
For Eriugena the teleological `direction' of the Return is away from diversity and 
towards simplicity; 8 a reversal of the cause and effect relation. 
The unformed matter which was created out of nothing and from which the 
structure of this sensible world, by the diversity of the forms impressed upon 
it, is composed: this matter he shall burn up like hay, when it shall be 
sanctified, that is purged, in that nature that was made in the Image of God, so 
that nothing material or temporal, or earthly or visible, or transitory or mutable 
shall remain in it for it shall be totally changed into spiritual stability and one- 
ness. 9 
There are a number of by now familiar Eriugenian notions given expression here, 
namely, that unformed matter is created from nothing, ' 0 that diversity of forms (QFs) 
accounts for sensible diversity, " l that all creation is effected through and in Man. 12 
Also apparent is Eriugena's low estimation of corporeal nature; it is this nature, or 
6I441B 
7 II 526BC. This passage could stand as an abstract for the Periphyseon as a whole. The twelfth century 
MS (Trinity College 0.5.20) which Thomas Gale used for his edition of 1681 is entitled Peri Physeos 
Merismou and translated as De Divisione Naturae. See I. P. Sheldon-Williams, "The Title of 
Eriugena's Periphyseon" Studia Patristica 3 (Leipzig, 1961) pp. 297-302. 
8V 953A: nos qui in hac vita compositi sumus, in simplicem quandam unitatem adunabimur. 
9V 960D 
10 III 636D 
1111170 IA. Note that qualitative difference acounts for sensible diversity but is not the locus of 
individuality. 
12 For example, IV 764A: Lotus isle mundus sensibilis in ipso [sc. homine] conditus est. nulla enim pars 
eius invenitur sive corporea, sive incorporea, quae non in homine creata subsistat. 
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rather man's debased relationship with this nature, that accounts for the difference 
between the sensible world and Paradise. The list of adjectives - material, temporal, 
earthly, visible, transitory, mutable - all seem to stand in a relation of mutual 
entailment; it is impossible for an object to display just one (or several) of these 
characteristics and not to display all. The actual Return, according to this passage, is a 
process of purgation and then transformation into spiritual stability and oneness. 
This Return is conceived by Eriugena under three aspects (modus). There is 
the general Return which consists in the transformation of the whole of sensible 
creation, of all bodies, so that there is no body remaining in nature. All is ultimately 
intelligible substance, subsisting within its cause. The second aspect of the Return 
concerns the saving of human nature by Christ. Human nature, through the mediating 
role of Christ, is returned to its original created dignity. The third aspect concerns the 
return path of those who, 
besides ascending to the highest point of the nature which is created in them, 
shall, through the abundance of the Grace of God, which is supplied through 
Christ and in Christ to His elect, pass beyond the laws and limitations of 
nature and on that superessential plane be transformed into God Himself. 
13 
As I have already stated, there. is no room in an analysis of body and material 
substance to examine in any detail the subsistence of deiform human nature on the 
superessential plane. But it is under this third aspect of the Return that Eriugena 
discusses the ascension of corporeal human nature into the intelligible realm. 
As a conclusion to his discussion of the categories of place and time in Book I, 
Eriugena argues that, as opposed to the necessarily spatio-temporal existence in this 
world, the coming beatitude shall be infinite. 
Those who participate in the eternal beatitude will be encompassed neither 
by 
place nor time... For all who shall return into their eternal reasons which 
have 
13 V 1020C. These three modus are conceived by Eriugena as offering different perspectives on the 
same process. In a sense, as I understand it, the second and third aspects are species of 
the first, general 
Return. 
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neither a beginning of time through generation in place and time, nor an end 
through dissolution, and are not defined by any local position so that only their 
eternal reasons, and nothing else, will be in them. For being infinite they will 
to infinity adhere to the Cause of all things. Not that their nature perishes in 
them, but that in them He alone is manifest Who alone truly is. 14 
In this passage are found a number of the points already sketched: firstly, the Return 
is conceived as a return to reasons. Secondly, the return is described as a stripping 
away of categorial differences. Here only place and time are mentioned, but elsewhere 
the other categories are also denied of the returned nature. 15 All the categories that is, 
except Substance. For Eriugena, the Return is defined as a passing into substance. '6 
And furthermore, ousia is, in its peculiarly Eriugenian sense, precisely that nature 
from which man has fallen and into which he shall return. 17 It is, therefore, identical 
to the "eternal reasons" mentioned in the passage quoted above. 
For our nature shall be purified, the vice shall be winnowed away, the grain, 
which is our substance, shall be stored, the stubble, which is sin, shall burn in 
the flame of Divine Judgement, the places hid in darkness shall be illumined, 
and God shall be seen as all in all. 18 
Thirdly, what remains after this stripping away of categorial difference is a 
nature in which are to be found only the eternal reasons and in which nothing is 
manifest except God. Without pre-empting the findings of this chapter, we can 
already conceive in outline this process as the individual substance's identity to the 
specific substance no longer marred by the adherence of QFs. 
In order to "return" somewhere, we must, at some previous point in time, have 
been there. So, for Eriugena, 
14 I 482D-483A 
15 V 884B: moles itaque terrena, mortalis, fluxilis, quae ex diversis qualitatibus sensibilium 
elementorum et assumpta et composita est sub forma hac quae sensibus corporeis succumbit... 
solvetur, et in melius mutabitur, in spiritum stabilemque substantiam. 
16 V 993AB: omne, quod in hoc mundo sensibile et locale et temporale, omneque mutabilitate 
obnoxium periturum, hoc est transiturum in ipsam substantiam, 
hoc est, naturam. 
17 I 492D: of ria cuius est quantum corpus, immortalis inseparabilisque sua propria naturalique 
virtute perdurat. 
18 V 1016A 
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the end of [the sensible world] also is its beginning, which it seeks and in 
which it will rest when it has found it; a rest which will not consist in the 
abolition of its substance, but the return into those "reasons" whence it 
sprang. 19 
That which is both the beginning of the sensible world and its end is clearly God; God 
is both the beginning and end of all things, both efficient and final cause. 20 Thus, 
since both divisions correspond to one subject, "the beginning does not differ from the 
end but is one and the same. "21 For this reason, the teleological movement is 
characterised as a `return. ' 
Because it is to the same Cause that all things that proceed from it shall return 
when they reach their end, it is therefore called the end of all things and is said 
neither to create nor to be created. For once all things have returned to it 
nothing further will proceed from it by generation in place and time and 
genera and forms since in it all things will be at rest and will remain an 
indivisible and immutable One. 22 
This pattern of procession and return is to be found also in the whole of created 
nature. Eriugena offers several illustrations from the liberal arts. For example, 
arithmetic is concerned with the descent of the Monad into the "different species of 
numbers. "23 Likewise, geometry begins with a point or signum24 from which it is 
possible to construct planes, solid figures, surfaces and so on. But all these are 
resolvable back to the point in which they subsisted and continue to subsist 
potentially. 25 He offers similar illustrations from music, astronomy and dialectic. 
26 In 
19 V 866D. The seeking of the sensible for the intelligible is a reflection at a global level of the 
appetitive process that takes place throughout the hierarchy of genus, species and individuals. E. g. V 
916A: non enim naturalis ratio sinit superiora in inferiora mutari, inferiora vero superiora naturaliter 
apetunt eisque volunt adunari. 
2V 870CD; Cf. 144 1B- 442A; II 526C: prima nanque et quarta unum sunt quoniam de deo 
solummodo intelliguntur. Est enim principium omnium quae a se condita suns et finis omnium quae 
eum appetunt ut in eo aeternaliter immutabliliterque quiescant. 
21 V 892D 
22 II 527A 
23 V 869A 
24 `Signum' is Eriugena's translation of 077/Jeiov. 
25 See I 465D: in ipso [i. e. deo] enim omnia et stanz, hoc est immutabiliter secundum suas rationes 
subsistunt, et iacent, hoc est quiescunt; finis enim omnium est, ultra quem nihil appetunt. 
26 His use of the illustration from dialectic is perhaps consciously circular since 
it is by means of 
dialectic that he aims to prove his case. Dialectic is both the means and the end. 
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respect of the resurrection of the human substance the process is summarised by the 
Alumnus as follows: 
The passing of mortal bodies into immortal, of corruptible into incorruptible, 
of animal into spz iritual, and of spatio-temporal into eternal bodies free from all 
local limitation. 7 
And the Nutritor is pleased by his pupil's summary, and takes satisfaction in his own 
paedagogical success: "This is what I wished to convince you of, and I see that I have 
succeeded. " 
As was noted in the previous chapter, the Fall is essentially regarded by 
Eriugena as the addition to created nature of corporeality. And the addition is made on 
account of man's sin. The converse is true of the Return; by means of the natural 
appetite of all inferior things for their superiors, and by God's Grace, the resurrection 
shall take the form of a subtraction, a stripping away of multiplicity: 
Every substance shall be purged of its corruptible accidents and free from all 
things which do not pertain to the state of its proper nature, its indissoluble 
simplicity. 28 
So the Return is to be seen as undoing the effects of the Fall, or rather a returning of 
the effects into their causes. And since all things have their being through the reasons 
or causes by which they exist, the Return is effectively a return to being. 29 
The relation of the Return to the Fall raises a question that needs to be 
addressed at the outset since it concerns the scope of the discussion. The obvious 
point has already been made that in order to return somewhere, one must at a previous 
time have been there. But it was found in the last chapter that the substance of man - 
the interior or spiritual man - abides eternally and immutably in its cause. How is it 
possible therefore to return to a place you never left? After all it is surely impossible 
27 V 906C 
28 III 666A: omnis substantia ab omnibus corruptibilibus accindentibus purgabitur et ab omnibus quae 
ad statum suae propriae naturae non attinent absolvetur, solis naturalibus virtutibus decora insolubili 
simplicitate. 
29 For things having their being through their reasons / causes see 11 5751); 11 61613-1); 622C; III 627C. 
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for there to be any movement, downward or upward, forward or backwards for an 
eternal and immutable substance? And Eriugena goes so far as to admit that this is 
the case: 
This Return of which we are now speaking will not be a Return of substances, 
for these remain immutably and indissolubly what they always were, but of 
the qualities and quantities and other accidents, which of themselves are 
unstable and transient, subject to the conditions of space and time, susceptible 
to birth and decay. 30 
Restricting our examination of the Return to body and material substance turns out 
not to be a restriction at all. The Return consists solely in the return of the body or 
more accurately, the properties of body, into its causes. Let us now turn to an 
examination of the Return itself. 
Near the opening of Book Five, Eriugena offers a five stage Return . 
31 Let us 
call this Model A. 
Model A 
1) The first stage corresponds to the death and corruption of the body. The body 
suffers dissolution and returns to the four elements of which the sensible world is 
composed. 
2) At the Resurrection each person shall have restored to them their body. This 
restoration is made from out of the four elements. 
3) Body is changed into soul. 
4) The soul (which is now the whole human nature) returns to the Primordial Causes. 
And these causes, as we have seen, reside immutably in God. 
5) The spirit with its causes is absorbed into God. There is nothing left but God. God 
will be all things in all things. 
30 V 8850 
31V876AB 
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And at the very end of Book Five Eriugena offers another, seven stage analysis of the 
Return. 32 
Model B 
1) Earthly body is transformed into vital motion. 
2) Vital motion is transformed into sensation. 
3) Sensation is transformed into reason. 
4) Reason is transformed into mind. And the reason is the end of every rational 
creature. 
These four stages mark the first part of the ascent, the lower natures becoming 
absorbed into the higher natures. This first part of the Return takes place, as it were, 
within the creature. As Eriugena points out, reason is the end of every rational 
creature. But there now follow three more stages of the ascent (tres ascensionis 
gradus) that mark the ascending relation between creature and creator. 
5) The mind is transformed into the knowledge of all things that come after God. 
6) The knowledge of all things that come after God is transformed into wisdom, that 
is the innermost contemplation of the Truth insofar as that is possible for the 
creature. 
7) "The supernatural merging of the perfectly purified souls into God Himself, and 
their entry into the darkness of incomprehensible and inaccessible Light (1 Tim. 
6: 16) which conceals the Cause of all things. "33 
32 V 1020C - 1021 A 33 V 1021 A: in ipsum Deum supernaturaliter occasus, ac veluti incomprehensibilis et inaccessibilis 
lucis tenebrae in quibus causae omnium absconditur. For Eriugena's claim that tenebras recce 
cognoscentium convertit in lucem (the last words of the Periphyseon -V 1022C) see 
Carabine, Deidre, 
"A Thematic Investigation of the Neoplatonic Concepts of Vision and Unity", Proceedings of the 
Dublin Conference on Neoplatonism, 1992, pp. 43-56, esp. 49-53. 
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Although this is a sevenfold ascent, it comprises eight stages. Firstly, body, vital 
motion, sense, reason and mind, and then a further three: knowledge, wisdom, and 
God. 
Human nature shall through the eight stages of its ascent return into its 
Principle. Five of those stages lie within the limits of nature, while three lie beyond nature and beyond being in God Himself. Then the fivefold number of 
the creature shall be united with the threefold number of the Creator. 34 
Stages 5), 6) and 7), the stages that lie outside of nature, will be of less interest to us 
here. It also follows from Eriugena's statement made at V 885C (quoted above) that 
steps 5), 6) and 7) do not strictly belong to the Return; the Return does not comprise 
substances since substances remain immutably, indivisibly and eternally the same. 
The last three stages of Model B, therefore, remain outside the scope of the Return as 
it is generally understood, and refer to a mystical `drawing up' of the substantial 
human nature into God. Of primary concern in a discussion of body are the first few 
stages of Models A and B. Let us turn, therefore, to the subject of death and 
corruption. 
11 : Death and Dissolution 
In the last chapter I claimed that a recognition of the Fall and our fallen nature was a 
necessary first step on the Return. This claim appears to be contradicted by the first 
propositions on both models. In the case of Model A, the death of the body and its 
dissolution is listed as the beginning of the Return. And according to Model B the first 
step is the passage from earthly body to vital motion. So where does this leave the 
earlier claim that a recognition of our fallen nature marks the first step in the Return? 
Later in this chapter I aim to show that this claim need not be abandoned since 
Eriugena identifies the recognition of our fallen nature with death itself. 
34 V 1021 AB 
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For the sake of argument, therefore, let us accept for now Model A's assertion 
that the death and subsequent dissolution of the body is the beginning of the Return. 
Death becomes, therefore, a turning point in Eriugena's dialectic of procession and 
return. It represents the fulcrum on which the whole edifice of natura is balanced. At 
the moment of death, the balance tips; the Fall ceases, and the Return begins. As has 
already been noted, the end point of the Fall, and the first point of the Return are 
identical. Now it is possible to identify this moment with the death of the physical 
body: 
It is from this lowest depth of his Fall that the Return begins. This lowest 
depth of the Fall is the dissolution of the body. Therefore the dissolution of the 
body is the starting point of the Return of nature. 35 
Let us look a little more closely, therefore, at what Eriugena means by 
dissolution. Eriugena assumes that the dissolution of the body is total: 
If in this corporeal and dissoluble matter there should be any single, 
immutable, and quite indissoluble essence, then it could not be wholly 
dissolved by any thought or action. But in fact it is dissolved: therefore there is 
nothing in it which is indissoluble. 36 
Matter is, therefore, the Nutritor concludes, "nothing else but a certain composition of 
accidents. "37 Interestingly, however, Eriugena has returned to this passage and 
qualified it with an insertion to the Reims MS. The insertion reads as follows: 
The accidents themselves remain without change in their own natures (in sua 
natura) for the reason that underlying them all there is something indivisible 
in which they naturally (naturaliter) subsist as one. 38 
It seems entirely plausible to suppose that this insertion was made after the 
composition of Book V, or at least after reflection on the material and subject matter 
that comprises Book V. The motivation behind the insertion seems to be the retention 
of the possibility of bodily resurrection. Holding to the view that accidents remain 
35 V 875C 
36 1 479C 
37 I 479B: nil aliud... materiam... nisi accidentium quandam compositionem. 
38 1 479C 
153 
immutable in their natures allows Eriugena to maintain that the material, exterior 
body, though dissoluble into its constituent elements, also continues somehow to 
subsist in its nature(s). How is this possible? What is that nature in which the 
accidents immutably subsist? In order to answer these questions it will be necessary to 
examine Eriugena's theory of the resurrection of the body. 
i) The resurrection of the body: 
Eriugena is committed to the orthodox Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the 
body. The souls waiting in purgatory for the Day of Judgement will, "take back their 
bodies. "39 But when asked by the Alumnus whether, "physical objects which are 
extended in space and time and composed of many different parts... are to be 
included in the general resurrection? "40 the Nutritor makes the following assertion: 
We do not say that the masses and forms of visible and sensible bodies will be 
resurrected, but that in the resurrection of man... they will return with man 
and in man into their Causes and principles which were created in man. 41 
How does this passage compare with the insertion to Book I (I 479C)? Firstly, are 
they about the same thing? In the insertion to Book I Eriugena is discussing accidents; 
in the Book V passage he refers to, "masses and forms of visible and sensible bodies. " 
The accidents in Book I are those of the ten categories - namely Quantity, Quality, 
Situation and Condition - that come together, commingle and constitute visible 
matter, and are normally perceived by the bodily sense. In order to be perceivable this 
agglomeration of accidents must also have form. This is the qualitative or material 
form. 42 It seems licit, therefore, to identify the masses and forms of visible and 
sensible bodies mentioned in the Book V passage with the matter and qualitative 
39 IV 858A: donec corpora sua recipiant [sc. animaeJ. 
40V913C 
41 V 913CD 
42 111703 B: forma vero illa materiae adhaerens ad constitutionem corporis varia semper atque 
mutabilis inque diversas differentias secundum accidens dispersa. 
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forms (QFs) of the Book I insertion. These forms and masses, although they shall not 
be included in the resurrection as they are, shall return, "with man and into their 
causes. " In Book I this return is not referred to as a process, the accidents, "remain 
without change in their own natures. " If the masses and forms of the Book V passage 
are identical to the accidents that remain changeless in their own natures, how is it 
that they return? Surely they can never have left? The qualitative or material forms, in 
virtue of which individual bodies are sensible and dissimilar one from another 
proceed from those things that 
are understood about it [viz the specific substance, eg. Man], namely from 
places and times, from generation, from the quantity and quality of their diets, 
their habitats, the conditions under which each was born, and, to speak 
generally, from all things which are understood about the substance and are 
not the substance itself. 43 
Despite this somewhat peculiar list, these things, "understood about substance" are 
clearly the ten categories minus Ousia, or Substance. Indeed Eriugena explicitly states 
that "the other nine categories are about it [sc. Mum] or within it. "44 It seems, 
therefore, that these accidental sensible differences proceed from the categories in the 
same way that an effect proceeds from its cause. Visible matter and a fortiori bodies 
are effects of invisible causes. 45 The causes are the categories, and since that upon 
which the nine non-substantial categories depend is itself immaterial, so the 
categories, "are incorporeal when considered in themselves. "46 When considered in 
themselves, that is when considered as causes, they are incorporeal. When considered 
as effects they come together to form visible bodies. The `consideration' is crucial. 
The components of visible bodies can either be in themselves eternally subsistent 
43 III 703C: ex his quae circa eam [sc. substantiam vel naturam] intelliguntur contingit, ex 
locis 
videlicet temporibusque ex generatione ex quantiate et qualitate alimoniorum regionum rerum 
in 
quibus quisque nascitur et, ut universaliter dicam, ex omniubs quae circa substantiam 
intelliguntur et 
non ipsa substanita sunt. 
as I 478D 
as 1479B 
46 1478D - 479A 
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causes (unproceeded categories) or instantiated in visible matter, "dispersed among 
diverse differences by accident, "47 depending on the point of view of the person 
'considering'. Taking into account `consideration' will also answer our earlier 
question as to the possibility of returning to a place we never left. Considered as 
substance, or as abiding within its causes there can be no return, it seems. Considered 
from the point of view of its accidental differences or effects, then there is a return 
journey to be made. But the picture is slightly more complex than this. In fact, 
Eriugena wants to say, the act of consideration is itself the locus either of the Fall or 
the Return: to consider an object as to its sensible accidental differences is to express 
the Fall, to consider an object as to its eternal, immutable substance, as ever-abiding 
within the causes that themselves subsist as a unity within the Word, is to express the 
Return. 
This dependence on point of view or consideration also explains the difference 
between the passages under discussion. In the Book I insertion - part of a general 
metaphysical survey - the categories are being considered in themselves; in Book V 
Eriugena is concerned with detailing the process whereby fallen nature is restored or 
returned to its created perfection. And yet both passages are fundamentally concerned 
with the same subject: the relation of material effect to immaterial cause. 
So the, "masses and forms of visible and sensible bodies" are not resurrected 
in themselves, but in Man. Just as male and female are absorbed into the simplicity of 
our sexless simple nature, so our sensible bodies will be absorbed into our spiritual 
Cause. Unable, as yet, to identify this absorption or reversion with the idea of 
resurrection, the Alumnus is confused. He fails to see how something can be said to 
perish when it continues to reside eternally in the primordial causes: 
47 III 703B 
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I should like to ask you why we say that a thing perishes when we know that it 
will return into its own Primordial Causes, and indeed into God Himself. It 
should rather be said of it that it lives forever, than that it dies and passes 
away. 48 
The solution to the Alumnus's problem lies in Eriugena's identification of the Return 
with the Resurrection. Eriugena is committed to the view that the body is resurrected: 
1) The resurrection of the body. The restoration of the body from the four 
elements. 
The body, on dying, is dissolved into its constituent elements, and scattered. How is it 
possible for the soul to recover its body? Eriugena believes that 
the impression (species) of that other body, the material and dissoluble, abides 
in the soul, not only during life but even after dissolution and returns into the 
elements of the world... Therefore the soul cannot forget or cease to know her 
parts wherever among the elements they may be scattered. 49 
The translation of `impression' for `species' is unexpected. At Points Eriugena uses 
`species' as a synonym of 'forma'. 50 If we substitute `form' for `impression' it 
becomes clear that Eriugena intends here to refer to the QF, "that form (forma) which 
is joined to matter so as to constitute body. "51 It is this form that abides in the soul 
even after the dissolution of the body. How this is possible is partially explained by 
means of the seal / impression analogy. Eriugena argues that the relationship between 
the exterior and interior bodies is analogous to that between a seal and its impression. 
Thus the exterior body leaves a permanent impression on the interior. Indeed, the 
impression 
remains always in the soul, even after the dissolution of the seal, because of 
that notion of it, which it always retains, recalls the parts of the seal, scattered 
as they may be throughout the elements, and recalls that, at the day of the 
Resurrection, they are to be formed again in the seal (that is, in the body) to 
the form of the soul (which is the interior body. )52 
48 V 897B 
49 IV 802BC 
so For example at I 442A 
51111 703B 
52 IV 802D-803A 
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This is at best only a partial explanation since Eriugena is able to shed no light on the 
means whereby the interior body or soul is able to retain a memory or notion of the 
exterior, dissoluble body. After all, the interior body is "simple and indivisible"; 53 and 
it subsists as substance, "immutably without transformation. "54 It is difficult to see 
how the QF remains in this simple, immutable substance when Eriugena has 
characterised the visible, material form or species (QF) as, "always varying and 
changeable. "55 But, although the QF is in a perpetual state of flux, it nevertheless 
seems to act as some sort of organising principle. When the Alumnus asks what it is 
that shall be included in the general resurrection, he poses the question in the 
following way: 
Are then the physical objects which are extended in space and time and 
composed of many different parts, as well as the visible forms (visibiles 
species) by which they are prevented from coalescing into one indeterminate 
mass, to be included in the general resurrection? 56 
The `visible forms' cannot be other than the QFs or species. Clearly they act here as 
an organising principle, or that through which the soul is able to recall the parts of the 
exterior and material body that have been dissolved into the constituent elements. It is 
the QF that prevents physical objects, "coalescing into one indeterminate mass. " The 
QFs, as a multiplex procession from a simple Cause, are essentially distributive; they 
give rise to difference. QF is the definiens of sensible matter and body, "for whatever 
becomes manifest becomes manifest through form. "57 And bodies are bodies only 
inasmuch as they are perceivable to the senses. 58 But they are also processions or 
53 IV 760A; V 941 D- 942A; V 922AB 
54 V 884A 
ss III 703B 
56V913C 
s' I 479B 
58 I 479AB 
158 
effects of a simple substantial cause. In themselves, therefore, they are incorporeal, 
and indeed are only inasmuch as they continue to subsist in their cause. 
But if this is the case one may straightaway ask, how does the resurrected 
human being retain its identity if it is absorbed into its Cause? Eriugena is never quite 
able to abandon the view that individuation is effected by means of qualitative, 
sensible form. Perhaps the answer lies, therefore, in the mysterious association 
between the substance and the qualities that invest it, between the interior and 
exterior, the impression and the seal. 
I do not believe that these qualities of the substances wholly abandon the 
substances upon which they depend so as entirely to immerse themselves in 
the matter of the sensible world: but in a miraculous and mysterious manner 
known to their Creator alone they continue to remain associated with their 
substances in an inseparable bond. 59 
The manner in which this substance - simple and immutable in itself - retains an 
impression (species) of the exterior body that is changeable and susceptible of 
dissolution is inexplicable. And this is unsatisfactory; one cannot help feeling that the 
individuality of the substance is retained by Eriugena simply to keep his thinking in 
line with orthodox Christian teaching concerning the resurrection of the body. 
ii) Death and Ignorance: 
When questioned as to the imperishable nature of all that subsists within the Word, 
the Alumnus confirms his belief that 
if I am not in Him I cannot be at all. And if I do not know this I am brought 
into the death of folly and ignorance. 60 
Earlier the Nutritor has elaborated on the results of this deathly ignorance: 
59 V 886D: nec sic tarnen praedictas substantiarum qualitates suas substantias, circa quas volvuntur, 
omnino deserere, et in materiem sensibilis mundi convenire arbitramur, sed mirabili et ineffabili modo, 
solifabricatori illius cognito, et circa suas substantial, quibus inseparabiliter adhaerent, semper 
permanent. 
60 V 910C 
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For there is no worse death than ignorance of the truth, no deeper pitfall than 
taking the false for the true, which is the property of error. For from these the 
basest and foulest monsters are wont to be fabricated in human thoughts, and 
when the carnal soul loves and pursues these as though they were real, turning 
its back on the true light and desiring but unable to embrace fleeting shadows, 
it is wont to plunge into the depth of misery. 61 
The language here recalls the description of the Fall in Book IV. The base and foul 
monsters that are fabricated in human thought, are the product of man's fallen nature; 
they are the superficial and beguiling phantasies of a warped sense faculty; they are 
shadows, unreal. 62 Indeed, they are death conceived of as ignorance of the truth. But 
these phantasies are the diversity of the sensible forms (QFs) that comprise the 
material world, or rather our fallen experience of the material world. They are taken, 
erroneously according to Eriugena, to be the experience of life. 
If death is actually the mistake made by man in embracing the fleshly life 
given in punishment for sin, then the first step on the return journey is the correction 
of that mistake. This correction may be effected either by the physical death of the 
body, or by an acceptance of Truth through knowledge. What is the relationship 
between death and knowledge? 
In virtue of its pivotal position within the dialectic of procession and return, 
death is given a profoundly paradoxical definition in the Periphyseon. Indeed the 
word `death' seems to include as part of its meaning its own contrary: life. Death, on 
the one hand is the ignorance of Truth, or life led in thrall to sensible appearance. But 
on the other, it is also the death of this life, and so its own contradiction, the death of 
death: true life, or knowledge. `Death' refers to false life or ignorance of truth. It also 
refers to the true life, or knowledge of the truth. In this second aspect, there 
is clearly 
a protreptic dimension to Eriugena's notion of death. For the Nutritor, 
death is 
desirable inasmuch as it represents a turning back to God. The dialectical 
61 III 650A 
62 Compare the passage at III 683D where again the sense data are referred to as 
`shadows'. 
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understanding of the body and its death is at once the means whereby the relationship 
between Creator and creation is expressed, and the means whereby the final resolution 
is effected. This resolution is brought about through a realignment of fallen nature 
into a state of Grace. Let us examine more closely this second aspect of death, death 
as true life or knowledge. 
In order to strengthen his understanding of death, the Nutritor cites the 
Pseudo-Dionysius's interpretation of the text, "Right dear in the sight of the Lord is 
the death of His saints" (Ps. 115: 15). Eriugena understands the Pseudo-Dionysius as 
claiming that the death of the saints refers to, "nothing less than their ascent into God 
through the loftiness of their contemplation whereby, though still in the body, they 
have transcended all things visible and invisible. "63 Likewise, the Nutritor asks, 
was not John the Evangelist dead to all created things when he transcended all 
things by the loftiness of his contemplation (theoriae)? 64 
For the Nutritor, therefore, death is understood as transcendence, a `dying to the 
world, ' achieved through contemplation: 
And just as those who are filled with virtue and wisdom even while they are 
still established in this world die in their mind, though not with their body, so 
shall it be with the whole world at its consummation. 65 
According to the Nutritor, therefore, `death' refers primarily to a state of mind, a state 
of mind that is described in the first passage as `lofty contemplation', and in the 
second as `virtuous and wise'. Eriugena thinks of contemplation as the end of 
wisdom: 
63 V 897B. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, EH III, 9 (PG3 437BC). For Eriugena's translation of this passage 
see PL 122 1085C - 1086A. Pseudo-Dionysius states that the saints and their 
followers are ob 
V Kpw9EVti LS, o, XXd ELS Oci otia my ýwrv Ex 9avatiov 9F_v#OLti116avtiaS. 
64 V 897C 
65 V 897CD. Cf. IV 753B: nam quiperfecte vivit, omnino corpus suum, et vitam qua illud 
administratur, omnesque corporeos sensus cum his quae per eos percipit, omnesque irrationabiles 
motus quos in se sentit cum omnium rerum mutabilium memoria, non solum spernit, verum etiam, 
quantum potest, et corrumpit et destruit, ne ullo modo in eo praevaleant, et omnino perire eis et ea sibi 
appetit. Note that according to this passage right-living (perfecte vivit) consists 
in striving to die to the 
flesh; it is in the moral agent's will that the `death' that is perfect life is to be found, not the 
body. 
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For if we are unwilling to learn and know about ourselves that means that we 
have no desire to return to that which is above ourselves, namely our proper 
cause, and shall continue to wallow in the bed of carnal matter and the death 
of ignorance. For there is no other way to the most pure contemplation 
(contemplationem) of the First Cause than certain knowledge of Its image 
which comes after it. 66 
It follows that to be filled with virtue and wisdom is to achieve the point in the 
philosophical ascent at which contemplation becomes possible. And this point 
presumably corresponds to, 
4) Reason is transformed into mind, 
of Model B. Eriugena suggests that those who, through being filled with virtue and 
wisdom, that is, through contemplation, are able to "die in the mind" can embark on 
the Return before bodily death. The Nutritor compares those who are capable of this 
death with the state of the world at its consummation. 67 Each one of its parts shall be 
returned to its Cause. The clear implication is that this is possible for the individual 
who is dead to the world but who is still established in the world. The Nutritor rules 
out the possibility of illumination, purgation and perfection, the final three stages of 
the Return that correspond to stages 5), 6) and 7) on Model B prior to the physical 
death of the body. 
The possibility of "death in the mind", the death of the contemplative, raises a 
number of questions. Are the Nutritor and the Alumnus talking past one another? The 
Alumnus is clearly exercised by the idea of bodily death and resurrection and how the 
latter is to be effected. The Nutritor on the other hand seems to understand by `death' 
the ascetic's withdrawal from the world. Is it the case that there are two deaths, or two 
aspects of death under discussion, one of which is open only to those who are filled 
with virtue and wisdom, and the other open to all? Not necessarily. According to 
66 V 941C. For contemplatio / theoria as the goal of philosophy see Moran, The Philosophy of 
John 
Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1989) p. 147. See also 
Leclercq, 
J., The Love of Learning and the Desire for God. A Study of Monastic Culture 
(SPCK, 1978) pp. 126-7. 
67 V 897D 
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Model A. death and the corruption of the body mark the first stage in the Return. But 
Model B makes no mention of death, only the transformation of the earthly body into 
vital motion, of vital motion into sensation, sensation into reason. These Model B 
stages do not appear to require the death of the body, only its transformation. They 
seem to refer, therefore, to the process whereby, through learning and knowing about 
ourselves, we return to our proper cause, that is, to created human nature, our 
substance, Man. This transformation, it is now possible to conclude, is identical to the 
death of the mind Eriugena mentions in the earlier passage. It is the mind's turning 
away from the gross sensible world and back to God, Who is the substance of all 
things. 68 
To return again to the Models of the Return, it is possible now to see that the 
third stage of Model A: 
3) Body is changed into soul, 
corresponds to stages 1) to 4) of Model B. Stage 3) on Model A follows, 
2) The death and corruption of the body. The body suffers dissolution and 
returns to the four elements. 
3) The resurrection of the body. The restoration of the body from the four 
elements. 
It seems, therefore, that the contemplative who is `dead to the world, ' who returns 
along the path indicated by Model B, is not strictly required to suffer bodily death, 
dissolution and restoration, since his or her body is already `transformed. ' Eriugena 
makes no claim to the effect that the contemplative will not as a matter of 
fact suffer 
bodily death. Death is, however, presumably nothing to the contemplative since they 
have already effectively died to their bodies, if not actually in them. 
68 For God as substance of all things: I 516C; III 671B; 111 6811); V 956B. 
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Although `death' appears to have contradictory meanings for the Nutritor and 
the Alumnus, in both cases it marks the passing of the body. This can be understood 
physically or in the `higher' sense as a turning away from the diverse sensible creation 
towards the simple intelligible Cause. 
iii) The Scope of the Return: 
First of all it must be noted that the Return is conceived by Eriugena - after the 
Pauline formulation - as being a return of all things to God. That said, however, 
Eriugena endorses the Church position that the world was brought into being in time 
and it shall be brought to an end. Everything which comes into being in the world and 
is composed of the stuff of the world must of necessity be dissolved and pass away 
with the world. Does this include material substance and the body? Eriugena believes 
there is nothing of the human being that is not resurrected since, "nothing exists in 
human nature which is not spiritual and intelligible. "69 Does it follow from this 
statement that nothing - not even the material body - perishes? No, clearly not, for 
`human nature' refers to the unfallen substance of man; it categorically does not 
include within its scope the corporeal accretions accrued to it as punishment for sin. 
The exterior, material body shall pass away: 
"Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away. " (Mat. 
24: 35) And lest anyone should suppose that these words can mean that the 
passing away of the world is from one place to another place, or from one time 
to another time, or from one visible form to another visible form, or from one 
quality to another quality, or from one quantity to another quantity, let him 
consider the way in which the Prophet addresses the Creator of the World: 
"The heavens are the works of Thy hands; they shall perish, but Thou 
remainest. " (Ps. 101: 26-27; Hebr. 1: 10-11) By using this unequivocal phrase, 
"They shall perish, " he makes clear the meaning of "They shall pass away. "70 
69 V 878D - 879A: in humana siquidem natura nil subsistit quod spirituale et 
intelligible non sit. 
70 V 890D - 891A 
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By means of this scriptural exegesis Eriugena attempts to show that `pass away' and 
`perish' are synonymous. He also makes it clear that, according to revealed doctrine, 
the earth, like any material creature existing in space and time shall perish. 7' And he 
is careful to explain that, "passing away" is not reducible to spatial or temporal 
relocation; it means passing out of existence. He revisits a selection from his list of 
Aristotelian categories - Place, Time, Quality and Quantity - and makes it clear that 
the earth shall not pass from one visible form to another. It is of course significant that 
form is qualified with `visible'. He is taking care to avoid expressing the view that the 
substance of the earth shall perish or pass out of existence. That the substance of 
anything should pass out of existence is explicitly repudiated. 
For among the things which derive their substances from the Cause of all 
things there is nothing which shall be reduced to nothing. 72 
How could it be, Eriugena asks, that the substance of any nature created by God 
should perish? 
For everything that is created in man according to nature must of necessity 
remain eternally intact and uncorrupted. For it is not in accordance with 
Divine justice that anything should perish of that which He has made, 
especially as it is not nature herself who has sinned, but the perverse will 
which moves irrationally against rational nature. 73 
Prima facie these sentences look like a contradiction of the previous quoted passage 
in which Eriugena claimed that the world shall perish. And yet if we accept that it is 
only the qualitative and sensible that pass away, the two passages are actually in a 
clear alignment. That which is created in man according to nature is man's substance, 
indeed it is the substance of all things since all of nature is created in man. Now, that 
71 IV 802AB: porro quia omne quod in hunc mundum per generationem localiter et temporaliter 
nascitur non potest fine carere, sive minimis (ut dies, horae, momenta), sive maximis (ut saecula), sive 
mediis (ut aetates, anni) temporum intervallis inter principium nativitatis in hanc vitam eiusdemque 
vitae finem interpositis, naturali creaturam ordinatione exigente - omne siquidem quod in mundo, ex 
mundo compositum, incipit esse, necesse est resolvi, et cum mundo interire. 
72 V 1020B 
73 IV 760CD 
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which perishes, according to Eriugena's exegesis of "Heaven and earth shall pass 
away, " are the visible forms and the categorial differences, differences of place and 
time and quality and so on. If this is correct then it must follow that these categorial 
differences, the visible forms of created substances are products of, "the perverse will 
which moves irrationally against rational nature. " And this, I take it, accords with the 
conclusions of the previous chapter in which it was found that the sensible world 
would be no different from the intelligible paradise if it were not for the irrational and 
sinful movement of man's will. It was also found at the end of the last chapter that 
this penumbra of qualitative forms (that is, sensible body) is in a sense, a shadow, a 
phantasy, unreal. The truth is veiled from man's epistemic faculty by the presence of 
an illusion. 74 
So this `passing away' or perishing, in fact the entire process of Return, can be 
understood to be a passage from the less real to the more real, a stripping away of 
phantasy to reveal the truly existent substantial core. 75 
For all things which vary according to place and time, and which are subject to 
the corporeal senses, should not themselves be regarded as truly substantial 
existents but as transitory images and verifications derived therefrom. 
76 
III : The Incarnation 
The incarnation is the necessary and sufficient condition of the Return. Without the 
grace of the Redeemer there can be no return: 
I now put forward the view that the general resurrection of the dead, of the 
wicked as well as of the good, could not be effected without the Grace of the 
Redeemer of the world: and that natural virtue is insufficient to achieve 
it: so 
that if God the Word had not been made flesh and had not made His dwelling 
74 111 6831): mentisque acie irrationabilibus passionibus infirmata et ex splendoribus perspicuae 
veritatis repercusa consuetisque corporalibus umbris contenta. 
75 As part of his discussion of the nature of the bodies of angels as they are manifest 
to humankind, 
Eriugena claims at V 993D that their bodies are, nec tarnen phantastice, sed veraciter, and 
this is in 
contrast to human bodies that are, materialia, ex qualitatibus mundi 




with man and had not taken upon Him the whole of the our human nature, in 
which He Himself suffered and arose from the dead, there world be no 
resurrection for the dead at all. 77 
The Return of all things takes place solely through the agency of the Word made 
flesh. Eriugena makes it clear in this passage that Christ takes on or receives the 
whole of human nature. For Eriugena the complete humanity of Christ is essential. 
The incarnation is a unification of the divine and the human. In other words it is not a 
case of the divine substance assuming the human, like a suit of clothes or a disguise. 
`Since', he [sc. Maximus the Confessor78] says, `like us He', that is, Christ, 
`has body and sense and soul and intellect. ' For human nature is constituted of 
these as of four parts, and Christ, as true Man, took them upon Himself and 
unified them in Himself. For He was made perfect Man. For He left nothing of 
man, except sin, that He would not receive into the unity of His Substance and 
would not unify, that is, would not make one, in Himself. 79 
Also ruled out by this complete identification is the view that the incarnate Christ acts 
as an intermediary between God and man. Eriugena explicitly denies the possibility of 
Christ as intermediary; there is no intermediary between the Word and the causes of 
all things. The only candidates that Eriugena considers as possibly holding this 
position are the angels. But if the angels were to occupy this place, between the 
primordial causes and the Word, it would render them uncaused, or uncreated. And 
this is clearly not licit. 
It is not to be believed that they [sc. angels] were made in such a way that their 
causes are not created in the Word. For there is no creature whose cause, made 
in the Word, does not precede it, and which is not substantiated by it so that it 
may be, nor ordered by it so that it may be beautiful, nor preserved by 
it so 
that it may be eternal, nor manifested either to the senses or intellects so that 
it 
77 V 899AB: nil aliud mihi occurrebat, praeter quod resurectio mortuorum generaliter 
bonorum 
malorumque non nisi sola Redemptoris mundi gratiaFutura sit, nulla naturali virtute cogente, 
in 
tantum ut si Deus Verbum caro factum non fieret, et inter homines conversatus non esset, et 
totam 
humanam naturam non reciperet, in qua passus est et resurrexit, nulla mortuorum resurrectioforet. 
See also I 445C where Eriugena makes the claim that sin is a 
loss of being, and that man is restored to 
being, unigeniti fillii dei gratia. 
78 Eriugena's christology is based squarely on that of Maximus. He begins 
his commentary on the 
sententiam venerabilis Maximi (I Ambigua xxxvii, PG 91 1304D -1312A) at 
II 529C and closes the 
discussion at II 542C. See Marcia Colish, "John the Scot's Christology and 
Soteriology in Relation to 
His Greek Sources" in Downside Review, 1982 pp. 138-51. 
79 11 541BC 
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may provide matter for praise of that one Cause from which and in which and through which and for which it was established. 80 
It follows from this that the incarnation is something like a cause becoming 
one with its effects. And indeed Eriugena gives the scriptural and theological account 
of the incarnation a metaphysical expression. He claims that God was Himself made 
man that He might save the effects of the Causes. In order to fulfil this salvific role, 
God, in Whom and through Whom and for Whom according to His Divinity 
all things were made, descended according to His Humanity into the effects of 
the Causes. 8' 
The effects are saved by being called back into their Causes, preserved in them just as 
the Causes are themselves preserved. 
The mechanics of this process still need to be made clear. Christ's incarnation 
represents, or follows the course of, the tumbling of that simple eternal and perfect 
human nature into accidental diversity. This is the descent of the cause into its effects; 
the descent of the Word into the flesh is an index of the procession of genus into 
species. And it is in this humanity that Christ is resurrected. The resurrection consists 
in the conversion or transformation of His humanity into His divinity. But this 
conversion does not involve the loss of humanity. Eriugena is at pains to point out that 
this post-resurrection humanity, the Christ that appears to the disciples before His 
ascension, is a humanity that lacks sexual division, does not exist in place and 
it is the same with time, with quality, with quantity, with circumscribed form. 
For it is most piously believed and most clearly understood that all these are 
absent from the whole Humanity of Christ, that is from His body, His soul, 
and His intellect, after the triumph of the resurrection; and to that same glory 
He shall after the general resurrection, bring His chosen <who> shall be one in 
Him and with Him. 82 
80 III 668D - III 669A 81V912A 
82 II 539C: eodem modo sane intellige de tempore de qualitate de quantitate de forma circumscripta. 
His enim omnibus tota Christi humanitas, hoc est corpus et anima et intellectus, carere piisime creditur 
purissimeque intelligitur post resurrectionis palmam, et ad eandem gloriam electos suos post 
katholicam resurrectionem ducturus <qui> unum in eo et cum eofuturi sunt. 
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It is not the case, however, that Christ's resurrection body is different from His 
incarnate body. In fact, Eriugena explains, there is no difference between Christ's 
post-resurrection humanity, His incarnate humanity, and humanity in its pristine, 
created perfection. Christ's resurrected body, the body that was visible to the 
disciples, Eriugena argues is no different from the body that was born of the Virgin. 
It was the same body, but from being mortal it had become immortal, from 
being animal it had become spiritual, and from being earthly it had become 
heavenly. 83 
This humanity of Christ, Eriugena argues, is perfected humanity: 
The perfection of man is Christ, in Whom all is consummated. 84 
The `becoming immortal', the `becoming spiritual' do not mark changes in the 
substance of Christ's humanity, substance is not subject to change. Rather they are 
consummations, unifications. In His resurrection Christ reveals, through His own 
glory, the glory of humanity. The incarnation and the resurrection mark the twin poles 
of man's Fall and Resurrection, as well as the core Neoplatonic trope: the procession 
of the cause into effect, and the effect's subsistence in its cause. By revealing the true 
nature of humanity, Eriugena argues, Christ is the initiator of the Return. 
It is as initiator of the Return through His death and resurrection that the 
incarnate Christ plays a key role in Eriugena's eschatology. Eriugena tells us that God 
descended into the nature of man in order to recall man to his former state, to heal the 
wounds of his transgressions and, "to sweep away the shadows of false phantasies, 
opening the eyes of the mind, showing Himself in all things to those who are worthy 
of such a vision. , 85 The identification of `false phantasies' with sensible body has 
already been made, both in this chapter and the last. It is as `sweeper away' that Christ 
is the herald of the Return, or indeed the cause of the Return. It is through Christ that 
83 V 994A 
84 IV 743B: Vir autem perfectus est Christus, in quo omnia consummata sunt. 
85 III 684A 
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those who are worthy come to recognise their fallen state, who have their minds 
opened. This opening of the mind is the dying to the world which has already been 
identified with contemplation or theoria. The orthodox interpretation of Christ's 
dying for us that we might be saved from death, is construed by Eriugena as a call to 
contemplation; the death from which Christ saves us, according to Eriugena, must be 
the death that is the beguiling of our sense faculties by the shadows of false 
phantasies. In other words, Christ saves us from the effects of the Fall, by initiating 
the Return. And that Return is conceived by Eriugena as a unification. 
For in Him after His resurrection body and sense, soul and intellect are not 
four but one, and not a composite one, but simply one. 86 
This is an internal unification, a unifying of man's composite fallen nature. In 
bringing about this internal unification, however, Christ also effects a general 
unification since, "in man... the universal creature is created"87 and in man all things 
shall return to God. 
In conclusion, therefore, the incarnation, represents a voluntary act on the part 
of the Cause of all to descend into Its effects. And this action on God's part is a 
miraculous breaking of the rules whereby a cause is understood to stand radically 
prior to its effects. 88 Even when, by means of dialectic, a cause comes to be identified 
with its effects inasmuch as the effects are found to subsist within their cause, and the 
cause is wholly instantiated in each of its effects, the relation is not quite identity. 
Cicero is substantially Man, and vice versa, but to claim that the individual Cicero, 
QFs and all, is absolutely identical to Man would be to claim for Cicero all the 
attributes of the incarnate Christ. The incarnation represents the Cause's assuming a 
complete identity with the effects, and thereby revealing to mankind the possibility of 
86 II 541C 
87 II 54 ID: in homine... universa creatura condita est. 
88 III 663C; V 913D 
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substantial resurrection. The reason for the incarnation, and the endpoint of 
unification coincide in the complete gathering together of undescended effects within 
their cause. This unification does not nullify difference, it preserves it. 
IV : Summary 
It has thus far been found that Eriugena offers a `layered' definition of death, a 
definition that comprises a number of nuanced meanings. These nuances, while not 
strictly contradictory, do not make it possible to extract a single, coherent argument 
from the exchange between the Alumnus and Nutritor at this point in the dialogue. 
Rather we find the ascetic, paradoxical definition of death, as the death of death, or as 
the phantastical illusion of life, deployed in conjunction with the more straightforward 
definition of death as the perishing of the body. 
Now that the first stage in the Return has been identified (albeit ambiguously) 
with the death of the body, and death to the body, it remains to be shown precisely 
what the Return consists in. According to both Models A and B there is clearly a 
certain sort of `motion' that is being described. Eriugena is explicit in thinking that 
the Return is a process of simplification; it is a movement away from complexity and 
diversity, towards unity and similarity. 
For since the nature of God, Who is a Spirit, is simple, so shall we also be 
when we are formed into the same Image. 
89 
Let us now turn to an examination of the Return understood as a movement towards 
simplicity. 
89 V 878CD. Eriugena authenticates his argument by reference to Ambrose, Expositio evangelii 
secundum Lucam, VII, 194 (CCSL 14 p. 282): sicutportavimus imaginem 
illius terreni, portemus et 
imaginem huius caelistis. See also V 941 D-942A; V 922AB. 
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Part Two : Return as Unification 
Introduction: 
`Unification', for Eriugena, is an eschatological term, it refers to the goal or end point 
of the entire Return. 
When nothing more shall come into the world by generation or go back into it 
by decay, all things shall be at rest. For when the world passes away no part of 
it shall remain. And if no part of it shall remain, then the whole shall be done 
away. For it shall pass into the Causes whence it came, in which there is 
neither space nor time, but only the simple and uncompounded "reasons" of 
space and time, in which all things are one, and not distinguished by any 
accidents. For all things shall be simple, without composition of substance and 
accidents, and, if I may so express myself, there will be a simple unity 
consisting of a manifold unification (multiplex adunatio) of all creatures in 
their principles and causes, and of the principles and causes themselves in the 
Only-Begotten Word of God, in Whom all things have their being and 
subsistence. 90 
The Return, as conceived by Eriugena, is something like the closing of a telescope. 
The complexity and diversity of creation is retracted into a state of immutable 
simplicity. 
For we who are now composite shall be one, and shall be transformed into a 
single substance. For in the Resurrection there shall not be one part inferior to 
another, as in this life our weak and corruptible flesh is inferior, rendered by 
the condition of corporeal nature susceptible to wounds and injuries, and 
weighed down by material bulk from rising above the earth and walking on 
high; but in the resurrection we shall be formed into the beauty of a simple 
creature. 91 
This, however, is only one side of the story for Eriugena who wishes (presumably 
partly as a result of certain doctrinal obligations) to retain the view that the whole 
human person - that is body and soul - will be resurrected and will ultimately 
be 
`unified' with the Divine Wisdom. Without this there can be no concept of 
individual 
human salvation. There is clearly a tension, therefore, between the 
desire to tidy up 
the Return into a single simple telos, and the need to explain the abiding presence of 
90 V 906AB 
91 V 878C 
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individual substances. An examination of whether or not Eriugena is able successfully 
to square these two positions (and if he does so, how he does so) will occupy the 
majority of this section. 
I: Unification 
The sensible body consists in the addition to the single created nature, or substance, of 
an exterior body. This body, as was discussed in Chapter One is made up of QFs and 
matter or rather, QFs investing a quantum produce visible matter or body. But, 
since God is simple, and we are made in the image of God, when we return to 
our original creation in the image, we too must be simple. 92 
The difficulty in squaring these two positions - the complexity of the body, with the 
simplicity of the created nature - lies in the claim that the process of unification does 
not involve any confusion of individual substances. Eriugena insists that it is 
"repugnant to reason" (rationi resistens) to suppose that 
intelligible substances should come together so as to be one, and yet each not 
cease to retain its own subsistence and property. 93 
The claim is, therefore, that in this process of unification there is no reduction in the 
number of individual substances. Prima facie this looks contradictory. After all what 
can `unification' mean if not a becoming-one? But Eriugena insists that the substances 
are not dissolved into one solution. Indeed since the substance of each and any thing 
is the reason whereby that thing subsists in the eternal causes which in turn subsist in 
the Word of God, it must follow, Eriugena argues, that the substance knows, "neither 
92 V 941D-942A; see also V 922AB; V 878CD. 
93 V 879A: intelligibiles substantiae sibi invicem adunari, ut et unum Sint, et unaquaeque proprietatem 
suam et subsistentiam habere desistat. 
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transience nor death. "94 In other words, the substances do not cease to exist, rather 
they are preserved in the higher substance; they subsist in it and are one with it. And 
Eriugena offers a number of examples by way of illustration. Firstly, he points out to 
the Alumnus that in every substance there are three things that can never change or be 
removed - essence, potency and act. None of these can exist without the others 
because all belong to one and the same substance. They are unified within the 
substance, abiding necessarily and eternally as part of the substantial nature. 95 
Eriugena offers further examples. In one species, he claims, there are many 
individuals. And likewise, in one genus, there are many species. In one essence there 
are many genera. But, Eriugena continues, 
each genus preserves its proper principles distinguished from those of another, 
not confused nor mixed nor compounded together, but unified so as to form, 
as one might say, a certain (quoddam) one which is both multiple and 
simple. 96 
The qualificatory ut ita dicam and quoddam are important; they indicate the 
mysterious, indefinable nature of this relationship between higher and lower orders 
that are compounded somehow in a complex unity. This is a special sort of 
unification, therefore, not a strict becoming-one, but an identification with that which 
is higher. So an individual is stripped of its accidents and becomes identical to its 
species; likewise the species becomes identical to the genus in which it subsists, and 
so on. 
94 V 884B. For the substance of a thing being its subsistence in the divine cause see IV 772B: 
datur 
intelligi nullius creaturae aliam subsistentiam esse, praeter illam rationem, secundum quam 
in 
primordialibus causis in dei verbo substituta est. See also 11 61613: principia omnium 
dicuntur esse 
quoniam omnia quaecumque in creatura sive visibile sive invisibile sentiuntur vel intelliguntur eorum 
participatione subsistunt, ipsa vero unius universorum causae, summae videlicet ac sanctae trinitatis 
participationes sunt. 
95 See also I 486BC: in omni rationabili intellectualique natura tria inseparabilia semperque 
incorruptibiliter manentia considerantur, olQicav dico et 
Svvtzjuzv, EvEpyslavque, hoc est 
essentiam virtutem operationem. 
96 V 881 C: in una oLoza unumquodque genus suas proprias rationes possideat, alterius generis 
rationibus discretas, neque confusas, neque mixtas, neque compositas, adunatas 
tarnen, atque, ut ita 
dicam, unum quoddam multiplex et simplex. 
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So the sound intellect must hold that after the end of this world every nature, 
whether corporeal or incorporeal, will seem (videbitur) to be only God, while 
preserving the integrity of its nature, so that even God, Who in Himself is 
incomprehensible, is after a certain mode (quodam modo) comprehended in 
the creature, while the creature itself by an ineffable miracle (ineffabili 
miraculo) is changed into God. 97 
Here we find that the identity relation is only `seeming'. In fact the integrity of the 
substantial nature is retained, indeed preserved. But the hesitant language reveals the 
speculative nature of the enquiry at this point; thus God is comprehended "after a 
certain mode" (quodam modo) in this eschatological reality, and the creature is 
changed by "an ineffable miracle" (ineffabili miraculo). Clearly the manner or mode 
in which an individual is unified with its species and yet retains its individuality 
cannot be given rational expression. It can only be expressed as a paradox: all things 
are one, and yet not one. 98 We are now running up against what is perhaps the most 
rebarbative and paradoxical element of Eriugena's metaphysics. In the middle of the 
Tractatio de Nihilo in Book III the Nutritor makes the claim that since God both 
makes all things and is made in all things, it is reasonable to conclude that, "all things 
that are are not inappropriately said to be both eternal together (simul) and made. "99 
They are eternal inasmuch as their causes subsist eternally in God's Wisdom; they are 
made inasmuch as they proceed from the Wisdom. The Alumnus is understandably 
shocked: "I am indeed bewildered and struck dumb as a dead man with 
stupefaction. " 100 And although he finds his master's arguments forceful, he is, 
"rapidly overwhelmed by the thick clouds, " of his thoughts. 
' 01 The Alumnus attempts 
to engage with the difficulties. First on his list of queries is death. It seems to him 
obvious that things are not eternal since they clearly die. That which receives a 
97I451B 
98 V 983B: omnes simul sunt, et simul non sunt. 
99 III 646C: omnia igitur quae sunt et aeterna simul etfacta non incongrue dicituntur. 
See also V 
907D-908A. 
100 III 646C: Valde miror ac stupefactus veluti exanimis haereo. 
1011116461): mox in tenebras densissimas cogitationum mearum relabor. 
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beginning of its being will necessarily receive an end. The Alumnus believes that the 
end will be an end of its essence. ' 02 And herein lies his mistake. The Nutritor is gentle 
with his pupil; he admits that in the past, he too was, "deceived by the false 
reasonings of human opinions that are far from the truth. "' 03 But the Nutritor's 
position is expressed clearly later: 
The essence... of sensible things... will, as true reason faithfully teaches, 
abide forever, for it is created unalterably in the Divine Wisdom beyond all 
space and time and change. ' 04 
There could not be an end to that which is eternal. But then what is to be made of the 
truth - revealed in Scripture - that all things shall perish? Once again the argument is 
thrown back against the Alumnus's original question: what does it mean to say that 
something perishes, if that same something continues to subsist in its cause for 
eternity? 
In answer, the Nutritor offers an extended arithmetical illustration to show 
how something can be both eternal and made. 
For [the numbers] are in [the monad] causally because it subsists as the 
beginning of all numbers, and in it all are one and simply indivisible, that is, in 
a universal and multiple mode, in the reason only, but not in act and operation; 
nor is the one an aggregate of many, but one deriving from its singularity 
(which is) both simple and multiple, so that all numbers are in it all at once 
and simple, as in their cause, and it itself is understood to be in them all 
multiplied by an ineffable distribution, as their substance. '°5 
102 111 647D: Nam quoniam principium essendi accepit essentiae suae terminum inevitabiliter 
accepturus est. 
103 III 649D 
104 V 867B: essentiam itaque rerum sensibilum ... perpetualiter permansuram esse vera ratio 
fiducialiter astruit, quoniam in divina sapientia incommutabiliter ultra omnia loca et tempora 
omnemque mutabilitatemfacta est. 
105 III 652BC: in ea enim causaliter sunt quia omnium numerorum subsistitprincipium et ibi omnes 
unum sunt Individuum simpliciter, hoc est universaliter et multipliciter sola ratione, non autem actu et 
opere, neque unum ex multis cumulatum sed unum sua et simplici et multiplici singularitate praeditum 
ita ut et omnes numeri in ea sint simul et simpliciter secundum causam et ipsa in omnibus multipliciter 
ineffabili distributione intelligatur secundum substantiam. 
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Of interest here is the assertion that the numbers subsist in the monad as, "one and 
simply indivisible, that is, in a universal and multiple mode. " 106 It follows that the 
monad is singular in an unusual way; since it contains all numbers, is indeed the 
substance of all numbers, it is, "both simple and multiple. " Likewise, the primordial 
causes are plural only in 
the aspects, that is, in the concept of the mind which investigates them and 
which conceives in itself such knowledge of them as is permitted and arranges 
that knowledge methodically. 107 
Whereas in fact, "these first causes are one and simple. " The complexity lies in the 
investigating mind, not in the substantial reality. Underlying this notion of complex 
unity, is the view that identity does not entail singularity. In other words it is possible 
to differ in number and yet be identical. 108 
It is the notion of numerically complex identity that allows for the possibility 
of unification. In the passage quoted at the head of this section Eriugena claimed that 
the end point of the Return shall be, "a manifold unification of all creatures in their 
principles and causes. " 109 
The key to understanding Eriugena's peculiar notion of singularity or 
simplicity, is substance, or the essence that eternally subsists. The monad is the 
substance of numbers. And in the same way the species is the specific substance of 
the individual. Let us return briefly to the discussion of the first chapter concerning 
form. 
Of the forms, some are understood in o'bßia, others in quality; but those 
which are in otß'ia are the substantial species of the genus. For of them 
genus is predicated because it subsists in them. For the genus, as we have 
106 Cf. I 492C: ratio siquidem omnium numerorum in unitate inconcussa est nec augeri potest nec 
minus. 
107 III 624A 
108 See Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge, 1989) p. 160 where a useful comparison is made between Eriugena's understanding of 
Identity with that of the German Idealists, and Heidegger in particular. 
109 V 906B 
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often said, is whole in each of its forms, just as also the several forms are one in their genus; and all these, that is, genera and forms, flow from the single 
source of of ßia and by a natural circulation return to it again. 110 
Here is the identification of the forms within Ousia with species. We labelled these 
forms `specific substances' and, following Eriugena, we identified them with species 
such as `Man' and `Horse' and so on. The other forms, the forms of Quality, however, 
are, "dispersed among the diverse differences by accident. ""' They are understood, 
"about substance but are not substance itself. " 112 It follows, according to Eriugena, 
that substantial human nature is, "one and the same in all whom it exists, and is 
always most like itself and admits of no variety. "' 13 To be dialectically balanced with 
this is the mysterious retention by substance of the `impression. ' The impression is the 
permanent relation that obtains between the substantial interior body and the 
qualitative exterior body. It is this relation that allows for individuation even after 
unification. To use again the telescope analogy, whether it is extended or retracted, 
the telescope itself suffers no substantial loss. Likewise, in the Creation and 
Resurrection, in the procession and return, natura suffers no substantial loss or gain. 
The radical simplicity of the telos even requires Eriugena to assert that the 
devil himself will be absorbed into the final End. It must be so because, "where all 
things are one there will be no more diversity. "114 
Unification is, therefore, nothing more than the passing of the qualitative 
forms, the accidents, into their principles and causes. Or, in doctrinal terms, it is the 
undoing of the effects of the Fall. What is left after this purging process is the 
substance or species. A denial of diversity does not imply absolute identity. 
1 10 I 494AB 
111 III 703B 
112 III 703C 
113 III 703BC; Cf. IV 801A where Eriugena quotes Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio, 28 (PG 44 
230A): mutatur enim per auctionem et diminutionem corpus, veluti vestimenta quaedam, consequentes 
aetaetates indutum. Stat vero per omnem conversionem intransmutabilis in seipsaforma. 
114 V 930BC 
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To what extent is it possible for Eriugena to retain the individuality of the 
individual substance and yet argue that that substance just is the species? The answer 
is unclear. On the one hand he admits that, "in the Resurrection... human nature will 
be made one. " 115 And this is demonstrable, according to Eriugena, by reference to the 
fact that human nature was made in the Image of God. How can that which is made in 
the Image be composite or multiple? 
If human nature is in the image and likeness of God, the whole Image is in it 
as a whole, and in each individual which participates in it, and admits neither 
in itself nor in another any division or partition or possibility of division or 
partition, whether in potency or act, of its uniform simplicity. For if the 
Divinity in Whose Image humanity was created is one and indivisible, it must 
follow that the latter also is one and indivisible, and that all men without 
exception are in it One. 116 
But on the other hand Eriugena insists that, "this wonderful and ineffable unification 
does not involve the confusion of the individual essences and substances. " 117 That 
which allows for the possibility of a manifold unity, a complex simplicity is the 
relation of mutual dependency that obtains between a genus and the species that fall 
under it. 
For as, when a genus perishes, everyone of its species must perish, so when 
the species perish reason requires (ratio cogit) that their genus must perish. 
For the genus is preserved in its species and the species in their genus. 118 
It follows from the above that for the genus to be one - indeed for the genus to be at 
all - it must contain a number of species. 
' 19 Furthermore, this relation must be entirely 
static, that is unchanging; in regard to its species, the genus can suffer no loss or gain. 
These claims are made by the Nutritor as part of a discussion concerning the genus 
itsV893C 
116 V 922BC 
"7 V 894A 
118 III 737B. Just as genus and species are mutually dependent, so too are causes and effects: see 
V 
912B: pereuntibus enim causarum effectibus nulla causa remaneret, sicut pereuntibus causis nulli 
remanerent effectus. 
119 That the genus must contain more than one species is explained at 111 7371): si una species sola 
permanserit caeteris intereuntibus, peribit etiam genus, quod nequaquam in una specie stabit. 
Quemadmodum enim una species ullum genus efficit non video 
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Animal and the status of irrational souls. Since man belongs in the genus Animal, and 
since man, after the dissolution of the body, survives, how can it be that other species 
of the genus Animal do not survive? After all, living and dying do not express special 
differences within one genus, rather they are absolutely contradictory: 
If then, after the dissolution of the body one species survives [viz man] while 
the other perishes [viz irrational animals], how will their genus preserve its integrity? 120 
But for Eriugena the genus Animal (which includes all things that consist of body and 
soul) does, as a matter of fact, retain its integrity, it must be case, therefore, that all its 
species are preserved intact. Irrational souls are to be included within the general 
resurrection. 
The same genus / species relation as that between Animal and Man, holds 
between Man and the individual essences and substances, that is, between the specific 
substance and the individual substances that comprise the species. Therefore, just as 
the relationship of mutual dependency between Animal and its species is static, even 
in some sense necessary, so the relationship between Man and its instantiations is also 
characterised by mutual dependency, static and bound by some form of necessity. 
In this way it seems that the, "lack of confusion" between manifold individual 
substances within a simple species, or to put it another way, between diverse effects 
subsisting within a single cause, is a logical prerequisite of Eriugena's metaphysics. 
No Cause could survive the destruction of the effects of the Causes, any more 
than the effects could survive the destruction of their Causes. For because 
Cause and effect are relative terms, they come into being together, they pass 
away together, or together they endure forever. 
121 
This claim has some interesting - and prima facie unpalatable - entailments. 
Unpalatable to Eriugena, that is. It surely follows from the above statement that the 
descent of the Cause into its effects is logically necessary. If there is a Cause, there 
120 III 737B 
121 V 912B 
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must be effects. And vice versa. But where in this picture is there room for God's 
grace, for man's irrational will as precipitating the Fall, for the possibility of 
redemption? Indeed, for Eriugena, as has been seen, the Incarnation is to be 
understood as the Cause of all things allowing Itself to descend into the effects. 
Eriugena believes that the relation between cause and effect undergoes no substantial 
alteration through procession and return. But this is not to deny the possibility of non- 
substantial alteration. And God's grace and man's irrational will both bring about 
non-substantial change. In the second case the change is qualitative, accidental, sub- 
substantial; in the case of God's grace, the change is super-substantial, or supernatural 
(see stage 7 on Model B). After all, God's grace is described by Eriugena as, 
"donum"; 122 it is a gift, an addition, given voluntarily. Likewise, man's irrational will 
falls outside of the causal framework of Eriugena's metaphysics. Man's turning away 
from God is a turning towards nothingness, it is a negative action, unaccounted for, 
indeed unaccountable within natura. 
Here again is the proximity of Paradise and the material, sensible world, or 
rather their identity. Since cause and effect, genus and species are mutually entailed, it 
follows that there can ultimately be no substantial difference between God (cause) and 
His creation (effect). The difference is non-substantial, even illusory, and is explicable 
by means of the Fall: man's wilfull turning away from reality. 
In order to illustrate his understanding of unification that has as its end a 
`manifold unity' or a complex simplicity, Eriugena offers a number of examples from 
the sensible realm. Air and light are different, but air does not lose its substance when, 
"it is wholly converted into the light of the sun. " He also uses the Dionysian example 
of candles in a church. The light that they give is single 
122 V 905A. According to Eriugena, donum gratiae neque intro terminos conditae naturae continetur, 
neque secundam naturalem virtutem operatur, sed superessentialiter et ultra omnes creatas naturales 
rationes effectus suos peragit (V 904B). 
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and yet it is most certain that the lights of the many lamps are by no means 
confused, though formed into one light. For if someone were to remove one of the lamps from the building in which they are burning, and carry it, still alight, into another place, it will leave behind it no trace of its own light in the brightness of the other lamps, nor take any of theirs with it. 123 
The example of voices in a choir is also given. 
It follows that unification is not strictly a process at all. The species subsist 
immutably within their genera; and the individuals stand in the same relation with the 
species. 
In It (viz the Divine Nature) all will be One, just as even now in their causes 
[viz sensible and intelligible species] they are One and always are so. 124 
But note that although all things subsist as a unity in their causes, the causes 
themselves will be One in the Divine Nature. The use of the future tense seems to 
allow for some temporal movement. This possibility is denied, however, by the claim 
that the Return is not a return of substances, but rather of qualities and quantities and 
other accidents. 125 
This static, non-process understanding of the Return, complements the 
findings of the previous chapter in which it was claimed that the doctrine of the Fall, 
as Eriugena explains it, is ahistorical. Of course the two notions of procession and 
return, Fall and Resurrection, are complementary. But I am suggesting here that they 
are complementary in a way that is not immediately obvious, or adequately 
recognised in the scholarship. The Fall and the Return are, according to this way of 
thinking, modes of understanding the unchanging nature of the relationship that 
obtains between God and His creation. 
Just as the deified shall ascend through an innumerable number of stages of 
divine contemplation... so those who are separated from God shall ever 
descend through the different degrees of their vices into the depths of 
123 V 883C; Cf Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus II, 4 (PG3 641AB). For Eriugena's translation 
of this passage see PL 122 1121 D- 1122A. 
124 IV 860C: in ipsa [divina videlicet natural unum erunt, sicut nunc et semper in causis unum sunt. 
125 V 885C 
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ignorance and into the outer darkness, where, "there shall be weeping and 
gnashing of teeth. " (Mat. 8: 12)126 
In this passage the process of Fall and Return are precisely twinned. Or rather human 
nature must choose to place itself upon a spectrum expressed in terms of procession 
and return, descent and ascent. On the basis of our earlier conclusions, this `moment' 
of choice can be termed a `dying' moment; it is either death to the sensible world, in 
which case the movement on the spectrum is up, and is to be understood as Return; or 
it is, "the death of folly and ignorance" 127 and corresponds to the Fall. In this sense 
Fall and Return play a salvific role. Or rather, they explain certain constant relations 
that obtain between Creator and creation, constant relations that, when understood 
correctly, will lead us back into a correct alignment with the Divine Providence, an 
alignment which is itself understood as contemplation or theoria. The means whereby 
we ascend, and the (unreachable) goal of the ascent are identical: divine 
contemplation. These relations are metaphorically correspondent to procession (Fall) 
and Return (general resurrection) but the relations are not temporally locatable events. 
After all, how could they have any spatio-temporal relations, since the relation 
between Creator and creation is effect eternally subsisting in its cause, as Creator 
manifesting Himself in creation? As with the Fall, there may be conceptual room for 
the Return, but there is no temporal or spatial distance between Creator and creation, 
so `emanation' language can only have a metaphorical meaning. 
128 No substantial 
transformation takes place; the substance remains unaltered. 
' 29 
126 V 945D - 946A: quemadmodum deificati per innumerabilies 
divinae contemplationis gradus 
ascendent, ita a Deo elongati semper descendent per diversos vitioru suorum 
descensus in profundum 




V 91 OC: insipientiae et ignorantiae interitu. 
128 Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill, 1978) pp. 17-26. 
129 V 884A: substantia ipsius, corporis dico, semper incommutabiliter absque ulla transmutatione 
permansura sit. 
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If this is a correct reading of Eriugena, however, in what way are we to 
explain the references to change and transformation in Models A and B? For example 
in Model A, proposition 3) expresses the claim that body is transformed into soul. 
And the whole of Model B is articulated entirely through language of 
'transformation'. The solution may again lie in Eriugena's notion of an effect 
continuing to subsist in its cause, and always willing to return to that cause. ' 30 With 
this in view, the mysterious change could be defined as the absorption of the effect 
into the cause, of the species into the genus. Thus, when the Nutritor reiterates his 
view that after the Resurrection there shall be neither male nor female, the Alumnus 
understands his teacher as saying 
there will be neither male nor female in the future life, for the simplicity of our 
nature, alone surviving, shall have swallowed up into itself the double nature 
of sex which now is. 131 
Presumably this is the change that Eriugena has in mind. Turning back to Model B it 
is now possible to see that the transformations that take place are more accurately 
`absorptions', or microcosmic returns within the global Return of all things. Thus, 
once the first four stages of the Model B return are complete, that is when the reason 
is transformed into mind, which is, "the end of every rational creature"132 there is, as 
it were, a caesura. This caesura marks the point in the Return at which human nature 
has reached its created perfection before the ascent of that nature firstly into the 
knowledge of all things which come after God, then from that knowledge into 
wisdom, and finally to be merged with God Himself. The caesura itself is interesting: 
Then this fivefold unification of the parts of our nature, in which body, vital 
motion, sensation and reason and mind are no longer five but one, in each case 
130 III 639C; Cf. III 663C; III 687C; III 737C; V 909C-910A; V 944CD. 
131 V 896B: simplicitas naturae duplicem, qui nunc est, sexum in seipsam absorpserit. 
132 V 1020C 
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the lower nature becoming absorbed in the higher not so as to lose its 
existence but to become one with that higher nature. '33 
It is interesting that the fourfold ascent of human nature into mind, and then the three 
fold ascent of perfect human nature towards a merging with God are described as 
processes of transformation, whereas within the caesura Eriugena conceives the 
process as absorption, of telescoping the lower natures into the higher. 
Higher natures always attract [attrahunt] lower natures to themselves. 134 
And this attraction is the motor of the Return. It is also the means whereby the four 
divisions of natura can be resolved. God is both Beginning inasmuch as He is the 
principle of all things; all things proceed from God into genera and species and 
individuals. But He is also the End of all things because 
it is to the same Cause that all things that proceed from it shall return when 
they reach their end, it is therefore called the end of all things and is said 
neither to create nor be created. 135 
And, Eriugena argues, the same process is to be found in created nature: 
Causes are separated from the effects and the effects are united to the causes 
because they make one with them in a single genus. 136 
And the similarity between God's relation to creation, and between cause and effect, 
is not accidental. God stands to creation in the same relation as cause stands to effect. 
It follows, therefore, that the creature must return to God. 
133 V 1020CD: post hanc quinarium veluti partium nostrae naturae adunationem, corporis videlicet, et 
vital is notus, sensusque, rationisque, intellectusque, ita ut non quinque, sed unum sint, inferioribus 
semper a superioribus consummatis. 
134 V 901 AB 
135 II 526D 
136 11 528A 
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Conclusion 
Having settled upon a definition of body and material substance in the first half of this 
study, we proceeded in the second half to test that definition in the theological and 
evaluative context of Books IV and V of the Periphyseon. 
In the light of our findings, it is now possible to conclude that Eriugena's 
attitude to body and material substance is profoundly ascetical. In the introduction to 
Chapter Four of this study the claim was made that Eriugena's understanding of the 
Return of all things to God is informed by a Pauline sensibility, and a number of 
Pauline references were discussed. It is possible, however, that to Eriugena the most 
important of all Paul's statements is the claim at Romans 1: 20 that 
ever since the creation of the world His eternal power and divine nature, 
invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things 
He has made. 
Eriugena does not read Paul's text as a basis for an argument for the beauty and 
perfection of the created world (although the perfection of God's creation is, of 
course, affirmed in the Periphyseon) rather he uses the verse as an authority for the 
development of an ascetical attitude to created nature. 
The changes - birth and dissolution - to which the flesh is heir are themselves 
beautiful and have no cause but the disposition of Divine Providence. Indeed, they are 
the spiritual medicine by which God willed to recall His Image to itself and 
into Himself that, wearied by its experience of the tedium of mutable things, it 
should long to contemplate the stability of immutable and eternal things, and 
ardently seek for the everlasting forms of true things, in the beauty of which it 
may find its rest, all variety being done away with. 2 
1 Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quaefacta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur sempiterna 
quoque eius virtus et divinitas. (Vulg. ) 
2V 959B 
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The real beauty of the material world consists precisely in those aspects that would 
generally be thought ugly or undesirable - mutability, dissolution, destruction; they 
are beautiful because they act as a medicine, a corrective. Material beauty is the 
opposite: dangerous, beguiling, false. Variety is to be avoided, shunned, simplicity 
sought. 
The message of the passage quoted above, is unequivocally a message of 
withdrawal from the world. But this withdrawal is not conceived by Eriugena as a 
negative exercise; in order effectively to withdraw from the world in the way that 
Eriugena intends, the intellect must be positively engaged in correctly aligning itself 
with substantial reality. This correct alignment Eriugena describes as contemplation. 
i) Contemplatio: 
Moran makes the claim that, "Eriugena's concept of philosophy is as a contemplation 
of the created world which changes the fantasies of this world into divine 
theophanies. "3 This is close to our conclusions here. It should be made clear, 
however, that the change takes place in the perceiving mind. The contemplation can 
make no substantial change to reality. How could it? Nature is substantially 
immutable. Rather, contemplation is a recognition of nature as theophany, a 
recognition of unchanging truth. Thus the return of all things to God, conceived by 
Eriugena as a function of contemplation, is not a change or transformation in the 
nature of reality. Just as the Fall is to be understood ahistorically, so too is the Return. 
The difference between the physical world and Paradise that we identified at the end 
of Chapter Three, is a reflection of man's fallen point of view. Man is divided from 
3 Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge, 1989) p. 132 
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the Creator according to his deserts. But likewise man is capable of unification with 
the Creator according to his merits. 
Abraham rejoiced in eternal peace, while the rich man groaned in 
inextinguishable fire. That is why the rich man saw Abraham as one that was 
afar off... This is the great distance and the unbridgeable gulf which divides 
the punishments from the rewards. For from the fact that the rich man could 
speak to Abraham as though he were close to him instead of far away you may 
understand that he was not separated from Abraham by his nature, but by his 
guilt. 4 
In the language of the first part of this study, the gulf between the rich man and 
Abraham is not substantial, but qualitative. In the language of the second part, the gulf 
marks the difference between the Fall and the Return. And in conclusion we suggest 
that the gulf, though expressible in metaphysical terms, is ultimately moral. 
For Eriugena, our moral stance in relation to any given object dictates the 
qualitative or sensible nature of that object. For the object to appear as an 
agglomeration of qualitative or sensible effects is to express the Fall. For the object to 
appear in its substantial simplicity, is to express the Return. And this latter expression 
is a function of the act of contemplation, an act that we identified above with a 
recognition of creation as theophany. 
Dialectics, for Eriugena, is not a school exercise, nor is it merely a tool to be 
deployed in the service of theological investigation, it is the very essence of 
contemplation. So it is in contemplatio that the reversion of effect into cause is 
ultimately to be realised. In his hexaemeral exegesis Eriugena identifies 
contemplation with the Tree of Life. 
5 The Tree is, in turn, identified with Christ, the 
perfection of human nature. Contemplation is therefore the perfection of 
human 
nature. Contemplatio, or human perfection, consists in the turning of the 
intellectual 
4V 983C. At V 984A Eriugena makes the same point in a non-exegetical passage: although omnes 
homines unius eiusdemque naturae... vero qualitates et quantitates, 
hoc est bonorum actuum 
malorumque differentias... longe a se invicem et multipliciter et 
in infinitum disparari. 
5 IV 844B 
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faculty towards the eternal substance and therefore away from the mutable and 
accidental materiality, towards being and away from non-being. It is unmistakably a 
call to ascesis. 
Show Thyself to those who seek for nothing but Thee; shatter the clouds of 
empty phantasies which prevent the glance of the mind from beholding Thee 
in the way in which Thou grantest Thine invisible self to be seen by those who 
desire to look upon Thy face, their resting place, their end. 6 
The means whereby the phantasies are shattered and truth revealed is, for Eriugena, a 
realigning of the will and the epistemic faculty away from the sensible world and 
towards contemplation of the Divine truth. 
6 III 650B 
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